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NICOLE CONSTABLE 
CARRYING OUT MODERNITY: MIGRATION, WORK, AND MASCULINITY IN 
CHINA 
Xia Zhang, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2011 
This dissertation is a historically and politically grounded ethnography of bangbang, an 
estimated 200,000 to 1,000,000-strong crew of male porters, who serve the transportation sector 
of Chongqing in southwest China. Bangbang are mostly Chinese rural migrant men who work as 
informal day laborers. Based on fifteen months of ethnographic field research conducted in 
Chongqing in 2004 and 2006-2007, my research examines the labor and gender inequalities that 
bangbang experience within the context of post-reform China’s economic development and 
modernization. My dissertation examines the cultural logics, social and cultural forces, and the 
discursive conditions and contradictions embedded in bangbang’s decisions to migrate, their 
occupational choices, their imagining of modernity and success, as well as their understanding of 
masculinity. It also documents the strategies bangbang adopt to defend their dignity and the 
changes that bangbang’s migration brings to their social relations.  
I argue that in Chongqing, rural men’s migrations are not just an important attempt to pursue 
economic advancement, but also part of their quest for decency and masculine pride. Out-
migration constitutes a valuable approach for these men to elevate their reputation as responsible 
and capable men. However, the majority of poor rural men experience systematic and gendered 
violence during migration which forces them to remain exploited and socially marginalized in 
 v 
the urban region. I also argue that the informality of bangbang’s employment is the result of 
China’s labor market deregulation and economic restructuring. The rhetoric of “freedom” which 
is made popular among bangbang by the Party-state, functions as a pro-growth strategy that 
reorganizes the flow of knowledge, capital, labor, social relations, and the formation of worker 
subjectivities. Lastly, this research has found that the fragmentation of employment contributes 
to the lack of large-scale, public, collective protests among bangbang against the government. 
Overall, this dissertation contributes to anthropological studies of development, labor, 
migration, and post-socialism. Furthermore, it contributes to gender studies in general and to 
masculinity studies in particular by contributing to an understanding of Chinese working-class 
masculinity. This research also provides insights into gender and class conditions in post-reform 
China. 
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Preface 
 
In this dissertation I focus on rural-urban migrant men who work as informal day laborers in the 
transportation industry of Chongqing, in southwestChina. In documenting the labor and gender 
inequalities that a group of rural migrant men called “bangbang” (male carrers or porters) 
experience, I critically examine the logic of development and modernization in post-Mao China 
that often devalues rural migrant men, depicting them as obstacles to China’s modernization and 
divorcing the economic imperatives of rural to urban migration from its cultural and social 
meanings. I also question such development tropes as “freedom,” “self-development,” and 
“modernity” and the truth-effects that they produce.  
I chose to focus on bangbang and their lived experiences of migration for the following 
reasons. First, labor migration is vital to China’s economic rise and provides a crucial lens 
through which the logic of China’s economic development and its social and cultural 
implications can be clearly observed. Second, in focusing on bangbang as itinerant laborers, I 
aim to challenge the popular view about China’s labor migration that tends to merely emphasize 
workers in the manufacturing industry, such as factory workers in labor-intensive off-shore 
factories in Shenzhen or Guangzhou. I attempt to shift academic attention toward the huge 
nomadic workforce whose members remain outside of the formal economy and that has been 
largely invisible because of the lack of public representation. Third, in treating bangbang as 
gendered beings, I examine the complicated connectedness of migration, work, and masculinity 
in post-reform China. I argue that rural men’s gender identities influence almost every aspect of 
their lives and that migrant men have suffered gendered violence when they participate in post-
Mao China’s development and modernization. The interplay of gender and power within the 
 x 
context of China’s century-long pursuit of modernity is particularly important to an 
understanding of rural migrant men’s gendered experiences. 
In carrying out my dissertation research, collecting ethnographic materials, and writing this 
dissertation, I have received enormous help from many individuals. My gratitude is first of all 
due to the bangbang and their family members, friends, and colleagues whom I met and worked 
with as an ethnographer. In particular, I would like to thank Brother Lu for his kind assistance 
and companion in the first stage of my fieldwork. I am also grateful to Lao Zhang and his family 
who accepted me as their fictive neice and to Sister Yang and her family who accepted me as her 
daughter’s Godmother. Without the support and trust of the bangbang community, I could not 
have completed this research.  
I owe a deep debt of gratitude to my dissertation committee members Joseph S. Alter, 
Kathleen M. Blee, Nicole Constable, Gabriella Lukacs, and Evelyn Rawski who provided 
valuable advice, sustained interest in my project, and great academic support during my graduate 
training at the University of Pittsburgh. I would especially like to express my profound gratitude 
to my advisor, Nicole Constable, under whose guidance I became an anthropologist. Her 
constant inspiration, encouragement and support were crucial for the completion of my graduate 
studies and dissertation. During my dissertation writing period at the University of Washington 
and the University of California, Berkeley, I benefited greatly from the unflagging intellectual 
communication and academic assistance from both the faculty members and the graduate 
students. I especially want to thank Ann Anagnost, Yomi Braester, Madeleine Yue Dong, 
Miriam Kahn, Xin Liu, and Sasha Welland for their kindness in providing me with valuable 
access to their courses, intellectual resources, and relevant academic activities. I am grateful to 
Ann Anagnost for making me part of the Value Theory reading group that she organized. I thank 
 xi 
her and the other reading group participants, especially Cheryll Alipio, Allan Lumba, Chingchai 
Methaphat, Evi Sutrisno, Bonnie Tilland, Hsun-hui Tseng, and Ta Trang X., for their close 
engagement with my dissertation project and their encouragement. I also benefited from several 
important intellectual conversations with Kam Wing Chan, Stevan Harrell, and Lisa Hoffman. In 
addition, I am indebted to two dissertation writing groups that I participated in. At the University 
of Washington, I thank Cheryll Alipio, Tami Blumenfield, Kasumi Yamashita and at the 
University of California at Berkeley, I thank Kun Chen, Zongshi Chen, and Eli Friedman for 
reading and commenting on various chapters of my dissertation and for their friendship and 
encouragement during the dissertation writing process.  
Over several years this dissertation has greatly benefited from intellectual communication 
with Mary Beth Mills, Hairong Yan, Renqiu Yu, Everett Yuehong Zhang, and Xiaodan Zhang. 
My colleagues and friends at the University of Pittsburgh, Frayda N. Cohen, Yi-tze Lee, Kevin 
Ming, Melody Li Ornellas, Joseph L. Cichosz, Nell Ning Zhang, Jianhua (Andrew) Zhao also 
provided valuable comments and suggestions on various versions of my dissertation proposals, 
outlines, and chapters. Yu Huang was both a great intellectual companion and kind friend, whom 
I consistently turned to for constructive critique and valuable insights. Matthew A. Hale must be 
credited for his generous intellectual assistance and constant inspiration. I am grateful to Sunny 
Xiang for her enthusiasm and her invaluable editorial assitance. I thank Andrea and Stan 
Washburn for their encouragement and friendship. I am also grateful to friends who have 
inspired me with their research and concerns: Chong Eun Ahn, Jeff Chan, Tapoja Chaudhuri, 
Hsiao-wen Cheng, Va Cun, Daisy Yan Du, Lyle Fearnley, Jingyuan Du, Xiang Gao, Yizhong Gu, 
Hao He, Ge Jian, Lu Jin, C. Michelle Kleisath, Minhua Ling, Xiao Liu, Qinyan Ma, Jeanette Ng, 
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Mari Quenemoen, Joseph Segar, Yun-ling Wang, Zhuoyi Wang, Guilan Weng, Jun Xu, Xiaohui 
Yang, and Jerry Zee.  
I am deeply thankful to Tieliang Liu and Lihui Yang at Beijing Normal University, who 
nurtured my initial interest in social sciences and anthropology and who provided enormous 
support for my fieldwork in China. My thanks also go to Yuhua Guo, Ge Sun, and Yunhua Yu 
for their helpful suggestions and advice for my project.  
My deepest debt is to my father, Chengquan Zhang, and my husband, Liming Wang, who 
always believed in me and supported me with unconditional love. I cannot possibly repay the 
great deal of understanding, care, and support they had provided me over the years. I dedicated 
my dissertation to them. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
On October 18, 2004, a 57-year-old male porter, named Yu Jikui, carrying a bag, passed a husband and 
wife (Hu Quanzong and Zeng Qingrong) on a sidewalk near the downtown Wanzhou Subdistrict, 
Chongqing municipality, in Southwest China. Yu’s bag touched Zeng’s pants, leaving a trace of mud. 
Zeng shouted at Yu at first, then jerked his shirt collar and slapped his ear. She would not stop even after 
Yu repeatedly apologized to her. Zeng’s husband, Hu, picked up Yu’s pole and repeatedly struck him in 
the legs and on the back, intending to break his legs. Hu also claimed that he was a public official and was 
reported to say that “If this guy (Yu) causes me more problems, I will pay 20,000 kuai (about $2,500) and 
have him knocked off” (Kahn 2004). This scene attracted hundreds of onlookers. Quickly, word spread in 
the city that a senior official had bullied a helpless porter. By nightfall, tens of thousands of people had 
gathered in Wanzhou’s central square, where they protested against the abuse of the porter, tipped over 
government vehicles, and set fire to the city hall. The protest lasted until the next morning when the 
protesters were driven away by the police’s tear-gas grenade and rubber bullets. Many were arrested and 
put in prison. Although the local government later announced that Hu was a fruit vendor, not a 
government official, and that Hu’s confrontation with Yu was a mistake, few local residents bought this 
story. The riot was widely reported by Hong Kong and Western mass media. The photos and video clips 
taken of the scene were quickly circulated in the Internet.  
Yu missed the riot that occurred in his name because he was kept at the hospital by local officials for 
two weeks. His children were told to take a vacation, paid by the government. Then he was forced by the 
government officials to make a statement on the local TV station’s evening news, emphasizing his faith in 
the government’s capacity to deal fairly with this “incident.” His speech irritated people who had 
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defended him at the protest; he was criticized for propagandizing for the government. He and his family 
members were threatened by neighbors and strangers. Yu was reported to say: “First an official tries to 
break my legs because I am a dirty porter. Now the common people want to break my legs because I 
spoke (was forced to speak) for the government” (Kahn 2004).  
Yu was one of an estimated 200,000 to 1,000,000–strong crew of male porters who work in the 
transportation industry as informal day laborers in Chongqing, China’s fourth municipality,1 which has 
been undergoing rapid urbanization and globalization since late 1990s. In Chongqing, male porters like 
Yu are refered to by local Chongoqingeses as “bangbang.”2 When appearing in groups, they are also 
called “bangbang jun” (an army of bangbang). Arriving from the countryside of Chongqing 
municipality3with limited skills and minimal education after China’s economic reform (1978), they eke 
out a living by using bamboo poles, ropes, and their own bodies to lug anything from bricks to fridges 
along this city's steep lanes. Most of the bangbang live in poverty and belong to the lowest rung of 
society.  
This so-called “Wanzhou Incident” not only demonstrates Chinese citizens’ deep-rooted 
dissatisfaction toward the corrupt government officials and their anger with social inequality, but it also 
exposes the vulnerability of poor bangbang as a social group in Chongqing. On the one hand, Yu became 
the victim of violence because of his vulnerable position; but on the other hand, the incident also won him 
great sympathy from the public. His vulnerability was used as a political flag to call for collective action 
against the repressive government. However, the same vulnerability also made Yu an easy target for 
social criticism when people found out that he was not a poor, helpless migrant worker who desperately 
needed salvation. This event highlights the social tensions around the lower working class in post-Mao 
                                                 
1
 The other three municipalities (zhixiashi) are Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. Chongqing became the fourth 
municipality in October 1997. 
2
 In Chinese, the word “bangbang” literally means a pole. In Chongqing, people call the carrying sticks (often 
bamboo poles) as “bangbang.” They also call the porters “bangbang” because the porters use bamboo poles and 
their own bodies to carry goods.  
3
 “Chongqing Municipality” and “Chongqing city” are two different concepts. Chongqing municipality has an 
alleged population of 32 million and has jurisdiction over 19 districts, 17 counties, and 4 autonomous counties. 
Chongqing city, on the other hand, refers to the major urban region of Chongqing municipality, which has a 
population of approximate 6 million, and includes 9 districts. The city lies on steep hills at the confluence of Yang-
tze and Jialing Rivers.  
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China. It exposes the complicated and even conflicting attitudes that the public in Chongqing hold toward 
bangbang.4  
In Chongqing, bangbang often become the focal point of social attention. One reason is because in 
China, only Chongqing has such a huge population of male porters working in the transportation industry. 
In order to promote Chongqing’s tourist industry, the local government made an ahistorical statement: it 
claimed that the bangbang in contemporary Chongqing are doing the same old job that the longshoremen 
did along the Yang-tze River after Chongqing was forced to open its port to Western merchants in 1891. 
The government’s goal of promoting this ahistorical narrative is to stress the uniqueness of Chongqing 
city as the transportation hub and center of businesses in Southwest China. By doing so, it aims to create a 
glorious image of Chongqing as an economic center of the upstream Yang-tze River, which has a long 
history of trade and business. Another reason is that bangbang are highly mobile, rural, adult men who 
often serve female customers with no supervision. The existence of a huge number of bangbang often 
gives rise to social debates over gender relations.  
I became interested in studying bangbang in Chongqing during my preliminary fieldwork in 
Chongqing in the summer of 2004. First, Western scholarly works suggest that Chinese rural migrant 
workers are subject to rigid body discipline and control in the work place and that they face extreme 
poverty and great difficulties in the cities, but many bangbang whom I met claimed that they enjoyed a 
great degree of “freedom” in doing their work despite the insecure nature of this work (Please see more in 
Chapter Three). I was puzzled about why this discourse of “freedom” is so powerful among bangbang 
and what “freedom” means in this specific context. Second, while dominant urban culture in Chongqing 
rarely represented bangbang as masculine and vigorous (instead, it depicts them as dangerous men or 
romanticizes them as exotic uncivilized men), the bangbang I talked to commonly prided themselves for 
being responsible and rational men. In their home villages, most of them were household heads and even 
village cadres; they led respected lives and were considered “capable men.” I was interested in how they 
                                                 
4
 I use the term bangbang to refer to men, when referring to female porters, who are much fewer in number, I 
specify bangbang women. 
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(re)position themselves and (re)evaluate what it means to “be a man” when they travel between the 
countryside and the city. Third, the local government insisted that bangbang represented revolutionary 
spirit and “traditional Chinese virtues,” such as perseverance and hard work. It also argued that this spirit 
should be cherished and kept for the benefit of the city’s economic development. However, it refused to 
include bangbang when it came to representing the image of urban Chongqing (Chapter Two). The local 
mass media even claimed that the vocation of bangbang work and the whole population of bangbang 
would eventually disappear with the construction of high-speed transportation in Chongqing. How was 
this self-contradictory narrative created, and for what purposes? How does it influence the making and 
implementation of the government policy in managing bangbang? What are bangbang’s strategies for 
countering this cultural logic of development and modernization that diminishes them and shun them as 
valuable subjects?  
This dissertation, based on a total of fifteen months of ethnographic field research conducted in 2004 
and 2006-2007, is a historically and politically grounded ethnography of bangbang. It examines the 
gender and labor inequalities that bangbang experience within the context of China’s turbulent 
transformation from socialist collectivism to market-oriented economy and accelerating incorporation into 
the global economy. Urbanization is also an important context in my analysis. In particular, I am 
interested in how Chongqing city’s rapid rise to prominence constitutes one of the most important 
attempts of the Chinese central government for strategic economic development. This dissertation is an 
ethnographic investigation of how bangbang make decision of migration, their occupational choice, their 
imagining of modernity and success, as well as their understanding of masculinity based on their lived 
experiences of migration and work. This dissertation also challenges the dominant discourses of 
developmentalism in post-reform China that often devalues rural migrant men as obstacles to China’s 
modernization and that often divorces the economic imperatives of rural to urban migration from its 
cultural and social meanings.  
In focusing on bangbang as footloose laborers, I aim to challenge the popular view about China’s 
labor migration. Such a view tends to emphasize the contracted workers in the manufacturing industry, 
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such as the factory workers in the labor-intensive off-shore factories in Shenzhen or Guangzhou. The 
economic restructuring in rural and urban China since the reform in late 1970s does not merely result in a 
mass exodus from the agricultural sector to the manufactory industry, but also produces a huge nomadic 
workforce whose members remain outside of the formal economy. Bangbang are significant members of 
these “socially deprived contingents” (Breman 2010:4). Recruited on a temporary and casual basis, they 
are at the lowest rung of the job market hierarchy. I would like to call attention to this large workforce 
that has been invisible because of the lack of public representation.  
1.1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
My research on Chongqing’s bangbang draws from and contributes to three domains of literature. In this 
section, I give a brief overview of this scholarship, the main arguments and intellectual debates, as well as 
the areas to which my research contributes. Here I will only highlight a few key points that are relevant to 
my dissertation research. Additional important scholarly works are cited at the beginning of each chapter.  
1.1.1. Rural to Urban Migration and Gender in China 
Rural-to-urban labor migration is not something unique to Chinese society; but as Li Zhang (2001) 
correctly points out, the specific cultural process of naming such migrants as “floating population” 
(liudong renkou) and the cultural and political meanings attached to these migrants are distinct to post-
Mao China. My dissertation builds on Zhang’s claim as well as on a number of scholarly works that 
discuss the process of such a large-scale labor migration in post-Mao China. These works highlight 
several key issues.  
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First, China’s hukou policy5 and the dichotomous economic system are keys to understanding migrant 
workers’ inferior and vulnerable positions in Chinese society. Solinger (1999) is among the earliest to 
examine the politics of migration in China. Her main argument is that the hukou system is at the center of 
how the socialist-era political system operates which explains why migrant workers are categorized 
unfairly as “secondary citizens.” She also argues that the questions of citizenship, membership, 
entitlements, and access to resources are crucial for understanding rural migrant labor politics. Solinger’s 
approach and arguments have been quite influential. Much research on China’s rural-urban migration 
since the reforms has centered on the concerns with the hukou system that allegedly victimizes migrants.  
While hukou policy is commonly portrayed in Western literature as designed by the Chinese 
government to block rural-urban migration, Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang point out that this argument is 
too simplistic (Chan and Zhang 1999). Their research finds that the hukou system was “part of a larger 
economic and political system set up to serve multiple state interests.” It has two basic functions: one is to 
classify and record people’s residence; the other is to determine one’s socioeconomic eligibility. The two 
authors argue that this policy is a tool of the authoritarian regime and a product of China’s planned 
economy and societal segregation. Even after the relaxation of the hukou system, the economic and social 
divide persists in the cities, and millions of peasants remain at the bottom of social hierarchy as they did 
before the reform. But why is this the case? What is the purpose of maintaining such a policy when 
China’s planned economy has been replaced by a market-oriented one since the late 1970s? I argue that at 
this stage of China’s economic development, the hukou system enables a policy that excludes the migrant 
                                                 
5
 Hukou, or Household Registration, policy, implemented in 1958 in order to keep peasants on the land, requires 
every Chinese citizen to register at birth with the local authorities as either an urban or a rural hukou holder from a 
particular place.  This system divided the entire Chinese population into two categories of subjects with unequal 
power. It regulates access to government services that range from housing to education to health care. Chinese 
people who worked outside their authorized domain or geographical area would not qualify for grain rations, state-
provided housing, education, health care, and so on. According to Kam Wing Chan, “for the past 52 years, the 
system has served to segregate the rural and the urban populations, initially in geographical terms, but more 
fundamentally, in social, economic and political terms. It is the linchpin of China’s divisive dualistic structure 
(eryuan jiegou), and the foundation for its two classes of citizenship” (Chan 2010).   
Although government controls over rural labor migration have been relaxed since the 1990s, migrant workers 
often remain second-class citizens in cities due to their non-urban hukou status and are deprived of social benefits 
and public services. Migrant children often miss out on education opportunities in the cities because of their rural 
hukou.  
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laborers from any social provisions; furthermore, this is a deliberate action that aims to keep the price of 
Chinese labor low and globally competitive. At the same time, my research argues against a simplistic 
dichotomous divide of rural and urban. Instead, it sheds light on the dynamic processes of rural-urban 
relations, especially between migrants and urbanities. I point out that class, instead of rural/urban 
residential status, may play a bigger role in determning social relations in and outside of the production 
process (see Chapter Six). 
Second, rural migrant workers are not merely either rational economic calculators or passive subjects 
who serve their families’ interests; the decision-making process for migration is much more complicated 
than it looks. Most earlier scholarly work on China’s large-scale labor migration considers rural migrants 
as mere economic agents who seek better financial opportunities in big cities such as Guangzhou and 
Shanghai (Guldin 1992, 1997; Johnson 1992). Scholars such as Cindy C Fan, however, pursue this 
question from a new angle (2008). Fan highlights the importance of household strategies in shaping the 
migratory process. She shows that from the peasants’ perspective, even if the hukou barrier is removed 
and peasants can freely choose where to stay, they still would not stay in the cities because they have 
developed a special migration pattern based on a “split-household strategy” that enables them to benefit 
from both urban and rural sectors at the same time. Fan’s approach is valuable in that she takes seriously 
the interests and concerns of both the migrants and their families and she views the process of migration 
from both their perspectives. She also shows that the migrants have agency in controlling the whole 
process, making decisions and protecting economic and other benefits of their families. Migrants, she 
argues, are not passive victims but active social agents.  
However, Fan’s argument that household strategies will eventually prevail over institutional structure 
and state policies seems too optimistic to be convincing. After all, the “split household strategy” can also 
be understood as a survival strategy developed by the peasants to compensate for the risks of migration 
and the lack of social security. An examination of both the institutional and structural limitation and the 
migrants’ household strategies is needed. My dissertation takes this approach to analyze the bangbang’s 
migration decision-making. I argue that family reasons can not fully explain rural men’s decision for out 
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migration. My fieldwork shows that migration decisions were often made after a full consideration of 
both the migrants’ individual desires and dreams and their families’ needs. These desires, hopes, dreams, 
and family needs reflect structural influences as well. 
Third, labor migration is inseparable from the state’s modernization and development project and 
reflects a developmental logic that focuses on re-molding citizen-subjects into proper modern subjects. 
The Chinese government has initially viewed migration as a social problem, an intrusion of “outsiders” 
whose presence in the cities interrupt the order of the urban society. The state tends to view migration as a 
“learning process” through which rural residents learn to be “civilized.” Hairong Yan’s works (2003; 
2008) provide a valuable critique of this state-promoted idea of migration. By examining young women 
who migrate from Anhui to Beijing to provide domestic service for middle-class families, she 
demonstrates how the meanings of professional domestic work are produced and reproduced in China’s 
pursuit of neoliberal economic success. These meanings shed light on a range of state discourses about 
development, modernity, consumption, suzhi (quality) and individualism. Her Marxist-based and 
feminist-informed post-structural ethnographic research points out the “liminal subject position” that the 
domestic workers occupy. She argues that the keywords of “suzhi” and “self-development” play an 
important role in reorganizing reproduction and social relations in China’s economic development. 
Migration is the vehicle through which “self-development” through the acquisition of suzhi is propelled. 
However, these “keywords” and their political, cultural, and social implications justify and disguise the 
overexploitation and marginalization that migrant workers (especially women workers) experience when 
they reform their subjectivities through their participation in the state’s development project. Building on 
Yan’s critique of the logics of development and modernist discourse, my dissertation argues that 
“freedom” is yet another development trope that the state uses to shift the economic risks and the cost of 
labor to the individual migrant workers’ shoulders, quite literally in the case of bangbang. The discourse 
of “freedom” also implies a training ground on which the migrant workers, by taking on casual, low-end, 
low-payment jobs in the city, craft modern selves and realize “self-development.” 
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Fourth, anthropologists do not focus solely on the demographic facts of migrants and their impact on 
China’s urban economy; in fact, they are more interested in the migrants’ lived experience and in the 
social and economic inequalities that shape migrant workers’ experiences. My dissertation pays special 
attention to the politics of exclusion that result in the segregation of the rural underclass in all walks of 
life. Wanning Sun (2009) concludes that the presence of migrant workers in the informal economy can be 
characterized as “ubiquitous invisibility,” “enduring transience,” and “intimate stranger.” These 
characteristics, which point to the specific nature of migrant workers’ presence in the city, largely result 
in the cultural politics of boundaries. Such politics can be based “not only on gender, sexuality, class and 
place, but also on such factors as rural versus urban attributes (behavior, dress, attitudes,) work versus 
non-work, and the domestic versus the public” (Sun 2009:18). In studying the bangbang, I would also 
like to add two more differentiating mechanisms:  the favoring of intellectual labor over manual labor and 
of skilled labor over “unskilled” labor.  These two factors, combined with the other cultural politics of 
boundaries that Sun mentioned, largely form the social, cultural, and economic position that bangbang 
occupy in the city. 
Fifth, gender is a recent scholarly concern in this literature. Gender is a key “trigger” of rural-to-urban 
migration since it points to contemporary Chinese notions of modernity that characterize cities as wealthy 
and modern and rural regions as poor and backward (L. Zhang 2001; Yan 2003b; Schein 2001). Many 
scholars have looked at women’s agency and the difficulties they encounter as women labor migrants (L. 
Zhang 2001; Lee 1998; Solinger 1999; Davin 1999). Ethnographers have also offered important insights 
about gender and migration by providing vivid account of the experience of women migrants (Lee 1998; 
L. Zhang 2001; Yan 2003a).  
However, studies of domestic migration focus almost exclusively on women (Schein 1999, 2005; 
Meng 1995; Lee 1998; Yan 2003a; Davin 1999) whereas scholarship on men and masculinity tends to be 
situated within a transnational context (e.g., Margold 1995; Osella & Osella 2000; Goldring 2001; Levitt 
2001; Gamburd 2000; McDowell 2000; Newman 1999). Little attention is paid to how Chinese rural 
men’s decisions and experiences of migration are also intimately linked to gender. Male migrants are 
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rarely treated as gendered entities, but often appear as an unmarked universal category that stands for 
humanity in general. Men have also been assumed to have power to dominate women. This literature thus 
fails to address the diversity of Chinese rural men’s migratory experiences and the ways that perceptions 
of masculinity vary by setting. It also eludes a nuanced examination of the relations between power and 
gender.   
What factors attract men to move to urban centers? Do rural men migrate for different reasons than 
rural women? What approaches or networks do male migrants depend on to choose where to migrate and 
what kind of work to engage in? What gendered experiences do rural migrant men have in urban areas? 
How do experiences of migration influence their sense of self and their ideas about masculinity in general? 
How does migrant life change their gender roles? What are the reactions of their home village mates 
when they return home? The answers to these questions will not only allow us to reconsider migrant men 
as gendered individuals, but will also help us understand what gender means and its important role in 
shaping rural migrants’ experiences in urban public spaces and within their village homes. My research 
contributes to this literature by exploring how male migrant workers’ decisions to migrate, experiences of 
migration, and occupational choices connect to their understanding of what it means to “be a man.” It 
argues that rural to urban migration cannot be fully understood from an economic perspective. Economic 
imperatives underlying the massive labor movement in China fail to account for this phenomenon unless 
social and cultural meanings are taken into consideration. The decision to migrate and to work in the 
informal economy is meaningful for Chinese rural men, not just as an attempt to pursue economic 
advancement, but also as a part of their quest for modern subjectivities and masculine pride.  
1.1.2. Masculinity Studies 
My dissertation research on masculinity(ies) in China mainly benefits from studies of men of color and 
working-class men. This literature did not emerge until the mid-1980s when gender construction theory 
largely supplanted sex role theory. Rather than viewing gender in terms of a preordained script with 
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which men and women act out their sex roles, this theory focuses on the making and remaking of 
gendered conventions in social practice itself. This theoretical trend focuses on the system of “hegemonic 
power relations” (Carrigan, Connell, and Lee 1985). It also focuses on the diverse ways 
femininity/masculinity is experienced by women/men in various social groups. It maintains that assessing 
the process of making femininities/masculinities requires consideration of the social differentiations (race, 
class, religion, education, etc.) of men/women and the interaction of different social categories such as 
class, ethnicity, race, religion, and age.  
Rather than treating masculinity as monolithic, scholars prefer to use the plural "masculinities" than 
the singular "masculine sex role." The variations of men’s experiences are seen as crucial to 
understanding men’s lives and the construction of masculinities. Men of relatively underrepresented 
status – such as working-class men, men of color, gay men and younger and older men – all become the 
center of scholarly work. Studies of the diverse men’s experiences and lives challenge the previously 
dominant definition of masculinity as white, middle-class, middle-aged, and heterosexual. Gender, thus, is 
not understood as a set of fixed features, but as a multifaceted, dynamic process suffused with power 
relations (Carrigan, Connell, and Lee 1985, 181). In other words, gender is made in a "historical situation, 
a set of circumstances in which power is won and held" (Carrigan, Connell, and Lee 1985, 94).  
Scholars such as Cornwall and Lindisfarne have pointed to the “imbalance” in gender studies when it 
comes to ethnography (1994). While women are rarely treated as social agents except as mothers and 
wives in kinship and marriage studies (Moore 1988:1), men “have been described as social actors in all 
manner of different locations and positions, yet their gendered identities have usually been taken 
completely for granted” (Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994: 27). The two authors argue for “dislocating 
masculinity” from power, masculinized power, or representation of powerful figurers and for relocating 
men in their gendered positions, which are shaped by the intersection of class, race, ethnicity, 
sociopolitical status, and so on. 
There have been wonderful intellectual analyses of Chinese masculinity(ies) from both literary critics 
and anthropologists. The literary critics focus on the representation of Chinese masculinity, especially 
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masculine ideals. The anthropologists , on the other hand, focus more on the specific social and political 
basis of dominant type of masculinity in post-Mao China. Several factors have been considered crucial in 
understanding the construction of Chinese masculinity(ies). Firstly, the binary construction of wen 
(scholarly talent, literati) vs. wu (martial valor; military strength) indicates a social preference of 
intellectual labor over manual labor throughout the course of China’s history. Kam Louie’s pioneering 
work Theorizing Chinese Masculinity (2002) pays much attention to the wen-wu dyad. He correctly points 
out that wen has become a masculine ideal that has prevailed throughout much of Chinese history, with 
the exception of the Maoist era. Secondly, Song claims that an understanding of Chinese masculinity 
requires a post-colonial reading of the masculine ideals that Chinese society adores because of China’s 
semi-colonial history and because the dominant Western notion of masculinity has been widely taken as 
the universal norm in China and other parts of Asia (Song 2004). My research, following Song’s methods 
in reading the production and reproduction of caizi (fragile scholar) in Song-Yuan periods, pays specific 
attention to images of masculine figures in post-Mao China’s popular culture and treats them as a group 
of discourses on ideal Chinese masculinity. I examine the production and circulation of some specific 
types of masculine ideals as well as the impact of these types on the desires of rural migrant men. I also 
examine how the migrant men appropriate and resist these images and discourses to their own ends.   
Literary critics’ groundbreaking works also provide rich material and valuable perspective to my study 
of masculinity. Many of them should be given credit for locating their literary analyses in a social and 
historical context. However, literary criticism leaves out the question of how masculinity is constituted 
and experienced in contemporary Chinese men’s daily lives. It does not provide insight into how 
individual Chinese men today understand the meaning of masculinity and (re)articulate their masculinity 
in a specific social and cultural context that intersects gender hierarchies with many other social forces 
such as class, religion, economic status and so on. But this is exactly where anthropologist’s work can 
contribute to the field of masculinity studies.  
Anthropologists have found that masculinity in post-Mao China has been primarily defined by wealth 
and social status, given the redistribution of wealth and power and increasing social inequalities. Men are 
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also said to be under greater pressure to achieve economic success (Jankowiak 2002). However, scholars 
such as Everett Zhang argue that wealth is not enough to bring masculinized power, especially since 
China’s market economy is conditioned by socialist legacies. According to Zhang, the fact that male 
entrepreneurs must for business purposes go through goudui (activities such as banquets, mahjong, night 
club entertainment, and saunas) with government officials exposes how the Party state can easily 
emasculate wealthy men with its power (Zhang 2003).  
Other scholars have argued that Chinese masculinities are constructed not only around wealth and 
political power, but also with the West as a reference. Erwin (1999) analyzes the gendered and racial 
implications of Chinese modernity. Despite the fact that it is more common for Chinese women to marry 
overseas Chinese and foreign men, the TV drama she examines reconstitutes the modern Chinese family 
by creating a model Western wife for Chinese men (though this wife must be a Zhongguotong6). The 
process of creating such an “ideal” family in mass media demonstrates the desire for a Chinese 
masculinity that is constructed around a feminized West. In his dissertation on men’s experiences of 
impotence and the popularity of nanke (men’s medicine), Zhang (2003) suggests that contemporary 
Chinese men’s “complex of impotence,” a sentiment about the inferiority of Chinese male body and 
potency in comparison with Western white males, is not just a physical experience, but a social and 
cultural product that reflects Chinese men’s imagination of and desire for modernity that take the “West” 
as a model. The impotent men’s experiences also reflect the transformation of a gendered value system 
produced by China’s transition from a planned economy to a market economy in the last several decades. 
Song (2010) points out that there is also a strong connection between the construction of masculinity in 
popular culture and the conspicuous rise of nationalism in Mainland China since the early 1990s. A 
“good” man is expected to bring honor to China and to safeguard national dignity on the international 
stage.  
However, these scholars rarely touch on the issues of class difference and labor when discussing the 
production of the meaning of masculinity. In the case of migrant worker, among which male rural 
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 Zhongguotong is a Chinese phrase that describes a person (often a foreigner) who knows China very well.  
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migrants are the majority, the factor of class and the politics of labor are essential to developing a more 
thorough understanding of the migrants’ experience of gender. I argue that masculinity in China does not 
revolve around a single or uniform concept but contains many diverse and conflicting meanings in 
relation to class, forms of work, and deep-rooted rural-urban divisions. I also argue that this inconsistency 
in the meaning of masculinity in contemporary China reflects the persistent changes in the different 
values surrounding what it means to be a man over the course of Chinese history. Three key factors have 
actively contributed to making and remaking Chinese masculinities: (1) growing rural-urban inequalities 
that render rural men less valued than their urban counterparts and rural migrant men more valued than 
impoverished non-migrant rural men; (2) persistent shifts in the dominant discourses about the 
manual/mental division of labor over the course of China’s modern history, which contribute to the 
changing social positions of manual and intellectual workers in different historical periods; (3) the denial 
of the gender order and values of the Maoist era in the post-reform period and the revival of a highly 
gendered division of labor and the recoding of gender differences. My dissertation, taking bangbang in 
Chongqing as an example, demonstrates how these three factors contribute to the changing discourse of 
Chinese masculinity and shape the experiences of bangbang in Chongqing.  
1.1.3. Globalization and the Changing Nature of Work  
Since the 1970s, technological advances have facilitated greater connectivity among people, organizations, 
and countries and accelerated the movement of goods, capital, and people within and across borders. 
Social scientists commonly use the word “globalization” to emphasize the increases in the volume and the 
velocity of such movement, not only of capital, but also of people, ideas, and things. David Harvey’s 
(1989) and Anthony Giddens’s (1990) research provide a framework for turning abstract and ahistorical 
discussions of globalization into ones that concern the cultural dynamics of globalization. Both authors 
demonstrate that globalization intensifies worldwide social relations. As a result, local happenings are 
shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa (Giddens 1990: 64). 
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This global increase of connectivity intensified economic integration, increased competition among 
companies, provided more opportunities to outsource work to lower-wage countries, and opened up new 
labor pools through immigration. With the development of high technologies, employers are no longer 
constrained by conventional temporal and spatial patterns and are able to seek greater flexibility in their 
relations with workers. The entry of China, India, and countries of the former Soviet bloc into the global 
economy in the 1990s doubled the size of the global labor pool. These changes have also reinforced the 
competitive pressure of global markets. All these factors contribute to a spatial restructuring of work on a 
global scale. As Lourdes Beneria observes, labor market deregulation and increasing flexibility of work 
emerged in both high and low income countries (Beneria 2001).  
Although this labor production restructuring is a world-wide occurrence, the case of Asia is of 
particular importance. Before the 1997 financial crisis, the economic growth and the rise of Asian tigers 
made people believe in the model of export-processing industrialization. Although work became more 
informalized and temporary and part-time employment increased in Asian countries in the 1970s and 
1980s, it was widely held that increasing labor productivity and relatively low wages could eventually 
improve income levels and living standards, which would eliminate the poverty associated with informal 
economiy. From this perspective, the significance of the informal sector would decrease as the formal 
sector absorbed the marginal working population and expanded its employment possibilities (ILO 1972). 
However, in both Asia and Latin America, the proportion of the population engaged in the informal sector 
has not decreased. Scholars have pointed out that “far from absorbing informal activities, the 
formal/modern sector often relied and fed on the former as a way to increase its competitiveness and 
profits” (Beneria and Roldan 1987).The  distinction between  the formal and informal has become 
increasingly vague (Perez-Sainz 2000).  
In addition to this informalization of the workforce, scholars since the 1970s have found that the 
changing character of labor markets around the world has led to a rise in female participation in the labor 
force and to a relative if not absolute decline in men's employment. There has also been a feminization of 
many jobs traditionally held by men (e.g., Ong 1991; Cheng 1999; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002). In 
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country after country, women laborers dominated off-shore factory production lines, family firms, 
subcontracting arrangements, and informal work sections. Global factories reproduced similar models of 
organization wherein women dominate the lowest levels of both pay and authority, whereas men occupied 
most positions of supervisory and managerial rank (Write 2001). Hierarchical gender ideologies define 
women’s labor as secondary and at best complementary to men’s labor (Ong 1991). Cheng (1999) 
suggests that capitalist systems define work as a process of production that can contribute to the 
accumulation and exchange of capital. This definition contributes to the devaluation of women’s work, 
which is not considered productive work involving exchange value. Corporate production, on the one 
hand, identifies desirable sexualized bodies for their preferred labor force—often young, deferential and 
“nimble-fingered” female laborers. In other words, by defining women’s labor as cheap and as less 
valuable than men’s labor, hegemonic gender ideologies, along with the capitalist system, cheapen the 
direct costs and facilitate global capital’s strategies of accumulation (Mills 2003).  
Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2002) offer brutal insights from a feminist perspective on the force of 
globalization on women and the feminization of global labor. Their work shows the global persistence of 
patriarchy is never the only cause of the subjugation of these third world women: first-world rich women 
can exploit poor women just as effectively as rich men can. Although the authors neglect the differences 
among rich career women in the first-world, their work convincingly warns us that the category of “Third 
world women workers” is not sustainable because of the severe disparity of women’ s positions and 
power in the world.  
Anthropologists working in Aisa emphasize the junior position of female workers as factory daughters, 
working daughters, and village daughters. Most are considered secondary labor in the sense that they earn 
lower wages than men who are of comparable rank; some also consider wage work as an interlude before 
marriage. Salaff’s work (1981) on Hong Kong working daughters, for example, demonstrates how a 
patriarchal system denies young daughters a sense of belonging to their families and how these daughters 
seek to compensate for their structural alienation by providing economic and emotional loyalty to their 
families. Salaff sensitively points out that in Hong Kong, unmarried working daughters continue to 
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subordinate themselves to the goals of patriarchal family. Furthermore, scholars point out that the 
“daughter” status at home is reproduced in the workplace, generating tensions between new feelings of 
personal freedom and persisting familial and social requirements (Ong 1987, 1991; Mills 1999; Wolf 
1992). Other scholars, on the other hand, point out that in some areas of Asia, it is women’s position as 
wives and mothers that devalue their labor and make their wages lower (and, in some cases, nonexistent) 
(e.g., Kondo 1990; Lee 1998; Zhang 2001).  
This body of literature has offered wonderful analysis of how globalization is made possible through 
the exploitation of labor from developing countries. This phenomenon has accelerated the growth of 
contingent and feminized labor in off-shore factories, domestic work, and high technological businesses, 
among others. Yet very little ethnographic research has been done concerning the changing nature of 
work in the transportation industry, despite this sector’s significant role in the circulation of goods in local, 
national, and global economies. There has been even less research on porters or shoulder pole carriers, 
who earn a living by carrying goods and traveling on foot for great distances between markets or between 
the markets and individual residents’ homes. It is especially interesting to study the form of work that 
porters engage in when China is undergoing large-scale development in transportation infrastructure; such 
developments include the building of roads and railways that reduce the amount of travel time between 
urban regions. How are bangbang’s working habits and lifestyles impacted by China’s obsession with 
efficiency and high-speed transport? How do bangbang justify their importance in this “age of 
technology”? Do they feel proud of what they do?  When the low-skill low-pay jobs are increasingly 
dominated by women whose labor is devalued by the global economy for the purpose of flexible 
accumulation of capital, how do male workers who are trapped in the informal economy maintain their 
masculine pride? Do they feel that their masculine authority is being challenged when their wives and 
daughters are preferred by labor recruiting agencies in the job market? What does working in an informal 
service sector do to their sense of manhood?  
Furthermore, while Western intellectual inquiry into China’s labor conditions has focused on the 
workers in off-shore factories in the manufactory industry, scant attention has been paid to the informal 
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sector and to the casual workers. The countless footloose laborers such as the bangbang, just as the 
millions of factory workers, contribute to China’s economic rise on the global stage. However, the nature 
of their work keeps the workers fragmented and separated, thus making them less visible than formal 
workers in the manufacturing industry. Although there have been many wonderful academic studies of 
the process of informalization of employment in developing countries such as Latin America and India 
(Jan Breman 2010), current academic research on China has barely touched this topic. My dissertation 
attempts to bridge this gap in this scholarship by documenting how China’s labor reform and labor market 
deregulation generate the growth of precarious jobs in the transportation industry in Chongqing and how 
China’s development and modernization impact individual transportation workers. My research also 
addresses the relations between Chongqing’s rapid urbanization/industrialization as one of the most 
important engines of China’s strategic economic development and the growth of the informal economy, 
particularly the growing number of migrant workers who participate in the street haulage business.  
1.2. FIELDWORK AND METHODOLOGY  
My research methodology is an important part of my dissertation research. Given that I am a woman 
studying Chinese masculinity among male migrant workers in a male-dominated occupation, and given 
the large difference in socioeconomic status and education level between the bangbang and me, carefully 
designed fieldwork methods became even more important to the success of my dissertation research. I 
conducted preliminary research in the summer of 2004 and year-long fieldwork in Chongqing from 
August 2006 to August 2007. I focused my fieldwork on three hardware and electronic machine markets, 
one wholesale daily utensil market, and two food markets in a High-Tech Industrial Development Zone of 
the Wanbei (pseudonym) Subdistrict of Chongqing. I chose to work in this area because this industrial 
development zone is one of several places in Chongqing that draws a large number of bangbang. There 
was simply no official data available on the exact number of bangbang working for these markets. The 
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estimate ranges from 300 to 500 for each market.7 I visited these six markets at least once a week. 
Sometimes, I visited two markets a day. Each market had one to two places where bangbang gathered. 
They often sat on the ground or stairs, placing their bamboo poles aside, chatting and exchanging business 
information with each other. Sometimes, they just smoked together and joked around. I often went to 
these gathering places to meet them.  
I conducted observation more than participant observation in the workplaces because I could hardly 
carry the same weight of goods as the bangbang. But I worked side by side with them whenever the 
goods were not too heavy. For example, I helped Old Zhang and Fat Kid Yan, two bangbang whom I 
knew well, to unload a whole truck of boxed hardware. The hardware weighed around ten ponds each and 
one person could hold them with both hands. Our job was to move the boxes away from the back of the 
truck and to organize them on the ground based on the type and size. Then we moved them into the 
warehouse. It took over two hours to finish the work. But it was not as physically demanding as what 
bangbang normally handled. I often joined bangbang when they delivered goods, especially when they 
used carts instead of bamboo poles for delivery and when the clients did not accompany them. On these 
occasions, they could talk to me because they did not need to use their bodies to carry the goods. I 
accompanied them from the beginning of the process (when they were called on by the client for the job) 
to the end (when they successfully delivered the goods and received the payment from the client). I also 
participated in their chats at the gathering places and in their leisure activities after work, such as dining 
together, watching TV, buying groceries, getting haircuts, playing card, and celebrating holidays. Such 
activities typically involve a group of people, sometimes including the bangbang’s wives and children.  
In addition to interviewing bangbang themselves, I also conducted informal and formal interviews 
with the bangbang’s family members (wives and children), colleagues, clients, friends, and relatives. I 
often conducted formal interviews in bangbang’s homes or in the places where they felt the most 
comfortable. With one interviewee, I normally had casual conversations and conducted informal 
interviews first. I conducted hours of informal interviews and casual conversations; my questions varied 
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 A few bangbang who worked in these markets made rough estimates.  
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person to person. For informal interviews, I did not use a recorder. This tactic was specifically intended to 
lower the interviewee’s anxiety. It was easier for people to talk freely without the recorder, especially at 
the early stage of communication. But I used a recorder for formal interviews. After one formal interview, 
I typed out all the information given by the interviewee and asked the interviewee to read it (I read it to 
the interviewees in many cases if they asked me to do so) and to correct any wrong information in the text. 
I also double-checked with them and made sure that they had no objections about letting me reveal the 
information they had given me in my dissertation and in future publications. I did this for all the formal 
interviews. This, I find, is a very useful strategy for cultivating mutual trust between my interviewees and 
me.  
During my fifteen months of fieldwork, I talked to 112 male bangbang and 12 female bangbang, who 
worked side by side with their husbands. I also talked to the wives of 23 bangbang as well as other family 
members. In addition to working in the urban regions of Chongqing city, during the Spring Festival of 
2007 (02/07), I accompanied a bangbang to his home village and spent five days in his house (02/14/07-
02/18/07). This trip gave me a precious chance to observe and better understand his family’s living 
condition, various aspects of the rural life, the difficulties and conflicts around migration, and the family’s 
opinion about the bangbang’s migration and work. In the July of 2007, during the busy farming season, I 
went on another trip with this bangbang to his home village, in order to observe how the bangbang had 
made his decision to go home in the peak season of farming (harvest season), the significance of his 
return to his family, and his and his family’s strategies to both secure his job in Chongqing and to make 
sure the farm work at home could be done. This trip was also made by the bangbang to pay a fine for his 
third grandchild. The man had wanted a grandson for a long time, but the birth was illegal because of 
China’s one-child policy. The trip was a great opportunity for me to observe the interconnectedness 
between gender, work, and migration. 
During my fieldwork, I lived in the neighborhood where bangbang with families chose to live. It was 
close to the bangbangs’ workplace, mostly within a ten- to twenty-minute walking distance. Because I 
lived in this neighborhood, I also went grocery shopping with bangbang and their wives and hosted 
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dinners for a few close bangbang co-workers and their families. I was also invited to lunch and dinners at 
their places. Living in their community provided me wonderful opportunities to observe and participate in 
their daily life activities – cooking, washing, gossiping, grocery shopping, dining out, and so on.  
During my time in Chongqing, I spent one day each week doing archival research; collecting historical 
records in the city library about shoulder-pole porters and their socioeconomic and cultural practices,; 
reading and collecting media representations of contemporary porters; and buying newspapers and 
popular magazines that carried stories and reports not just about the porters, but about gender, labor 
politics and migration stories in general. I also actively participated in several art exhibitions and 
performances organized by university scholars and NGOs in both Beijing and Chongqing; these events 
aimed to empower rural migrant workers. I observed the dynamics, compromises, contests and conflicts 
between the elite organizers and the rural migrants as well as the public’s reactions to these events. These 
experiences enriched my understanding of the varied ways in which rural migrants fight for social justice 
and the complexity of this process.  
During my year-long fieldwork, I was honored to be accepted by one old bangbang couple as their 
fictive niece and by a younger couple as their daughter’s Godmother (gan ma). While all of the bangbang, 
their family members, friends, neighbors, customers, as well as the scholars who participated in 
empowering bangbang were fully informed of and approved of my research, I have used pseudonyms for 
them to protect their privacy. I have, however, kept the real names of the scholars. 
As a young, female scholar who received her advanced education in the United States, I encountered 
many challenges conducting research that involved participant observation with men in public. The fact 
that I lived and worked alone in the city made the situation even more challenging. The gender difference 
immediately became a concern for both me and my bangbang co-workers. And my attempts to get to 
know them were occasionally viewed as an irresponsible media journalist’s manipulation of the poor.  
My entry into the bangbang’s community was at first made possible by one former bangbang man, 
Brother Lu, who was a small private company employee when I met him in 2004. I was introduced to him 
by two mutual acquaintances and very quickly he expressed interest in working with me. He was thirty-
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four when I first met him. He had worked as a bangbang for over three years before being recruited by a 
private business owner who ran two hardware and electronic machines stores in Wanbei subdistrict. At 
the time when I met him, he had three brother-in-laws and a group of friends who worked as bangbang. 
He accompanied me to visit the bangbang in their workplaces and in their homes. He helped 
immeasurably in breaking the ice between his former bangbang colleagues and me.  
When Brother Lu accompanied me, I was treated well by his bangbang friends and colleagues because 
he introduced me as a younger sister (xiaomei) of his who needed to write her “homework.” This scenario 
brought both benefits and drawbacks. On the one hand, it made me less threatening to the bangbang and 
gave me more opportunities to ask questions. It is culturally “natural” for a junior outsider to be curious 
and ask questions. The down side of it was that the bangbang would not talk about “men’s issues,” such 
as the topics of sex, romance, husband-wife conflicts, etc, in front of me, because these are inappropriate 
topics to talk about by older brothers in front of a younger sister.  
Brother Lu and I stopped working together in late October of 2006. Working alone, I developed more 
strategies than before in terms of dealing with gender, social status, educational gaps between bangbang 
and me. My photo-taking strategy helped the most. I brought my camera with me everywhere I went. 
When taking pictures in the bangbang’s workplaces, they would become interested in my camera and ask 
me all sorts of questions about it – for example, why I shot pictures of this and that, how long I have been 
learning photography, how much my camera cost, and so on. Then they would become interested in who I 
was. That was a good opportunity to begin a conversation. Depending on the situation, I would decide 
how many details about myself that I would reveal at the first meeting. In many cases, they would insist 
that I was a journalist, even though I stressed that I was a scholar and was merely attempting to better 
understand their lives. Very often, after a casual conversation, they would allow me to take pictures of 
them, especially when I promised that they could have these pictures for free. Some bangbang refused to 
have their pictures taken because they did not trust me. But in most cases, they would change their 
attitudes when I sent back the pictures to their colleagues as promised. Taking photos was very often a 
happy moment for the rural migrants and it broke the ice between us quite efficiently. It was a good 
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opportunity to conduct informal interviews, and sending the prints back to them helped cultivate mutual 
trust. I incorporated myself into several bangbang communities by using this strategy.  
Another useful strategy was to bring my male family members and friends (they are urban men) to 
bangbang’s workplaces and to invite them for a group meeting. I like this type of “collective interview” 
because I got the chance to observe the interaction between the rural men and their urban counterparts. 
The presence of urban men often changed the “chemistry” between bangbang and me. These rural-urban 
encounters often created wonderful conversations.  
The third strategy was to explain clearly and patiently to the bangbang my work. Despite the fact that 
it is not socially favored for a young adult woman to work closely with a group of rural migrant men in 
public, my identity as a “researcher” provided a way out. Some bangbang called me “college student” 
(daxuesheng); some called me “teacher” (laoshi). Once they understood that my work was not done 
merely for my own benefit or for commercial purposes, but for serious academic research, they normally 
treated it more seriously and were more cooperative. It took time to reach mutual understanding; but 
achieving this understanding was worth the effort.  
The fourth strategy was to make friends with bangbang’s wives. They, as women, were easier to 
access and safer to approach. They liked to talk to a researcher about their lives. When talking about their 
husbands, some wives had a lot to say, especially after we knew each other for a while. Also, they often 
provided different perspectives on their husbands’ work and lives.  
1.3. CHAPTER OVERVIEW  
This dissertation is organized thematically. In these chapters, I explore the intimate and intricate 
interconnection between migration, work and masculinity, including the socioeconomic forces and gender 
ideologies that shape the motivations and experiences of rural men’s migration and their engagement in 
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bangbang labor in Chongqing, China. I investigate male rural migrant workers’ agency in the face of 
labor regulation and exploitation, urban discrimination, and familial obligations.  
Chapter Two explores cultural politics in the process of urbanization and the city-branding of 
Chongqing which impact on the working and living conditions of bangbang. I focus on the post-Mao 
regime’s political rationale, economic development policies, urbanization policies and Chongqing’s 
government projects which aim to “remove the rural surplus labor from the countryside” (nongcun 
laodongli zhuanyi). This chapter examines both the material and symbolic forces that shape the livelihood 
of bangbang. It also examines the ways in which bangbang cooperate and unite in work. Various forms 
of labor organizing serve as an important strategy for the bangbang to protect themselves from harsh 
competition and the lack of labor protection in the city. But at the same time, these labor organizations 
reinforce the already existing stereotype of bangbang as law-abiding gangsters or secret society members 
and further legitimize the government’s attempts to discipline and control them. 
Chapter Three examines the meaning and importance of ziyou (freedom), a concept that has been 
taken by bangbang as one of the major reasons for choosing their jobs. It explores the question of why so 
many rural migrant men would trade the security of contract work for the “freedom” that bangbang labor 
is supposed to afford them. I argue that for rural migrants, the discourse on ziyou (freedom), as promoted 
by the state and expressed by bangbang, plays a significant role in facilitating the migrants' subject 
formation as modern individualized laborers, transforming them into self-reliant and enterprising workers 
even as it makes them vulnerable to fierce exploitation. 
Chapter Four analyzes the success story of Xiaoxiao Liu, a bangbang who is said to have turned 
himself from a penniless migrant into an entrepreneur and local celebrity. In this chapter, I close read both 
Liu’s own narratives and the narratives that scholars and media sources have produced about him. By 
comparing the dominant assumptions about rural migrant experiences with Liu’s own narratives, this 
chapter suggests that Liu’s narratives confirm, strategically use, and indirectly contest the official 
representations and dominant images of rural migrants. It further explores the cultural and social factors 
that enable Liu to extract representational value from his own derogated status and to convert it into 
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monetary capital. Instead of dismissing the success stories of rural migrants as mere government 
propaganda, this chapter investigates the values and principles that these stories ascribe to rural migrants.  
These values and principles are linked to the technique of government and the production of worker 
subjects in contemporary China.  
Chapter Five argues that although rural migrant men who work as bangbang do a “man’s job,” they 
fall short of the contemporary Chinese masculine ideals on at least three fronts. First, bangbang’s low 
income and marginalized social position deprive them of avenues and opportunities to become the 
masculine ideals that urban middle-upper classes favor. Second, they face gender critique for their lack of 
a “decent” and “real” job (that is, a full-time career with stable-income and benefits). Third, their work 
that requires the performance of deference and submission calls into question bangbang’s presumed 
masculinity. The resulting gender strategies reveal how male bangbang achieve a sense of manhood. In 
particular, I argue that bangbang emphasize the masculine aspects of their work (physical strength, solid 
body). Their strategies include distancing themselves from the “feminine” aspects of the work by telling 
stories, making use of socialist morality that favors peasants and manual labor, valuing their own job over 
that of their wives, and refusing to perform deference to customers, especially female customers. 
However, although bangbang’s gender strategies challenge the gender norms that emasculate them, they 
also serve to naturalize it and reconfirm the masculine ideals favored by middle and upper classes. 
Furthermore, while socialist morality empowers bangbang in some ways, these moralities also reinforce 
negative stereotypes of peasants as backward and uncouth.  
Chapter Six examines what rural migrant men in Chongqing say about their relationships with the 
people closest to them. An examination of the migrant men’s relationships is important because these 
relationships motivate rural men’s migration and heavily influence how migration is experienced by 
individual workers. Migration, in turn, brings changes and reorganizes migrants’ social relations. These 
relationships are shaped by powerful gender discourses, cultural expectations, and the social resources 
available to individuals. By examining the relations between migrant men and their close kin, friends, and 
employers, this chapter shows how gender and power are intertwined to shape migration experiences. I 
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argue that urban migration is not simply an economic activity but a process that is embedded in social 
relations and cultural expectations. Economic benefit for the family is one important reason behind 
migration, but relations with close kin, available resources, and social positions are also part of the 
“rationality” of migration. The experience of migration influences and transforms such social relations. In 
any case, rural migrants make their decisions with full agency and control their lives. They are not “blind 
flow” or simply followers of others. They are the “bosses” of their own lives. 
1.4. CONCLUSION 
In this Introduction, I introduced the reason I choose to study bangbang in Chongqing, the research 
questions posed by my dissertation, the theoretical framework for my research, my fieldwork 
methodology and experience, and the organization of my dissertation chapters. Overall, my dissertation 
addresses the gender and labor inequalities that Chinese rural migrant men experience when they 
participate in China’s economic development and modernization. My research pays specific attention to 
the large reserve army of labor in the informal sector (as opposed to the factory workers in the formal 
economy) because this fragmented labor force has not been widely studied within the context of China, 
despite China’s significance to the world economy. In studying the interconnected meaning of migration, 
work, and masculinity for bangbang, my goal is to examine the logic of development and modernization 
and its impact on individual Chinese migrant workers’ livelihood. A relevant theme that I focus on is how 
individual migrant workers encounter these challenges and struggle to take a control of their own lives. In 
the case of bangbang, I am concerned with how they strategically prevent themselves from being belittled 
as “not manly enough” because of their casual work, unstable income, and derogated social status.  
Working with the bangbang in Chongqing, I was deeply intrigued by the intimate relations between 
this migrant group and the sprawling development of the booming metropolis. This dynamic is not only 
because that such a large “army” of bangbang can only be found in Chongqing, but also because in 
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Chongqing, bangbang have become a sort of cultural icon, signifying Chongqing’s uniqueness in 
transportation and in regional development. In what way does Chongqing accommodate the thousands of 
bangbang who wander around almost every street and corner of the city? What is the relationship 
between bangbang and the local government? What urban social and cultural factors that contribute to the 
working and living conditions of bangbang? How does the urban setting exclude/include bangbang? 
These are the questions addressed in Chapter Two.  
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2.0 THE CITY AND THE BANGBANG 
In studying China’s economic development, project of modernization, and labor migration, researchers 
normally focus on either the largest metropolises such as Beijing and Shanghai or the manufacturing 
centers and Special Economic Zones in the east costal area, such as Shenzhen and Guangzhou. However, 
in the last decade or so, the rapid, sprawling development of Chongqing municipality can not be ignored. 
In 1998, Chongqing’s GDP was just $21 billion; by 2009 it had quadrupled to $86 billion. In 2008, when 
China’s growth significantly slowed to only 9%, Chongqing’s GDP grew at an eye-popping 14.9%. This 
rapid economic development of Chongqing has been widely reported by domestic and international media. 
In the media, Chongqing has been called “Chicago on the Yangtze”(Larson 2010), “the megalopolis you 
never heard of” (Watts 2006), and “China’s Chicago” (The Economist 2007). At the same time, since the 
mid-1990s, Chongqing has attracted about 1.5 million Chinese rural migrants every year. 
Chongqing municipality covers 82,400 sq km — more than Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin combined 
— and has an alleged population of 32 million. Its urban region lies on steep hills at the confluence of the 
Yangtze and Jialing rivers. Because of its precipitous topography, Chongqing has been nicknamed the 
“mountain city” (shan cheng) in China. Many of the city's hills are so steep that bicycles are scarce; 
motorcycles are a far more common sight. Largely determined by its mountainous topography, 
Chongqing's districts are spread over a series of hilltops and separated by major rivers. The precariously 
stacked apartment buildings clinging to the hillsides make for a unique view of the city. Because of its 
mountainous features, Chongqing was regarded as a safe haven and chosen as the capital of the 
Guomindang government during the Sino-Japanese war (1937 – 1945). Many important institutions and 
industries were relocated there, laying the foundations for the city's industrial power base. After the PRC 
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was founded in 1949, Chongqing was a sub-provincial city within Sichuan Province until March 14, 1997, 
when it was promoted to be the fourth municipality after Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. 
But what caused Chongqing’s quick rise in 1990s, given the great challenges that its hilly topography 
posed to the urban developers? Chongqing’s development is due in large part a national economic 
development strategy. The patronage of former premier Li Peng (the driving force behind the Three 
Gorges dam project8 on the Yangtze) and Deng Xiaoping (a native of the Chongqing area) is said to have 
played a crucial role in Chongqing’s elevation in status. According to a report from the Urban-Rural 
Coordinated Development Group of the Party School of the CCP (2008), Chongqing was chosen because 
of the typical structure of its rural-urban dichotomy, the geographic closeness to the Three-Gorges Dam, 
and its lagging economy compared with coastal cities. In other words, Chongqing was a guinea pig for the 
central government’s economic reform experiments, especially the reforms aiming to reduce the 
imbalance between rural and urban regions, to urbanize the countryside, as well as to expedite the so 
called “rural land transfer”9 project. The central government also aims to promote Chongqing as one of 
the major hubs for economic growth and development in Southwest China. Against this backdrop of the 
state’s plan to reduce the imbalance between the prosperous coast and more sluggish interior, Chongqing 
has been undergoing rapid urbanization since the 1990s. Money from state-owned banks and the 
government has poured into Chongqing to initiate the Three Gorges Dam Project in 1996, and the 
"Western Development" project10 in 2000.  
                                                 
8
 The Three Gorges dam a hydroelectric dam that spans the Yangtze River in Yichang city, in Hubei Province. 
So far, it is the world’s largest capacity hydroelectric power station. But the building of this dam caused the 
displacement of about 1.3 million people and ecological changes to many regions. The dam has been a focal point of 
controversy in both China and abroad.  
9
 Rural land transfer (tudi liuzhuang) is a term coined by the Chinese government to refer to the land leasing or 
transfer between peasants. Under China’s household responsibility system, peasants can use the land but do not own 
the land. When peasants went to the urban region to work, some of them transfered or leased the land to others. 
Rural land transfer also refers to a recent land regulation policy by the Communist Party. The main purpose of this 
policy is to seize the land from the peasants for the urban development.   
10
 The Western Development" project is a policy adopted by PRC to boost its less developed inland western 
regions. It began in 2000 and is an ongoing economic development project. The whole project covers six provinces 
(Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan), five autonomous regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, 
Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang), and one municipality (Chongqing). 
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2.1. CHONGQING’S RAPID URBANIZATION AND LABOR MIGRATION 
Because of the central government’s economic priorities, Chongqing’s government has been able to 
invest huge attention and resources into the so called “rural surplus labor transfer” (nongcun shengyu 
laodongli zhuanyi) project, which is in fact a state-sanctioned project that aims to speed up Chongqing’s 
urbanization and to turn millions of peasants into urban laborers. Why would the local government want 
to “transfer” the rural labor, and what would it transfer the rural labor into? The government’s logic is that 
the huge number of rural laborers in contemporary Chongqing countryside constitute “surplus labor” 
(shengyu laodongli), a serious barrier for China’s urbanization and development. Keeping such a huge 
army of reserved labor unemployed is considered a potential threat to China’s social stability. The 
resolution to this problem, according to the Chongqing government, is to push the rural “surplus labor” to 
seek employment opportunities in the city so that they can be absorbed by expanding urban industries.  
In 2003, Chongqing’s government began to develop training programs called “Rural Labor Transfer11 
Training,” for the purpose of pushing rural peasants to migrate to cities. In 2004, the local government 
formally carried out another project called “Project of Transfer and Employment of One Million Rural 
Laborers” to push peasants to leave their land and their rural homes at an even faster pace (Yu 2005). The 
goal of the government is to train more than 200,000 rural laborers every year and to turn 400,000 rural 
peasants into migrant workers every year. The government planned to convert 7 million rural laborers into 
migrant workers until 2007, with the goal of increasing the rural service revenue more than 10% every 
year. To serve this purpose, some subdistrict and township governments were designated to be the “rural 
labor export bases,” which are responsible for organizing and exporting rural laborers to work in high-
need urban industrial areas. The local governments were also made responsible for establishing training 
bases and job agencies to channel the flow of rural labor. In 2007, the government announced an 
“Opinion about Developing Labor Economy and Expediting Urban-rural Integration,” in which the 
government planned to turn 30% of rural young and middle-aged surplus labor into urban and township 
                                                 
11
 Transfer (zhuanyi) is a term that the government created to refer to the transfer of rural “surplus labor” to 
urban working labor during the government-promoted fast-paced urbanization.  
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residents by 2010 (Li 2008:23). In 2007, the city also began implementing a plan called the "one-hour 
economy circle" through which it aims to transfer two million rural residents into newly urbanized areas 
that are within an hour's driving distance from the city center. This transfer is intended to take place 
within the next five years. Another two million residents are supposed to be transferred in the five years 
after that (Howard 2007). 
In order to facilitate the flow of rural labor to the needed industries in the city, the local government 
has used several strategies. The first strategy is to seize the peasants’ farm land from them and to push the 
landless peasants to look for employment in the city. In China, peasants have never officially owned farm 
land; they only have the “right to use” (shiyong quan) the land through the household contract 
responsibility system.12 But many migrant workers have been informally transferring their land to other 
peasants. This form of land transfer was popular from 1984-1995. Beginning in 1995, the local 
government actively institutionalized land transfer. The land seized by the government is used either for 
the urban development or for the rapid industrialization of agricultural production. Since 2000, land 
transfer has sped up. Until 2006, around 6.46% of the agrarian land in Chongqing, has been transferred or 
is in the process of transfer (Yang 2009:167).  
The local government also persuades peasants to give up their farm land as a pre-condition to applying 
for the urban hukou (registered residence status). This strategy has been used by other provincial 
governments, such as those in the Pearl River delta region. However, this policy was not as successful as 
expected. Sun Yat-Sen University’s research in 2007 shows that only 24.8% of the local peasants would 
give up their land. On the one hand, urban resident status can no longer bring as much benefit to the 
hukou holders as it did in the Maoist era (Southern Urban Newspaper May 18th 2007). On the other hand, 
since 2006, peasants who have land in hand have been eligible to receive agricultural subsidies. Giving up 
land equates to giving up the right to get these subsidies. But the most important reason for peasants’ 
                                                 
12
 The practice of household contract responsibility was initiated by a group of farmers in Xiaogang Village in 
Anhui Province in 1978. The system contains two features. First, the farmland is owned by the collective. Second, 
production and management are entrusted to individual farming households through long-term contracts. During the 
contract period, the farmers pay taxes to the State and to local government and keep all the other produce for 
themselves.  
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refusal to give up their land is the lack of a social welfare for peasants in China. A piece of land is the 
only resource that peasants can ever have for survival if they lose the capacity to work or become 
unemployed. Land is the lifeline for Chinese peasants, which they cannot afford to lose. 
The second strategy the Chongqing government adopted to draw the peasants from their land was to 
promise to train them to be professional workers. The government claims that the suzhi (quality) of 
peasants is generally low; they will not make good workers unless they learn some professional skills. In 
particular, the government-subsidized professional training programs persuaded peasants to attend the 
training classes. The training programs are said to be free, and those who attend the programs were given 
an average of 200 yuan (around 30 dollars) by the government. But no matter how rosy this promise looks, 
the Chongqing government did not budget enough money to support this policy. Only a small number of 
extremely poor peasants could have free classes. Most peasant trainees needed to pay around 500-1000 
yuan per person out of their own pocket to get some sort of profession training. Those peasants whose 
financial conditions were already vulnerable could barely afford it. Even worse, news reports exposed that 
some training programs inflated the number of the trainees in their classes in order to get as much subsidy 
from the state as possible. When interrogated by a journalist, the local government refused to provide any 
information about this problem (Liu et al. 2005).  
The Chongqing government’s third strategy is to keep issuing new policies to relax administrative 
controls over rural to urban migration. Before 2005, rural peasants who wanted to work in the city needed 
to go through complicated procedures to prepare all kinds of “permits” before they could officially move 
to the city. They needed to have in hand the ID card (assigned by the local Public Security Bureau), 
“Certificate of the Status of Marriage and Child Rearing” (hunyu zhengming) (assigned by the family 
planning administrative department of local governments or Subdistrict Offices), “Temporary Residence 
Permit” (zanzhu zheng) (assigned by local public security bureau), “Migrant Worker Employment 
Registration Card” (waichu renyuan jiuye dengjika) (assigned by local labor security department), as well 
as “Health card” (assigned by local medical and public health institutions). Since 2005, Chongqing has 
begun to implement “one permit/card” policy. One card refers to “resident card.” Theoretically, with this 
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card, rural migrants can “send their children to the schools near where they work without paying 
‘temporary schooling fee’ (zanzhu fei) for it. Children of migrants have the right to get free state-
sanctioned vaccinations. Migrant workers can register with the local government to find employment. 
They can also have occupational consultation with the labor recruit agents. They also have access to legal 
aid for labor conflicts (2005). However, most of the new policies and bills are vaguely worded, and there 
is no official institution or government department to supervise the execution of the policies. In the end, 
many such policies turn out to be empty promises. 
2.2. BANGBANG IN THE PORT CITY 
China’s binary economic structure, the relaxation of the hukou system after reform, and the post-Mao 
China’s labor politics have contributed to the presence of a large population of bangbang in Chongqing. 
But the city’s economic development and its subsequent rise as the “hub” of transportation and as a 
commercial center in Southwest China are also reasons why such a large population of porters can exist in 
Chongqing. Chongqing’s major economic “pillar” is manufacturing. One “card” that the local government 
plays in attracting corporations and foreign investment is to guarantee corporations plenty of low-cost 
labor. A number of prominent domestic appliance manufacturers whose production was previously 
concentrated in coastal provinces—including Haier Co., Ltd., Media Group, and TCL International 
Electrical Co., Ltd.— set up operations in Chongqing because of the lower costs of labor. At the same 
time, Chongqing also plays important role in the production and exportation of aluminum and certain 
chemicals. A number of growing multinational corporations have also developed rapidly in recent years.  
Carrefour Group and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., have each opened three stores in Chongqing. Metro Group of 
Germany opened the largest supermarket in Chongqing's downtown area, along with shopping centers in 
the Economic and Technological Development District. According to Lammie, Chongqing's economy 
grew 12.6% annually between 2002 and 2007, hitting 411.2 billion yuan (60.2 billion US dollars) in 2007. 
 34 
Foreign trade expanded 36% in 2007 to reach $7.4 billion, of which exports comprised 4.51 billion US 
dollars (Lammie 2009). 
Having an adequate supply of cheap labor is also important for Chongqing’s local transportation 
industry. Located further upstream than any other significant port on the Yangtze, Chongqing is one of 
the most important port cities in Southwest China. The city emerged and developed as a port city in the 
Qing dynasty. Scholars have pointed out that as early as late Qing, Chongqing had become an important 
trading center and economic hub in Southwest China (Zhou et al 2002). Most natural resources and goods 
such as salt and rice were exported to other cities via Chongqing and via the Yangtze River.  
Nowadays, Chongqing is still the major transshipment point for outbound freights in the Southwest. 
Lammie reports that “anticipating a surge in throughput as a result of shorter river journey times to the 
coast, Chongqing will invest 15 billion yuan (2.2 billion US dollars) in river port expansion and is 
building the most modern container terminal on the upper Yangtze. On November 25, 2008, the PRC 
State Council approved Chongqing's application to give Cuntan Harbor bonded port status” (Lammie 
2009). However, due to the hilly topography, Chongqing has always faced the challenge of efficient 
transportation. The road network cannot reach many places, even in the city; neither can it reach some 
docks along the Yangtze River. The difficulties of transporting goods provide an opportunity for the 
booming labor market of bangbang and longshoremen.  
Not only are bangbang economically central to Chongqing, but they are also symbolically significant 
to the city. This cultural significance is what distinguishes bangbang from the other migrant workers. The 
city of Chongqing and the bangbang as a social group have such an intimate relationship that the latter 
have become a symbol of the city.13 This relation, I argue, is mostly a production of media and cultural 
forms. The media provide the most important discursive space for generating discussions about the 
bangbang work and the bangbang. Bangbang as a social group is routinely discussed in the urban media; 
vividly shown in the newspaper stories, television dramas, and movies; and widely written about in 
                                                 
13
 In media, TV dramas, movies, Internet circulations, bangbang are depicted as one of three symbols of the city 
of Chongqing (hotpot, beauty, and bangbang). 
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literature and blogs. Media outlets regularly carry statements by government officials, policy-makers, and 
scholars. These statements, however, are often contradictory and reflect the government’s multiple 
ideological needs and desires. 
2.3. CONFIGURING BANGBANG  
Longshoremen in recent Western history belong to typical blue-collar working class and often organize 
themselves through unions to protect their rights and interests (Nelson 1990). Banbang men in Chongqing, 
however, pose a difference case. With the disappearance of the social analytical category of “class” in 
post-Mao Chinese society, the representation of bangbang in media outlets has not focused on their class 
identity, but on their cultural significance.  
2.3.1. Ahistorical Bangbang 
One of the most popular narratives about bangbang – one that the Chongqing government actively 
promotes -- is an ahistorical account that aims to explain the presence of a large population of porters in 
Chongqing. According to this narrative, Chongqing’s booming trading business and waterway 
transportation business in mid-19th century attracted many poor, bankrupt peasants to look for work in 
the city. Most of the migrants were males. The proportion of male migrants were exceptionally high 
during Jiaqing period (1760－1820), even higher than that in new industrial cities in modern period 
(Zhou 1997: 238). Some of the male migrants made a living by carrying drinking water from the Yangtze 
River to the city residents14. These water carriers, according to this narrative, were the precursor of 
                                                 
14
 Chongqing city was built on the hills above the Yangtze River. In the pre-modern period, the hilly terrain of 
the city makes it extremely difficult to extract drinkable water from the Yangtze River. This special geographic 
condition paves the way for the emergence of a service – water carrying – mostly by rural migrants. Their job was to 
deliver the water from the river to the city residents.  
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bangbang.15 What this narrative shows, first of all, is that Chongqing was historically the center of trade 
and transportation in Southwest China. Second of all, it shows that the presence of large quantities of 
porters in Chongqing is part of the local tradition. Overall, this narrative naturalizes the presence of a 
large army of casual laborers who make a living by doing the dirty, low-end job that most urban dwellers 
would not like to do for such a meager wage.  
This ahistorical account neglects to take into consideration the specific subject positions of bangbang 
as a historical construction that generates unique cultural and social meanings about this group of people. 
The term “bangbang” is a recent creation, which did not exist before the 1990s. The specific cultural 
meanings attached to this group are also unique to and can only be fully understood within the context of 
China’s turbulent transformation from a socialist collective to a market-oriented economy and of post-
Mao China’s labor politics and socioeconomic structure. In the following section, I briefly explain how 
the cultural meaning of porters in Chongqing is historically and socially constructed and changes over 
time.  
Historically, people who made a living by carrying goods for others were called “wild coolies” (ye li) 
or just “coolies” (li fu) in Chongqing. It is beyond the realm of this dissertation to examine the origin of 
these terms; yet given the length of time that these terms were widely used and the social and cultural 
meanings that became attached to the porters in a specific historical period, it is worth pointing out that 
scholars in China commonly agreed that coolie was popularly considered despicable occupation in pre-
modern and modern China.  
After the CCP came into power in 1949, almost every aspect of Chinese society changed, and, 
accordingly, the coolies were organized by the local transportation enterprises and turned into gongren 
(workers). During the Maoist era, some of the coolies became formal employers of either the state-owned 
transportation enterprises or the collectively-owned transportation crews. Theoretically, the work unions 
                                                 
15
 It is not my intention to argue the validity of this proposal. My goal is to show that the casual service heavy 
labor has historical roots in this area and is not something that exists only in post-Mao era. I also want to show that 
rural to urban migration was and has always been part of the local history (except during most of the Maoist era).  
15
 I asked about the difference between “bangbang” and “biandan” and was told that “biandan” was 
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protected the rights and interests of both groups of porters. Now the leading class in the country, the 
porters theoretically held a higher social status than they had before the founding of the People’s Republic 
of China.  
However, I argue that the advancement of the porters’ social status should be understood as a 
discourse that circulated through political propaganda and public representation. The porters’ experiences 
varied during that period. The differences were mostly caused by the workers’ varied employment 
statuses, political statuses, and the rural-urban divide. Besides the formal transportation workers in the 
state-owned transportation enterprises, two new types of porters also emerged in early 1950s. One type of 
porters was unemployed urbanites. Under the slogan of shengchanzijiu (to provide for oneself by 
production), the local government mobilized the unemployed urbanites to join the labor force. At that 
time, many housewives and lower-class people in the city were encouraged to join the bangbang working 
groups to carry goods for state-owned work units. They supplemented the porters in the state-owned 
transportation enterprises, providing extra hands when needed. My interviews with some “supplemental” 
porters in 2007 reveal that the recruiting policy was highly gendered. While most of the porters in the 
state-owned enterprises were men, the “supplemental” porters were largely women. Another type of 
“supplemental” porters were rural migrant men. Before the household registration system was 
implemented in 1958, a small number of male rural residents were also employed by the “supplemental” 
porter groups to work as longshoremen along the docks of Chongqing port. Unlike the workers in state-
owned and collectively-owned transportation enterprises, these porters were not viewed as gongren 
(workers) and thus did not enjoy the state-subsidized food and medical care. They were called “temporary 
workers” (linshi gong).  
The three types of porters were employed with very different entitlements to social provisions and 
welfare and also held very different social statuses. The workers in the state-owned enterprises were at the 
top, the supplemental porters in the collectively-owned working groups were in the middle, and the 
temporary workers were at the bottom of the hierarchy. Looking back, one “supplemental” porter 
admitted that she had barely paid attention to the “temporary workers” because the latter frequently came 
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and went. “They were hired as needed, but we barely kept them long,” she said. While the gongren 
porters worked with the temporary workers now and then, they did not bother to conceptually include the 
latter as part of their crews. 
During late 1950s and early 1960s, especially with the reinforcement of the 1958 Household 
Registration Policy in 1958, these “temporary workers” were no longer permitted to stay in the city and 
were forced to return to their home villages. This action caused a labor shortage in the bangbang business. 
The supplemental porter groups were called on more frequently to share the workload of the workers in 
the state-owned transportation enterprises.  
With the relaxation of the Household Registration policy in the 1980s, and especially after the 1990s, 
more peasants began to look for jobs in the city. Many of them became porters, but not in 
state/collectively-owned transportation enterprises/working groups as they had in the past. These 
enterprises and working groups faced the serious challenge of competition from private transportation 
enterprises and moving companies. Migrant men who worked as casual porters were offered even lower 
rates and were hence more welcomed by customers. Many state and collectively-owned transportation 
enterprises went bankrupt and were pushed out of business. Huge numbers of workers were laid off.  
However, workers in the state-owned enterprises got laid off with much better compensation packages 
than those in the collectively-owned enterprises. Not only did they receive compensation packages, but in 
some cases, they also received life-time medical care. Meanwhile, workers in collectively-owned working 
groups received much less compensation. Some of them were forced to leave their work without any 
compensation. The collective properties of these working groups were also pocketed by the corrupt cadres. 
The laid-off workers protested against these cadres in April 2006, asking for monthly basic living 
allowance of 240 yuan (around 40 US dollars).  
In the 1990s, more bangbang could be seen in the city. People began to call the porters “bangbang” 
(bamboo shoulder pole) instead of “biandan” (wooden shoulder pole). Local residents commonly 
attributed the change in terminology to the fact that the porters began to use bamboo poles instead of 
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shoulder poles.16 However, the real reason is hardly known. The influx of thousands of low-cost porters 
into the city and their presence in almost every corner of the city has made for a new and unique urban 
scene to the local residents. People who want to hire a bangbang just need to shout “bangbang!” on the 
streets or to wave their hands, and a bangbang appears. In some cases, a group of bangbang rush to the 
customers and compete for the job.  
This brief history of the presence of porters in Chongqing demonstrates that in different historical 
periods, the social groups who worked as porters vary, as do the meanings and implications attached to 
porters and their work. The narrative that the government of Chongqing created is ahistorical and invalid. 
By considering the historical figure of porters and the contemporary manifestation of bangbang as 
interchangeable, the government has produced an essentialized image of the porter that transcends space 
and time. This narrative has emerged against the backdrop of the local government’s desire to legitimize 
Chongqing’s leading role in the transportation industry and trade in Southwest China and to naturalize the 
presence of a large number of porters in the local economic development.   
2.3.2. “Beautiful Scenery” 
Another narrative has emerged in relation to the government’s desire to make Chongqing attractive to 
domestic and foreign investors and to promote the local tourist industry. To serve these ends, the 
government considers bangbang and their work part of the “unique and beautiful” urban landscape of 
Chongqing, especially in tours and in media representations. One tour guide says: “What do you expect to 
see in Chongqing? Let me tell you – the beauty, the hot pot, and the bangbang! All the bangbang are iron 
men with strong Chongqing characteristics. They speak a language that you do not understand, they like 
to curse with no reason, and they practice kung fu with their bamboo poles on the street. But they can also 
                                                 
16
 I asked about the difference between “bangbang” and “biandan” and was told that “biandan” were made from 
wooden sticks, and were more expensive than “bangbang” which are made by bamboo. The advantage of “biandan” 
is that it is more flexible so when bearing heavy load, it is more comfortable to use “biandan.” But the bangbang 
always prefer the cheaper tool.  
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treat you like you are their brothers, talking and laughing with you, as if you are a family member…The 
bangbang are the unique part of the scenery of this city.” 
Such descriptions of bangbang often exaggerated their bodies (stout torso, muscular calves, incredible 
strength in lifting goods, and high endurance of hardship), the way they behave and talk, and their innate 
wildness. Furthermore, this exoticization makes use of the haohan (good fellow) stereotype in pre-
modern Chinese literature and popular culture, for example, as represented in the novel All Men Are 
Brothers.17 Haohan are heroes who come from the underprivileged classes; their social mobility is very 
limited. The stereotype is that they have a high tolerance for alcohol, like to eat meat, and generally 
abstain from sex. In Chongqing contemporary writer Dequan Cao’s fictional text, The Legend of 
Bangbang in the Mountainous City (Cao 2005), he mentions that meat and alcohol were the presents he 
chose to give to bangbang when they first invited him for a dinner in their place. He writes that the 
bangbang drink copiously, and “after three cups of wine, they began to vie with each other in telling [Cao] 
their experiences” (Cao 2005).” Literary descriptions such as this one reinforce the stereotypical image of 
bangbang as masculine social outcasts. 
It is worth noting that bangbang seem to hold the most symbolic value in the urban setting only when 
they appear or act in groups. Individual bangbang are not considered “a beautiful scene” and are 
represented much less in media. There have barely been any literary works or media discussions that 
feature a single bangbang man and that shed light on his humanness as an individual. Local Chongqing 
residents use “bangbang army” (bangbang jun) to refer to bangbang as a whole. This politics of naming 
implies a homogenous, undistinguished mass of reserve labor. What the media is really concerned is with 
their quantity, not the quality or the uniqueness of each individual laborer. The word “Jun” (army) seems 
to indicate the opposite of min (civilians). In the CCP’s propaganda, the military solders (jun) are civilians, 
but different from the civilians; Jun is educated with Marxist and Maoist thought, obeys the CCP with full 
                                                 
17
 All Men Are Brothers is a novel about one hundred and eight male outlaws who lived at the margins of society 
and resisted government repression by using military force. Scholars debate who the author of the novel is and in 
which historical period that this novel was written. One dominant opinion in China is that its author is Shi Nai’an, 
and the novel was written in late Song and early Ming dynasty.  
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obedience, and serves civilians whole-heartedly. The word “Jun” also implies a disciplined workforce that 
is ready to be deployed for the state’s economic development.  
This quantification of bangbang in the cultural politics, I argue, is a politics of exclusion that 
differentiates the working masses of bangbang from an urban setting that emphasizes individualism and 
uniqueness. This quantification also reflects the way that the bodies of bangbang are imagined and 
conceptualized in post-Mao China. Ann Anagnost argues that the Chinese body has been transformed 
from a producing body in the Maoist era to a consuming body in the post-Mao period. While decades ago 
the proletarian masses were viewed as a progressive force in history and the most productive class, they 
are now seen as bodies with consuming demands that are “out of balance with [the bodies’] productivity” 
(Anagnost 1997:126). In the post-reform Chinese society, the “quality,” not the “quantity,” of the masses 
matters. Bangbang, being large in quantity but presumably low in quality, can barely be included into the 
urban productive workforce. It is no wonder that these “backward” and “valueless” workers are often 
accused of being an obstacle to regional development.  
2.3.3. Gangsters and Secret Societies 
One popular discourse about bangbang describes them as gangsters or secret society members. A scholar 
in the Chongqing Academy of Social Sciences told me: “People often think that they [bangbang] are just 
peasants who work in the city. It is not that simple. These people [bangbang] have 
miscellaneous backgrounds (zhe qun ren hen za). Some of them were/are mafia members (hei shehui). 
Some of them were/are secret society members (paoge).18 All in all, they are from Three Religions and 
Nine Schools (sanjiaojiuliu).” This description of bangbang, however, seems to contradict the image of 
obedience and dedication that the term bangbang jun conveys. Depicted as gangsters or members of 
secret societies, bangbang are largely “crafted” to be potential criminals at the margin of the society. 
They are on the opposite side of the law and order, and they pose a threat to social stability and harmony. 
                                                 
18
 Paoge, literarily means “gown brother”, actually means the member of Gulu/Gelao Hui (secret society). They 
are in fact gangsters.  
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The problem with this characterization, though, is that just as with the bangbang jun, it represents 
bangbang in quantities, not as individuals.   
2.3.4. “Embodiment of Spirit” 
Media discussions often argue that bangbang embody chiku nailao (diligence, toughness, indomitability, 
and hard work), the “spirit” that “ensures the success of Chongqing in economic development” (Li and Li 
2007). In 2004, when Chongqing held an International Forum of the Image of Cities (chengshi xingxiang 
guoji luntan), the conference participants fervently discussed whether it was appropriate to use the image 
of bangbang to represent Chongqing. One participant argued that “Bangbang is the unique product (te 
chan) of Chongqing – they have the spirit to climb up (the ladders). They embody the virtues of diligence 
and perseverance” (Li, Cao, He and Liu 2004). Xu Jialu, the Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee 
of the National People's Congress, also told the public that he was moved by the spirit of bangbang. “The 
bangbang spirit is the high point of the Bayu (Chongqing and Chengdu) culture.”  
Most commonly, the so-called “spirit” of the bangbang is turned into a metaphor for the “spirit” of 
Chongqing. For example, in 2007, in a news program entitled “Four-Scholar Talk about Chongqing’s 
Humanistic Spirit,” organized by the Department of Publicity of Chongqing City and the Xinhua News 
Channel, the former head of Industry and Commerce University of Chongqing said, “Chongqing has a 
[big] group of bangbang, which is rare in [other cities in] China. This is the hardest kind of labor but 
reaps relatively low payment. But many Chongqing people are doing this work for a living. They can ‘eat 
this bitterness’ because they have been climbing [Chongqing’s] steep terrain like this. Historically, 
Chongqing has been through ups and downs. But [because Chongqing people have a high spirit, just like 
bangbang], they can persevere through [the ups and downs] with the hope of going up again.”  
Most of such narratives are simply repetitions of the CCP’s official speeches. While embodying the 
“spirit” of chiku nailao (eating bitterness) had enormous political significance to individual people in the 
Maoist era, such significance has largely disappeared in the context of post-Mao China. “The spirit of 
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chiku nailao” has become an empty shell with no concrete political meaning in/to it. It is one of the 
fragments of the socialist past that lingers in today’s Chinese society and that today’s people have 
struggled to appropriate to capture the social reality. For the government, this narrative naturalizes the 
exploitation and social inequalities that bangbang experience. The logic is that bangbang are supposed to 
experience suffering (eat bitterness) because they represent the spirit of chiku nailao. However, narratives 
such as this make visible the “mental elevation” of the privileged classes. After all, people who come 
from these classes and marvel at the “spirit” of bangbang would never allow their children to become part 
of the “beautiful scenery.” When an urban child does not perform well in school, middle-class parents 
often point to the bangbang on the street and tell the child, “If you don’t study hard, you will just end up 
like him!” 
2.4. CAN BANGBANG REPRESENT CHONGQING? 
Since 2003, Chongqing’s government has carried out a series of projects to brand the city. The officials 
decided that a delegate should be elected to represent the “image” of Chongqing. Unlike other 
municipalities such as Beijing which is said to be the center of politics and Shanghai which is said to be 
the center of trade, Chongqing has not found its strength and established its reputation. And this, the 
government thinks, has ruined Chongqing’s capability of attracting investment and its economic 
development. Thus, it is crucial for Chongqing to have a symbolic delegate, or as they call it, a “business 
card” that would be able to represent the uniqueness and the strength of Chongqing to the outside world.  
Michalis Kavaratzis, in his research on city branding, states that city branding and the creation of so-
called “city images” originate from the idea of the “entrepreneurial city” and the marketing of places, 
which have been one of the defining features of the entrepreneurial modes of urban governance in the 
Western world since 1970s. The entrepreneuralization of cities means that cities are “being run in a more 
businesslike manner” and that the city governance has taken on certain characteristics that were once 
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distinctive to business, such as risk taking, promotion and profit motivation. As Ashworth and Voogd’s 
research (1994) shows, image marketing is one of the three most important developments in the 
emergence of place marketing and “solves the difficulty of transferring marketing knowledge from its 
initial field of industrial goods and services to places” (Kavaratzis 2004:59). Hubbard and Hall (1998:7, 
cited by Kavaratzis 2004:62) actually conclude that entrepreneurial city can be considered as an 
imaginary city, constituted by a plethora of images and representations.  
It is not difficult to understand why the Chongqing government wants to brand and market this city 
when we consider its desire to balance the economic development of the inland and the coastal areas. But 
it does raise the questions of which images and whose images the local government prefers to use to 
represent Chongqing and why. The interesting thing is that during these projects – which include 
elections, campaigns, conferences, public forum discussions, and so on – the local government and the 
regular city residents normally held quite different opinions regarding whether bangbang should represent 
Chongqing. Among the city residents themselves, different opinions also emerged, causing fierce debate. 
These discrepancies in opinions show not only the awkward social position that bangbang occupy in the 
urban setting but also the conflicting value systems that shape people’s opinions about bangbang as a 
social group.  
In 2005, the city government sponsored a city-wide election with the purpose of choosing ten 
“business cards” for the “image” of Chongqing. The so-called “business cards” must be items or 
individuals that represent certain aspects of Chongqing politics, economy, products, history, and urban 
culture. The winners, which were disclosed later, included “beautiful women, hot pot, monument of 
Liberation, the Red Cliff19, the slang ‘xiongqi’,20 the Three Gorges, the young revolutionary martyr Zou 
Rong,21 the capital of bridges, the Diaoyu Castle, and the family tourist site – hot spring. Although 
bangbang were proposed by some city residents, they did not make it to the finalist.  
                                                 
19
 The Red Cliff is a Kuomingtang prison in Chongqing during the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949).  
20
 It is a popular local slang, meaning “cheer up.”  
21
 Zou Rong was born in Sichuan province in West China in 1885. He became interested in Western ideas, and 
went to Japan to study in 1901, where he was exposed to radical revolutionary and anti-Manchu ideas. In 1903, he 
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In 2009, the government sponsored another election, calling on the local residents to vote for the 
“representative spokesman” of the city. Funded by a toothpaste company, Leng Suan Ling, the election 
was named “Leng Suan Ling Cup 2009 Election for the City Representative Spokesman of Chongqing.” 
The main webpage of the election read: “At the starting point of the next ten years [of development], 
Chongqing has reached a new high. We live in the same city, and drink water from the same river. As a 
part of this city, who do you think is the representative of Chongqing? This red May will feature the great 
election for the city spokesman. Let’s establish the new city brand image (chengshi pingpai xin xingxiang) 
for Chongqing.” According to the Chongqing Evening Newspaper, a total of 8,370,000 people voted for 
the representative spokesman. The winners, announced by the government on July 23, 2009, were two 
males, Li Gu and Yundi Li. Both of them were born and raised in Chongqing. The former is a multiple-
time world champion of the game of go. The latter received the world championship in the International 
Frederic Chopin Piano Competition in Warsaw in 2000 when he was 17 years old. Again, bangbang were 
nominated by unnamed local residents to be candidates for the “spokesman” election. However, again, the 
panel of judges (mostly comprised of government officials) left out bangbang.  
Journalist Yixing Zhou wrote in the QiLu (Shandong Province) Evening Newspaper that the election 
ignored the bangbang as whole. He writes: “…‘bangbang army’ mostly came from the countryside and 
lives in Chongqing. As a social group, … they are quite well known in Chongqing and in China. 
Moreover, this social group has a spirit of self-reliance and embodies the spirit of the plain laboring 
people. In this sense, the fact that the “bangbang army”…cannot become one of the business cards of 
Chongqing…is to be regretted in terms of the authenticity of this election.” He continues: “The business 
card of a city……should put the ‘human’ in the center of city life, paying attention to ‘human,’ especially 
the groups living at the bottom of the society……So I [the author] would like to ask the relevant 
[government] departments and experts: ‘Why not include the bangbang army into Chongqing’s business 
cards?’.” 
                                                                                                                                                             
published his most important work “The Revolutionary Army,” a tract that inspired many revolutionary radicals 
before the 1911 Revolution. Zou was arrested for publishing the tract, and died in prison in 1905. 
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However, such questions were never answered by the government. During the 2009’s city spokesman 
election, bangbang became one of the top 50 candidates. However, one of the local celebrities, painter 
Qikai Zhang, publicly stated that “bangbang is the distinguishing feature of Chongqing, but they cannot 
be promoted (xuanchuan) as the representation of Chongqing.” But very quickly, the Chongqing Evening 
Newspaper published a reader’s letter, which expressed the readers’ dissatisfaction with Zhang’s 
statement. The reader writes: “Taking into account the proportion of the bangbang in the local population, 
the symbolic meaning of their coming into the city and their contribution to the city-countryside 
integration policy, and their contribution to building the city…bangbang is the best representative 
spokesman of Chongqing. No matter whether Mr. Zhang admits it or not, … the characteristics of 
diligence, warm-heartedness, and kindness are enough to offset minor shortcomings, such as bad hygiene 
and poor education…” At the same time, the assistant (government ) minister of the Publicity Department 
(xuanchuan bu), Bo Zhou, tells the public that “… the ‘bangbang army of the mountainous city’ is a 
special group of people unique to Chongqing. My understanding is that they definitely can represent 
Chongqing. However, bangbang are a group of people. The question of how to make a group represent 
Chongqing is worth further research later” (Yi 2009). But the government has never reported any further 
research or research results.  
It is worth noting that it is not just the government that has a negative attitude toward using the image 
of bangbang as a delegate of the image of Chongqing; some city residents also dislike this idea. On an 
online message board on the famous Chinese website tianya.com, a web user asked in a post whether the 
Chongqing netizens supported bangbang as representatives of Chongqing. In the 64 responses to the post, 
about 18 respondents supported this proposal, but around 25 expressed strong opposition. One opponent 
posted, “‘bangbang army’ doesn’t fit in. How can they be integrated into the international environment 
(yu guoji jiegui)? They are too rustic (xiangtu hua).” This person’s opinion was echoed: “The original 
poster just wanted to shame Chongqing by asking that question [of whether bangbang should represent 
Chongqing]. His question also invited all of China to make fun of Chongqing for its lack of cultivation, 
its lack of talented people, and its being a typical peasants’ city. That’s the goal of the original poster.” A 
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similar opinion reads, “The bangbang need regulation. It is beyond my imagination to have them to 
represent Chongqing.” Another one reads: “How can the ‘bangbang army’ represent the ten-year (1997-
2007) achievement of Chongqing, the young municipality? The term ‘bangbang army’ is itself a negative 
one. The original poster is definitely not from Chongqing. Maybe someone whose motivation is evil (to 
shame Chongqing).”  
Another group of opponents agreed that bangbang have some merits; however, bangbang, in their 
opinion, cannot represent how modern and developed the Chongqing municipality has become. One post 
reads: “The ‘bangbang army’ is a product of one period of development in Chongqing, but it cannot 
represent the image of a [modern and developing] municipality, even though the local residents have 
connection with them…” Another one reads: “It [the fact that bangbang cannot represent Chongqing] is 
not because the city residents are biased but because you (the original poster) have a parochial view 
(yanguang xia’ai) of Chongqing. Bangbang can at the most represent the past (of Chongqing), but must 
not represent the fifth municipality (meaning, the young and hopeful modern city) of China.” Some other 
poster expressed similar opinions: “The ‘Bangbang army’ in Chongqing embodies the spirit of those who 
are hardworking, are fearless in the face of difficulties and sacrifice, and are dedicated (to nation-
building). However, they don’t seem to represent the local history and culture, the contemporary city 
residents’ spirit, and the future development of Chongqing.”  
The third group of opponents thought that bangbang were the shameful evidence of the city 
government’s incapability and, thus, could not be the image of Chongqing. One such post reads: “The 
‘bangbang army’ is a malformation of the city…One either enters the city and becomes a city resident, or 
goes back to the country to become a peasant. Who are these people when they are neither urban nor rural 
residents?...The ‘bangbang army’ is concrete evidence of the incapability and the shame of the local 
government. How can the government choose [bangbang] as a candidate for the spokesman?”  
One person tried to communicate with these opponents and persuaded them to respect bangbang: “My 
friend, you said that the term ‘bangbang army’ has negative connotations. That is because for a long time, 
many people look down upon the bangbang, just like you. … The ‘bangbang army’ doesn’t steal from 
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others. They work hard to earn money in order to raise their families. They are much better than the 
thieves, cheaters, and beggars. Yes, they were peasants. They are poor and dirty, but they are simple, 
friendly, hard-working, and strong. They don’t trouble the society and the government or become 
defeated by poverty. On the contrary, they provide convenience for thousands of Chongqing city dwellers. 
We should respect them and learn from their courage and sprit.” However, this poster’s comment did not 
raise reflection or critical thinking, but only more aversion. One post reads: “Actually bangbang in real 
life are thieves and steal everywhere. No way can they be considered simple and friendly!” Another post 
reads: “How many bangbang are real Chongqingeses? How can they represent Chongqing?”  
The fierce debate between the regular city residents and the city government as well as among 
individual city dwellers themselves about whether the “bangbang army” can represent Chongqing shows 
the different values that the government and individual city residents hold toward the rural migrant 
workers. On the one hand, the past socialist period leaves a long legacy of socialist values and morals 
such as valorizing manual labor, poor laboring people, and the “spirit” of hard-work and living simple 
lives. Therefore, nowadays, continuing in this tradition, the rural migrant workers, instead of the urban 
residents, are chosen to convey such values and morality. On the other hand, the bangbang are viewed as 
backward, low quality, and belonging to the past, a group that the quickly developing Chongqing would 
like to leave behind or transform. The fierce debate also shows the awkward social position the bangbang 
occupy in Chongqing society. It is not just the awkward identity of the bangbang of being neither peasant 
nor urban resident; rather, it is more about the awkwardness caused by China’s desire to simultaneously 
keep the “skin” of socialism and to continue its privatization and capitalization under the name of 
“Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” In many cases, maintaining that “skin” of socialism is for the 
purposes of helping the market play a bigger role in China’s economic and social transformation.   
Baozhuang, a Chinese term that literarily means “packaging” or “packing,” denotes the desire to make 
commodities look attractive and sell better in the marketplace. Given this trend of post-Mao China, goods 
with fancy packages can be sold at a much higher price than those that look plain. Fruits cultivated in 
greenhouses that are bigger, shapelier, smoother, and more neatly packaged are much pricier in 
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supermarkets than the regular fruits, even though the latter may taste better. The “business cards” and the 
“representative spokesman” of Chongqing as well as other urban design projects carried out by the 
Chongqing government can be understood as strategies to package Chongqing as a brand. Contributing to 
efforts toward increasing Chongqing’s marketability and thus its profitability, “business cards,” city 
symbols, and the representative spokesmen help make the city “a total concept, a timeless essence” 
(Anagnost 1997:162). To compete with other cities domestically and internationally, Chongqing is eager 
to show its brightest and most developed “face,’ among many other “faces,” to the potential buyers in the 
global market. To this end, bangbang must be left out. For the Chongqing government, they are not only 
useless for the purpose of selling the city, but are also barriers to Chongqing’s modernization and 
development. While Chongqing city is assumed to have a bright future, the government is careful to make 
sure that bangbang are not part of that picture because they belong to the darker, duller past.  
2.5. CONCLUSION 
The former mayor of Chongqing city, Hongju Wang, made a proposal in a government meeting about the 
regulation of rural migrant workers. He said that the urban residents should stop calling the porters 
“bangbang” because “this term has negative connotations.” The proposal provoked heated debate among 
the city dwellers. Xinhua news reports that over one hundred urban residents made phone calls to the 
government offices, supporting the mayor’s proposal. These people proposed eight other appellations for 
the bangbang, including Lige (literarily, laboring brother), shifu (master), and so on (Zhang 2005). The 
Labor Service Office of the city government also supported the mayor’s proposal and suggested that the 
new name for the shoulder-pole porters can also be packaged as a new brand of workforce, something 
unique to Chongqing. This brand of workforce can then be “channeled” to the needed places outside of 
Chongqing.  
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However, Chongqing residents disagreed with the officials. People’s Daily reports that many city 
residents thought that it was no use to merely change the way bangbang are hailed. “’Bangbang’ is not 
necessarily a negative term. The problem is not what the bangbang are called, but whether they are 
respected.” Some local residents think that merely changing the name for the the bangbang would not 
change their identity. The key [to stop urban discrimination against bangbang] is to encourage tolerance 
and respect for them and to help them learn more survival skills” (Zhang 2007).  
What do the bangbang think of the mayor’s proposal? When I asked this question to a group of 
bangbang, the majority of them told me that they were concerned not with what people called them but 
with how much they could earn. “If I can earn one hundred yuan (around 15 dollars) a day, I don’t care if 
I am referred to by a different name,” one bangbang said. Another one complained about the mayor’s 
proposal. “I am used to being called ‘bangbang.’ When people call [bangbang], I know they are talking to 
me. If people called me ‘shifu’ or ‘lige,’ I won’t be able to react as quickly and might lose my business.” 
His opinion received the support of other bangbangs. According to a survey by Southwest University in 
Chongqing in 2007, 80% of bangbang interviewed showed no interest in the debate regarding their label. 
Rather, they are considerably more concerned with their daily earnings and survival in the city. These 
bangbang’s responses show clearly that the former mayor’s “care” for the bangbang is superficial and 
just another performance of “humanistic care” by government officials.  
In claiming that the intimate connection between bangbang and the city of Chongqing is largely a 
product of the media and a discursive construction, I want to emphasize the significant role that bangbang 
play in the city’s local economic development and to highlight the social inequalities that they experience 
every day. At play are the cultural politics of both exclusion and (in)visibility. These politics naturalize 
the exploitation and inequalities to which bangbang are subject.  
Early in my fieldwork, when I asked the bangbang why they chose this job, they told me that they 
liked their work because they felt a sense of “freedom” in doing it. Their response confused me. What do 
they mean by “freedom”? What type of “freedom” do they enjoy in doing this work? Is there a limit to 
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their “freedom”? What does this “freedom” imply in terms of labor politics and power relations? These 
are the questions that my Chapter Three attempts to answer.   
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3.0 GOVERNING THROUGH ZIYOU: BANGBANG’S OCCUPATIONAL 
CHOICE AND THE FORM OF THEIR WORK 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Shortly after I started my fieldwork, I began to notice one “strange” phenomena emerging from my 
question requesting for the reasons why and how the bangbang ended up with doing this job. Their work, 
in its contingent and casual form, is very different from contracted work that factory workers and 
construction workers do. Given the fact that a large proportion of rural to urban migrants work in the off-
shore factories in the Pearl River Delta region and many migrant men either work on construction sites, 
collective farms, or mines, why does this huge population end up in Chongqing, working as porters, the 
lowest rung of the job hierarchy? How do they make that occupational choice? What are they concerned 
with in making that choice?  
When I asked the porters these questions, surprisingly, they often gave to me a very simple answer: 
“Ziyou (freedom).” They told me that the job gave them the sense of ziyou; many bangbang also perceive 
their work as more ziyou or “free” than other jobs. It made me wonder what kind of freedom this sweating 
heavy-labor low-payment job could possible provide to the migrant workers. Yet, this “ziyou” rhetoric 
was so frequently heard in their responses to my questions about their occupational choice that I began to 
question its meaning. Furthermore, my interviews with urban business owners and regular urban residents 
also showed that they commonly viewed bangbang as “having uncontrolled liberty” (ziyouzizai). They 
perceive bangbang as highly mobile and “lighthearted” because bangbang appeared to spend a lot of time 
wandering around, doing nothing in the daytime, while waiting for business. Through an examination of 
their experience in choosing occupation, this chapter seeks answers for the following questions: What 
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does ziyou mean for these rural migrant workers? What kind of ziyou does bangbang work give them? 
Why are the narratives of ziyou so significant among bangbang? What subjectivity does the discourse of 
ziyou form among these workers?  
While in China, rural migrants are widely represented as the responsible, self-reliant subjects who 
rationally take advantage of the costs and benefit of migration, just like the neoliberal notion of rationality 
would have it, this chapter explores whether neoliberalism alone deliberately and vehemently transforms 
these laborers into enterprising, calculating, and self-governing subjects. Some scholars who argue that 
the Chinese Party-State is "regrouping" rather than "retreating" (Sigley 2006) and that the post-socialist 
state continues to condition the occupational choice of young professionals of the post-Mao period 
through appropriating the Maoist era norms and values of serving the country (Hoffman 2006). Following 
these scholars, this chapter argues that, for rural migrants, the discourse of ziyou (freedom) promoted by 
the state played a significant role in facilitating migrants' subject formation, transforming them into self-
reliant and enterprising laborers, even as it made them vulnerable to fierce exploitation. At the same time, 
bangbang turned this neoliberal rationality around and used it to struggle for the security and aid that the 
state refuses to provide because it externalized the "technologies of the self." Bangbang internalize 
neoliberal techniques of governance that are framed as ziyou (freedom), not from the social responsibility 
or patriotism, but from disappointment with and distrust of the state. 
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3.2. NEOLIBERALISM AND THE QUESTION OF GOVERNMENTALITY 
This chapter is framed by theoretical debates on neoliberalism as a "tactic of governmentality."22 It 
connects rural migrant workers' occupational choice with their subjectivity formation and analyzes the 
dynamics of these two elements from a perspective of governmentality. As Lisa Hoffman's study of 
governmentality in Dalian’s talent service center and job fairs wisely suggests, choice and autonomy are 
actually a part of the processes of governing and subject formation. “Freedom is not indicative of the 
absence of power or control over the working bodies but is a technique of governance for which the 
regulation and management of subjects happens through the rhetoric of ‘freedom’” (Hoffman 2006). 
Neoliberalism has different meanings from different points of view. As Aihwa Ong suggests, in the 
United States, neoliberalism is usually termed as “market-based policies” and “neoconservatism” and 
indicates the seeking of strategies “to eliminate social programs and promote the interests of big capital” 
(Ong 2006). In Asia, neoliberalism is viewed by politicians and pundits as “America’s overweening 
power” for destructive market domination over Asian economics; in popular discourse, neoliberalism 
represents “unregulated financial flows” that threaten national currencies and living conditions. But in 
general, neoliberalism is often viewed as a market ideology that opposes the governance and activity of 
state (Ong 2006). Some scholars construct a framework of a neoliberal North versus a South under siege, 
stating that neoliberalism from the North sweeps the South and engenders conflicting responses. Some 
scholars seek to identify “neoliberal states” that centralize capital and monopolize power “at the global 
                                                 
22 There is a body of scholarship that considers neoliberalism as the “tactics of governmentality.” Here are a few 
examples. Burchell, Grahman, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller. 1991. The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality with Two lectures by and An Interview with Michel Foucual, University of Chicago Press. Rose, 
Nikolas. 1993. “Governmentm authority and expertise in advanced liberalism,” Economy and Society 22: 283-299. 
Barry, Andrew, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose (ed.). 1997. Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-
liberalism and Rationalities of Government, University of Chicago Press. Lemke, Thomas. 2000.  “Foucault, 
Governmantality, and Critique,” paper presented at the Rethinking Marxism Conference, University of Amherst 
(MA). Ong, Aihwa. 2006. Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Duke University 
Press. 
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level.” However, as many scholars have pointed out, neoliberalism can also be understood as the 
technology of government, “a new relationship between government and knowledge through which 
governing activities are recast as nonpolitical and nonideological problems that need technical solutions” 
(Ong 2006:3).23 In other words, neoliberalism is a newly developed technique of Foucault’s “biopolitics” 
that relies on market knowledge, the politics of subjection and subject-making to govern modern human 
beings. Since the state, as Foucault suggests, has no essence, and the institutional nature of the state is a 
function of changes in practices of government (Gordon 1991), neoliberalism as technology of 
government should not be taken as the natural existing sphere that contradicts the overpowering state, but 
a new form of state planning for optimizing public resources and population control. In Lemke’s terms, 
neoliberalism is above all a political project that endeavors to create a social reality whose forms of 
governance need to be studied (Lemke 1999).  
Foucault defines government as “the conduct of conduct,” meaning “the array of knowledges and 
techniques that are concerned with the systematic and pragmatic guidance and regulation of everyday 
conduct” (Ong 2006). As a guidance of subjects’ daily life, governmentality covers a range of practices 
from “governing others” to “governing self.” The concept of governmentality helps us open the 
conceptual space to recognize that neoliberal rationality functions as a politics of truth, insinuating 
market-driven truths and calculations into the domain of politics, “producing new forms of knowledge, 
and inventing new notions and concepts that contribute to new domains of regulation and intervention” 
(Lemke 2000). From the perspective of governmentality, the retreat of the state in advanced liberal 
democracies under neoliberal policies is in fact a prolonged government. Neoliberalism is far from the 
end of politics, but is a transformed politics that restructures the power relations in society. Neoliberal 
forms of government extend from political government to forms of self-regulation, featuring not only 
                                                 
23
 Similar argument can also be found in many scholars’ works, for example, Bourdieu, Piere. December 1998. 
“The Essence of Neoliberalism: Utopia of Endless Exploitation.” Le Monde Diplomatique (English edition); Gordon, 
Colin. 1991.  “Government Rationality: An Introduction,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 1-51; Barry, Andrew, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose (ed).1997. 
Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism and Rationalities of Government, University of Chicago 
Press.  
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direct intervention of state apparatuses, but also indirect techniques for leading and controlling individuals 
(Lemke 2000). 
The question of whether it is appropriate to apply the concept of neoliberalism to study post-colonial, 
authoritarian, or post-socialist situations in emerging countries with non-liberal/illiberal traditions has 
been lively debated among scholars. I agree with Ong (2006) and others (such as Hoffman 2006) that we 
should focus on “the active, interventionist aspect of neoliberalism in non-Western contexts,” where 
“neoliberalism as exception is introduced in sites of transformation, where market-driven calculations are 
introduced in the management of population and the administration of spaces.” Sigley has also proposed 
“liberal despotism,” meaning “authoritarian and illiberal measures are constitutive of the way in which a 
liberal art of government operates” (Sigley 2004). Following their arguments, I argue that we should use 
neoliberalism as exception to understand the dominant principles of labor control and labor management 
in post-socialist situation in China because neoliberal ethos has been constitutive of the government 
operation, even with neoliberal practices not being the general characteristic of technologies of governing. 
The “wedding” of neoliberal techniques and active state regulations has paved the way for the mode of 
“governing through freedom” and producing “self-enterprising citizen-subject[s]” that aim to “[optimize] 
conditions for responding technically and ethically to globalized uncertainty and threat” (Ong 2006).   
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3.3. THE ATTRACTION OF BANGBANG WORK 
Bangbang do not just blindly “jump” into this occupation; neither do they choose this job because they do 
not have other options. On the contrary, many of them have previous working experiences in other 
occupations and deliberately choose this job for reasons such as immediate cash, closeness to their home 
village, and the lack of requirement for an educational certificate. But as noted earlier, the reason that 
came up repeatedly in my interviews with the bangbang was that this job afforded them “ziyou.” The term 
ziyou has multiple meanings for the bangbang.  
The first meaning of ziyou is being free from an employer’s bodily discipline and control, which is 
often a feature of other manual jobs, such as factory work. One bangbang and former factory worker 
compared bangbang work with factory work, saying:  
“I began to work in a motorcycle accessory factory in 2000, before I quit it in 2004 for the 
bangbang job. In the factory, I had to work at least twelve hours a day, sometimes even fourteen hours, 
from eight in the morning to ten at night. I worked at the assembly line, polishing the accessories. The 
work is boring and backbreaking. I had Hepatitis B and needed rest occasionally. When I did, the 
supervisor would come up and criticize me loudly. I felt humiliated …because I thought of myself as a 
hard worker. He also turned to the boss, saying that I was lazy. There was no way for me to argue back 
because I did not want to lose my job. I could do nothing but go back to work. After a while, I found 
myself sick of this job, expecting a break all the time. But the break never came to me until I finish a 
whole day's workload. The bangbang job is different. I can take a break whenever I want. …Nobody 
bosses me around. I think this is great!”24  
 
These words reflect the firm and relentless control over the worker's body in a factory. As Pun Ngai 
argues, the moving assembly line "coupled an individualized body with a specific position, but at the 
same time it linked the individuals to form a collective social body devoted to the singular aim of 
maximizing production” (Pun 2005). The worker's body is thus individualized and forced to adapt itself to 
the speed, time, and movement of the moving belt. By contrast, bangbang jobs do not require a worker to 
accommodate a certain production line, and there is no boss around. The workers, then, feel they have the 
                                                 
24
 The author’s fieldnotes, November 3, 2006. 
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option to decide when, where, and how long to work, as well as for whom they work, just like an 
entrepreneur. 
The second aspect of ziyou is to have the flexibility of making short trips back to the countryside and 
to maximize the benefits of both rural and urban regions by making a circular migration. This type of 
freedom is important because many bangbang still farm land in their home villages. They return to the 
village during the peak farming and harvest season (usually in early March and the middle of August). 
Similarly, many bangbang have wives and children in the villages who they want to visit occasionally. 
Working as a bangbang, they can leave for home at any time and stay in the village for a certain length of 
time with no worry of being fired or fined by an employer. The flexibility of bangbang jobs meets their 
needs.  
Big Brother Mo, a fifty-two-year-old bangbang and former quarry worker, told me that he liked 
bangbang work and would never go back to the quarry where he had worked for ten years. I asked if it 
was because quarrying was more arduous than bangbang work. He answered: "Both jobs require almost 
the same labor. But I get more ziyou by doing the bangbang job." I asked what ziyou he enjoyed. He 
seemed surprised that I asked this question but answered: "That's obvious. Don't you see we bangbang 
have no bosses? I'm my own boss. I decide if I work today or not, when and where to work, for whom I 
work, how long to work, and with whom I want to work. No one has the right to order me around. Can 
quarry workers have such ziyou?" He then told me about his painful experience, working in a private 
quarry where the quarrymen had to obey the boss's orders:  
“My wage was in the boss's hands. What could I do? One time my son was in the hospital. I wanted 
to go take care of him, so I asked for a short-term leave. My boss said okay, but to come back to work 
as soon as possible or I would risk being fired. I'd just had enough of it. You know we rural men are 
not like urban workers who are accustomed to obeying the discipline of the danwei. We never have 
danwei, and we've been accustomed to ziyou.” 
The third aspect of ziyou refers to the fragmentation of labor across an enormous span of makeshift 
occupations. Bangbang do not have written agreements with their customers. This allows them to change 
occupations easily. Many bangbang have several part-time jobs at the same time in order to make ends 
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meet. Some bangbang do short-term jobs for immediate cash. They want, in their own words, "double 
security" and extra money.  
A bangbang nicknamed Lao Tang, worked as a temporary part-time worker in the sculpture 
department at a fine arts college. He worked most often in June and July when "most students are 
graduating and they need helpers." This temporary job "almost doubles the monthly earning of a 
bangbang," he said. Whenever the bangbang job did not enable him to make ends meet, he went to the 
college to find work. In addition, he collected cardboard and other scraps to sell for extra money. Such 
jobs require that the laborers not be bound by any contract, employer, work time, or workplace. 
Finally, some bangbang refer to ziyou as freedom from state regulation. The household registration 
system which requires each rural migrant to register at the local branch of the Public Security Bureau 
does not work well in the case of bangbang for two reasons. First, there are too many bangbang, and they 
are hard to trace. One local authority to whom I talked said: “Actually you never know where a bangbang 
plans to go, because he often moves.” Second, many bangbang do not bother to register because they 
think the process is costly and time-consuming and does not provide them substantial benefits. One 
bangbang said, “Nobody can govern (guan) us bangbang, not even the Emperor of Heaven (tianwang 
laozi)!” 
3.4. COMMODIFICATION OF LABOR AND THE RISE OF ZIYOU AS A POPULAR 
DISCOURSE 
The narratives of ziyou are so strong among bangbang in contemporary Chongqing. But if we look back 
to the socialist era, ziyou was not such a big concern for the shoulder porters. When Mao was in charge, 
the porters worked under the supervision of the cadres who told them where, when, and how long to work, 
how much the workload was, and how far they had to carry the goods. Like workers in other occupations, 
they also had to fulfill a lot of political tasks, such as attending political meetings and doing volunteer 
work for work units. The majority of the porters at that time were urban residents who were controlled by 
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the work units through the welfare system and redistributive economics. Their labor force was not a 
commodity to sell in the marketplace and was not a personal resource to be used flexibly and efficiently. 
The laborers also did not view themselves as individuals, but rather as one member of the collective. 
It was against this socialist regime that the emergence of a free labor market and the legitimacy of 
workers choosing jobs at will were seen as representing freedom from the state and a resumption of 
agency for individuals. This attitude can be explicitly seen in my conversations with porters who worked 
during the Maoist era. One woman porter said: "If you asked me what I think of the present bangbang, I 
would have to say that they have too much ziyou. When I worked as a bangbang in my work unit, I had to 
obey the cadre’s assignment all the time. We didn't have choice as for when and where to work, with 
whom to work, like today's bangbang. We didn't have time to relax. What we thought all the time was 
how to contribute to our country in a better way." When I asked how she felt about working under the 
planned economy, she answered: "Well, I didn't think that much about myself. What I considered the 
most was how to finish the workload as efficiently as possible. I devoted my whole life to the state, not 
like today's bangbang, who do everything only for themselves."  
The change in the significance of ziyou to regular Chinese people is intimately linked to China's 
transformation from Maoist socialism to the "socialism with Chinese characteristics" beginning in the late 
1970s. Post-reform China witnessed a growing prominence of the term ziyou (freedom) in people's daily 
life, such as geren ziyou (individual freedom), yanlun ziyou (freedom of speech), and xiaofei ziyou 
(freedom in consumption), freeing individuals from the highly socialist state and political coercion and 
reclaiming individual autonomy and choices that had been largely erased during the Maoist era.  
The concepts of ziyou were first introduced to China by Fu Yan in the early twentieth century as he 
translated John Stuart Mill's work On Liberty into Chinese. Yan used the Chinese term ziyou for the word 
"liberty." Yu Gao correctly pointed out that the meaning of ziyou is actually quite different from what is 
understood as freedom or liberty in the western world (Gao 2004). According to Gao, the concept of ziyou 
has been constructed at two interconnected levels: the level of individual freedom and the level of 
national liberation. The ziyou discourse implies that nation-building and liberation have priority over 
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individual freedom, and it is morally proper for individuals to sacrifice their personal freedom for the 
liberation of the nation. Individual freedom, Gao argues, was hardly the end of revolution but always a 
political tool in bombarding feudal despotism.  
After the foundation of the PRC in 1949, the concept of individual freedom, which quickly mobilized 
many intellectuals and radical youth to revolutionary cause, collapsed in the face of the vehement lashing 
out of socialist collectivism. Individual interests had to obey the nation's interests, and the discourse of 
individual freedom largely disappeared in a highly collective society (1949-1978). However, right after 
the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), a "de-Maoification movement" emerged in China, and 
the state was criticized for cruelly intruding on people's personal lives and for harshly repressing 
individual freedom. So-called "trauma literature" (shanghen wenxue) and "reflection literature" (fansi 
wenxue) emerged in the 1980s, reflecting people's traumatic experience in the Cultural Revolution and 
spurring a popular craving for individual freedom in the post-Mao period. 
The prevalence of the discourse of ziyou in the post-reform period also goes hand in hand with China's 
labor reform. According to Becker and Gao (1989), labor had a "unique role" in socialist China, where the 
labor system was based on three important principles. First of all, labor was owned by the state rather than 
the individual, and the labor produced social value instead of private value. The state required that all 
able-bodied citizens contribute their labor to it and assigned jobs to workers through "unified allocation" 
(tongyi fenpei) (Becker and Gao 1989). This principle left little room for workers to choose their preferred 
occupations. The second principle was a principle of egalitarianism that assumed that individual interests 
and state interests were one and that individual workers were supposed to work for the larger national 
goals. The third principle was that the labor system provided a compensation system to the workers where 
compensation varied with labor "input." However, factors such as education and tenure rather than past or 
current productivity determined payment. This labor system made possible a relative balance of losses 
and gains among members of the society. Individual preference and gain were considered incompatible 
with the concepts of true socialism; labor contracts were considered tools of capitalism, especially during 
the Cultural Revolution period (Becker and Gao 1989).  
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However, with the economic reform in the early 1980s, these principles were disavowed as "out of 
date" in the official discourse. The job allocation system, the control of employment, and the egalitarian 
view toward wages were said to have hindered productivity and undermined the incentive to work. It was 
also said that a new environment would need to be constructed so that the labor force could flow freely in 
the market in accordance with the demands of enterprises and individual preferences. This new "freedom" 
to work for individual material rewards, according to some leading proponents of the free labor market in 
China, “guarantees a free labor market, in which people are allowed to choose their own jobs in an 
environment of equal opportunity and fair competition … with laborers bearing the economic risks for 
their own decisions on labor input” (Du 1995).  
On the other hand, in order to achieve the responsiveness of labor to the free market forces, the labor 
contract system (laodong hetongzhi) was constructed to replace the systems of job security (the Iron Rice 
Bowl) and egalitarian wages (eating from the big pot) in state-owned enterprises. Then the labor contract 
system was extended to both state and collective sectors in urban areas. Chinese economists such as Feng 
Lanrui and Zhao Lukuan praised the new labor system for achieving a breakthrough in productivity. 
However, the labor contract system encountered vehement resistance from workers and was poorly 
implemented in state and collective sectors, although this resistance was interpreted by officials as the 
result of bureaucracy and a poor understanding of why or how things were to be done (White 1987).  
At the same time, large numbers of state enterprise workers found that more freedom and autonomy in 
occupational choice did not bring them better material rewards and profits as was promised by the reform. 
Instead, they were subjected to massive layoffs, a rampant reduction in earnings, and strict labor 
discipline in the workshops. Furthermore, they were largely excluded from the process of privatization or 
liquidation of their enterprises and were considered morally "incorrect" for asking for further social 
benefits from the state. They were expected by the state to take care of themselves. They considered 
themselves to have been abandoned by the state. 
The labor control of peasants during the Mao era, like that of the urban workers, was closely 
monitored by the socialist state, although the official regulation was not always effective (Zhang 2001; 
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Solinger 1999). As explained by Dorothy Solinger, peasants were always reserve labor for the socialist 
state. Rural-to-urban migrations between 1949 and 1978 were legally permitted by the state only when 
they met the state's economic ends. But after the reinforcement of the 1958 Household Registration Policy, 
the movement of peasants to the cities was rigorously prohibited. This program forced farmers to remain 
in the fields, growing the foodstuff to feed urban workers and to sustain the cities. It was backed up by a 
series of labor recruitment rulings, selective food allocation, and a lack of residential space for migrant 
peasants in the cities (Solinger 1999).  
The advent of economic reform in the late 1970s, however, changed the peasants' situation 
dramatically. The socialist communes that had firmly controlled peasants' labor power and movement 
were dissolved beginning in 1979, generating a surplus of nearly 200 million rural farm laborers (Jeffery 
1988). An urban economy quickly developed, and foreign and overseas capital poured into China, which 
demanded large amounts of cheap labor. As a response to this new economic development, the Household 
Registration System began to relax and allowed rural migrants to live and work in the cities on a 
temporary basis. A series of economic policies authorized and facilitated peasants entering the cities for 
employment opportunities, calling on the government to "set the peasantry on the path to the market 
through ideological campaigns and policy designs and to lead, push and pull the peasantry from being 
'small producers' to being 'commodity producers' in the market economy” (Yan 2003).  
Central to constructing a market economy was the making of new subjects out of rural migrants whose 
labor was commodifized and ready for sale in the free market. Ironically, although the state led peasants 
to the cities and encouraged their connection to the market, the government officials also worried that the 
migrant population might possess too much ziyou. Rural migrant workers were labeled as a "floating 
population" (liudong renkou). (The word "floating" has the negative cultural implication of being rootless, 
unstable, and dangerous.) (Zhang 2001). Zhang's research on rural migrants from the Zhejiang Province 
in Beijing reveals that the state conducted everyday forms of regulation over this population through 
mandatory registration, close monitoring and diffused surveillance, and birth control policies. Supervision 
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and control of the "floating population" became the "big headache" for the local government (Zhang 
2001). 
This brief review of the establishment of the free labor market in both rural and urban China clearly 
shows that the neoliberal rationality, when applied to the labor system by the state, produced the discourse 
of ziyou (freedom) in relation to work. State-produced discourses endeavored to create a new mode of 
subjectivity, namely a responsible and moral individual, and also an economically rational individual, 
who assessed the costs and benefits when choosing an occupation. This discourse emphasizes 
individualism, free choice, free trade, and the free flow of labor in the market. It also stresses individual 
responsibilities in shouldering the economic costs and any consequences caused by flexible employment 
and job insecurity. In Lemke's terms, neoliberalism made individual life into an "entrepreneurial form" 
(Lemke 1999). However, this new mode of laborers' autonomy in occupational choice was not a natural 
product of the free market but largely a product of the state's intervention and regulation, which aimed to 
achieve certain economic ends for the nation-state.  
3.5.  “FREEDOM”’S CONDITIONS AND LIMITS 
It is worth noting that bangbang themselves had contradictory feelings about ziyou. On the one hand, they 
felt that the casualness of this work gave them autonomy to make many decisions themselves; on the 
other hand, they realized that this sort of ziyou involves a high degree of insecurity, which exposes them 
to exploitation and danger. When these migrants chose bangbang work, they may have had to give up 
regular wages, written contracts, or work protections that contract work might provide. One bangbang 
sighed and said, “Sometimes I think … bangbang have too much ziyou … If  [ziyou means] nobody wants 
to take care of me… then, what’s the point of having so much ziyou?”   
This bangbang was one of many who expressed their concern about “too much ziyou.” While I do not 
mean to discount the flexibility of bangbang work and bangbang’s agency in making decisions about 
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their lives, what I want to know is whether bangbang, in possessing “too much ziyou,” really have the 
autonomy and choices they claim to have? My ethnographic research suggests an answer that is not so 
optimistic. Further examination of the relations between bangbang and their customers shows that bodily 
discipline and control in fact permeate a bangbang's work. Many customers have specific and sometimes 
even detailed requirements about the ways bangbang move their bodies, place their goods, and use their 
tools. There is also an expectation for the degree of efficiency that bangbang should demonstrate.  
The working experience of one bangbang, Uncle Zhang, serves as an example. A customer asked him 
to unload a large load of goods from a truck. The customer told him in detail how to move the goods. 
First, Uncle Zhang was required to move the goods from the truck and put them on the ground. Second, 
he was asked to distinguish different model numbers printed on the shipping boxes and to put goods with 
the same model number together. Third, he was to pile the goods in groups, five pieces to a group. Fourth, 
he was to count the total number of pieces and report it to the customer. Fifth, he was to use the 
customer's cart to move the goods into the customer's truck, but he had to be very careful not to break the 
cart. Sixth, he was to sit in the truck to protect the goods from moving around and getting damaged when 
the truck was in transit. Seventh, he and other bangbang were to carry the goods into the customer's 
storehouse. Last, he was to return the cart to the customer's store. The work included many messages 
directed at the discipline and control of Uncle Zhang's body. While he was working, the customer came 
and watched, and gave further instructions on how Uncle Zhang should work. Such detailed supervision 
indicates that a bangbang may not have a single employer who strives to make the maximum profit out of 
them by controlling their bodies along the assembly line, yet they nonetheless can be subject to minute 
discipline by any customer for any service. 
In some extreme cases, the customer not only verbally “guides" a bangbang's bodily movements, but 
also commits physical violence against the bangbang. One bangbang named Xiao Peng informed me that 
his customer “kicked his ass" to "indicate" to him that he should speed up when unloading the goods. I 
asked Xiao Peng if he kicked back. He answered: "No. I could have, but I just chose to ignore it. I can't be 
too upset with it, you know. Otherwise, I might lose my customer." Then I asked whether he hated such 
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"physical guidance," He replied: "Of course, I don't like it. But what can I do? I am just a bangbang. I can 
only think, hmmm, he (the customer) is just an unconscious child."  
As Xiao Peng mentioned, since bangbang do not have any social welfare or insurance, customers are 
the life blood of bangbang’s livelihood. When a negotiation between a customer and a bangbang 
threatens the bangbang’s relationship with the customer, a bangbang often chooses to follow the 
customer’s requirement and give up his or her ziyou. One bangbang said, when asked about the 
customers' “guidance," “I told myself that I have to swallow it. I repeatedly reminded myself that I need 
nothing but my wage." However, the bangbang-customer relationship is full of conflicts, especially when 
the customer refuses to pay for a bangbang’s medical treatment in case of an on-the-job injury. 
Sometimes, this type of conflict results in vehement physical violence. A bangbang sighed to me. “Our 
lives are as cheap as one jiao; the customers’ lives are as valuable as one yuan (one jiao is ten cents; One 
yuan is worth ten times of one jiao).”  
Furthermore, bangbang’s use of labor in a flexible way does not necessarily afford them freedom, but 
rather often places them on a work schedule that squeezes every drop of strength out of them. A female 
bangbang said that she was fully consumed by her work schedule. She mainly worked as a bangbang but 
also had two part-time jobs. She began the day's work at five thirty in the morning, working as a 
bangbang in a food market. Then she went to a restaurant to pick up lunches to white-collar workers in a 
nearby building. After the delivery, she went to another restaurant to wash dishes. She could eat her lunch 
only after she finished washing dishes. Then she went back to the food market around 2 or 3 p.m. and 
looked for customers until six or seven o'clock. Before going back home, she also collected cardboard to 
sell and firewood with which to cook her dinner at home. She has a young son attending school in the 
countryside and her wage pay for her son's expenses. She told me that she was often exhausted and 
longed for a break, but she couldn’t afford to stop working. 
The majority of bangbang I met did not want their children to become bangbang. They expect their 
sons and daughters to be well educated and to work "in an office," instead of "on the street." However, 
most of them do not expect their children to support them economically when they get old. "You know," 
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one told me, "there is no life-long job anymore. You never know if you will be fired. My child might lose 
his/her job and depend on me for a living. What can I expect from him/her?" 
3.6. WHAT DO BANGBANG DO WITH “ZIYOU”?  
My central research question is why do bangbang celebrate that the bangbang work gives them ziyou 
when in reality their experiences suggest that this ziyou is circumscribed by various forms of constraint? I 
argue that many factors contribute to the strong narratives of ziyou among bangbang. The concept of 
ziyou is packed with meaning against the historical backdrop of China’s highly socialist past and in this 
particular juncture of Chinese history and socioeconomic transformations. The “freedom” of bangbang, 
“the pretension that they are self-employed in whatever they do at any moment” as Breman describes, 
needs to be examined critically (Breman 2010:64).  
I would like to highlight one factor — the role of the Chinese state in promoting the discourse of ziyou 
as a strategy of development. This development project which highlights the significance of ziyou 
transforms the process of development into a policy focused on remolding workers/citizens into proper 
modern subjects. And as I mentioned in the previous section, this policy is a continuation of a broader 
modernist discourse of “freedom” that can be traced back to China’s revolution at the beginning of the 
20th century, which called on the young revolutionaries to free themselves and the people from feudal 
despotism and patriarchal families. However, the meaning of “freedom” has changed significantly in 
accordance with changes in historical periods and specific social and economic context.  
Under the present neoliberal rationality, the post-Mao state infuses the discourse of ziyou into society 
through policy-making, political intervention, social regulation, education, and media representation. One 
strategy of the state is to reject the Maoist economic principles as unproductive and to condemn high 
collectivism for suppressing individual freedom. For decades, the state has been transforming rural 
migrants into self-reliant and self-enterprising subjects who expect social welfare from the state. The 
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bangbang, and other migrants, ought not at the bottom of society and become the cheap labor that fuels 
China’s economy.  
This state project is implemented not through political persecution, suppression or coercion, but 
through “softer” ways. On the one hand, the state promotes the neoliberal ethos of autonomy and choice 
through policymaking, political intervention, social regulation and through the cultural processes of media 
representation, education, and discourse production. On the other hand, the state extends its micropolitics 
to "a value articulation of human subjectivity" through the discourse of suzhi. This "neohumanism" (Yan 
2003) functions to encourage peasants to migrate to the cities, "learn in the ‘comprehensive social 
university,’” and aspire to urban middle-class standards of material consumption. Since rural migrants are 
devaluated as backward and having low suzhi, the extended risks of bodily impairment and exploitation at 
work are justified as the necessary training process that can improve their suzhi and disguise the 
exploitation of migrant workers' labor.  
With its focus on economic growth, the state does not provide support and insurance for peasants and 
migrant workers. It sides with factory owners and investors. The workers have no power in bargaining 
wages, work protection, or contract assignment; in the worst case, they are not even able to collect their 
pay. An extreme case that illustrates the helplessness, hopelessness, and agony of rural migrants is what 
happened throughout the coastal area in 2005. Workers were so infuriated that they did not return to their 
jobs after a New Year's break. Factories in the Pearl River Delta were unable to recruit enough workers 
(Yardley and Barboza 2005). 
Some of my interviewees had had other jobs at which they were unable to collect their wages. 
“Bangbang Chen” was a construction worker in Guangdong Province. He once worked with a group of 
laoxiang (people from the same place) for a headman who was hired by a businessman to manage the 
workers. He was told that he would get his wages after the job was done. For half a year, he lived on the 
work site, working day and night, with no immediate cash available. When the work was finished, 
however, the headman ran away with all the money for wages. When they asked the businessman for their 
pay, he claimed that he had already paid the workers and then left. They wanted to sue the headman but 
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could not afford the fee. They finally gave up and returned to Chongqing. After that, Chen decided to 
work as a bangbang. "At least I have cash!" he said. 
In recent years, aware of the mounting inequality between social classes and concerned about the 
social unrest it may cause, government officials and leaders have repeatedly attempted to intervene in the 
market and soothe the agony of the rural migrants. So far, however, scattered efforts from central and 
local governments to provide social welfare to peasants and rural migrants have been meager and never 
gained traction. For example, a policy introduced in 2006 by the City Council of Chongqing City aimed 
to extend pension welfare to migrant workers by promoting a new system with primary individual 
contributions, collective contributions from local enterprises, and government subsidies to replace the 
current system (Li, Li and He 2006). For migrant workers, the current system requires a contribution of 
two to twenty four yuan per month (between 26 cents and US $ 3.20), with a payout rate of eight to nine 
yuan per month ($1.00), which is insufficient to provide any protection. It is no wonder that the policy has 
only about 56,000 subscribers among migrant workers, a 1.71 percent enrollment of migrants. However, 
the new system requires an even higher individual contribution ratio, while the government subsidy is 
ambiguous. It is not expected to change the situation that requires peasants and migrant workers to be 
self-reliant in old age. I asked some bangbang if they thought the new policy was helpful. Their answer 
was, "I don't care." One bangbang explained, "Nothing changes. I have to have money in the first place to 
pay for the premium of the pension, don't I? But I don't have that much money! See, the new policy 
changes nothing." 
Similar situations can be easily observed with other welfare policies, such as medical coverage. 
Skyrocketing medical expenses have become an increasing burden for Chinese citizens, especially for 
peasants and migrant workers. In an attempt to alleviate this burden, in 2005 the Chongqing government 
designated certain hospitals for migrant workers, where presumably they would enjoy a waiver or 
discount on some medical fees. However, the Chongqing Business Daily reported that the prescribed 
medicines in these hospitals were 15-20 percent more expensive than elsewhere. These hospitals wanted 
to recover the loss they suffered from lower fees by raising the medication prices. Migrant workers were 
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fully aware of this trick. In the month after these hospitals opened the "migrant worker window," they had 
only one migrant worker patient (Peng 2005). For many bangbang, the only hope is to accumulate 
personal savings for medical purposes and old age. As a bangbang told me, "We have nothing to rely on 
but a small amount of money that we saved throughout these years. No welfare, no insurance, no secure 
job for me. There is nobody there for us, either. Nobody can be trusted. That's why money is important. If 
you have money, you are the master."  
The marketization and commodification that prevailed after the reform in 1978 dramatically changed 
the subjectivities, responsibilities, occupational choice, working conditions, and living state of peasants 
and migrant workers. The state provided no valid aid, no welfare, and made little effort to protect the legal 
rights of migrants. Rural migrants had to switch from a planned economy, where the state controlled 
every aspect of their lives, to a socialist market economy, where the state had regrouped basic functions 
and always sided with the market. They have found that the state was unreliable. The only security and 
aid available to them is to earn as much money as possible and to get the payment in cash as soon as 
possible. 
Thus, the bangbang work becomes an “ideal” occupation for migrant workers who lack skills and 
education. Although it provides no benefits or security beyond the cash payment, it gives the workers 
"freedom" to intensify their labor to earn a little extra money, especially immediate cash. Under the 
neoliberal regime, bangbang are not transformed without resistance into self-reliant and self-governing 
subjects. They are fully aware of the "tricks" that the state plays on them. Their agency of resisting and 
struggling is ironically expressed in choosing bangbang work, choosing to be responsible for themselves, 
and choosing to bear the consequences. They make use of the ethos of neoliberal rationality and take 
advantage of of the morality of “ziyou.” As a result, earning as much money as they can is seen as the 
only way to bring a semblance of security to their lives. This is barely a conscious choice of resistance, 
but more a survival strategy. Yet, when thousands of migrant men chose to survive by taking on casual 
work, they somehow formed an indispensable power. One bangbang man said during my interview, “If 
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we bangbang are not happy with one place, we do whatever we like and just leave. No one can find us 
because we are floaters (liudong de) and we have ziyou.” 
However, this power has never been turned into collective action against the repression and 
exploitation. Ching Kwan Lee, in her research on the labor unrest in China (Lee 2007), argues that 
Chinese laborers’ protests against the capitalist labor relations are localized, dispersed, cellularized and 
seldom evolve into large-scale, trans-local rebellion. Compared to migrant workers working in the 
factories where Lee conducted her fieldwork, the collective resistance of bangbang is even harder to bring 
to fruition due to the casualty of their work. During my fifteen months of fieldwork, I did not see the 
bangbang organize even one collective action against the government. The state’s repression against labor 
unrest surely played an important role; the lack of class consciousness and sense of solidarity among the 
workers also contributes to the lack of collective resistance. In fact, class consciousness is often muted 
among the workers as they rarely seen themselves as a unified class with shared interests. Constable 
writes that among Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong, collective action was difficult to organize 
because domestic workers work in different homes and for different employers (Constable 1997). The 
lack of collective protest among bangbang is similar. Although bangbang have to be careful to retain their 
clients, they still have a certain degree of “freedom” to choose or drop a client. This degree of individual 
“freedom”- helps to alleviate the immediate tension between the employer and the bangbang. Dropping 
an employer is more practical for an individual worker than collective resistance by multiple workers 
against different employers. 
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3.7. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined bangbang's occupational choice and its relationship with the discourse of 
ziyou from a perspective of neoliberal governmentality. My finding is that, although the neoliberal ethos 
has played an important role in bangbang' occupational choice, neoliberalism alone cannot fully explain 
the transformation of rural migrant workers into self-reliant and enterprising laborers, who are vulnerable 
to fierce exploitation. From the perspective of governmentality, neoliberalism in China is facilitated, 
authorized, and in many ways intersects with the Party-State. In other words, the state never "retreats 
from," but rather reinforces government and is in fact an extension of the neoliberal economy (Lemke 
2000). Therefore, neoliberalism is a transformation of politics, an alternative form of governance by the 
state, and a restructuring of power relations in society. 
Bangbang are the subjects of this neoliberal governmentality; however, they are not totally docile and 
submissive. They take advantage of this ethos and struggle for the security and aid that the state refuses to 
provide by, ironically, internalizing the "technologies of the self." Hoffman has argued that the state 
conditions the autonomy of Chinese young professionals with socialist notions of social responsibility and 
patriotism (Hoffman 2006). I argue that the state has lost its credibility among rural migrants because it 
provides no aid to them. Migrant workers respond to this neoliberal government rationality by choosing 
an occupation that meets their needs for securing their needs as much as possible.  
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4.0  NARRATIVES, VALUE TRANSACTIONS, AND THE SUCCESS 
STORY OF A CHINESE RURAL MIGRANT WORKER 
Shortly after I went back to China to conduct my pilot fieldwork in the summer of 2004, one of my 
relatives, upon hearing that I was doing research among bangbang, insisted that I meet Xiaoxiao Liu, 
whom he called “the chief commander of the army of bangbang.” He said that Liu was a role model for 
the bangbang and that “all bangbang should learn from him.” Later in my fieldwork, the name of 
Xiaoxiao Liu was mentioned on various occasions by local residents, including the bangbang with whom 
I worked. Not believing that the “army of bangbang” truly had a “chief commander,” I was intrigued by 
this case. I did some research on the Internet and got a handful of media reports about Liu’s success. He 
was said to have effectively turned himself from a penniless bangbang man to a business owner.     
In the winter of 2006, I met this “chief commander” in his office, located in one of the city’s 
subdistricts. When I arrived at the place, I found that the office was in a huge, highrise residential 
building in a bustling commercial area. The whole office was in fact an “office-to-be.” It was being 
remodeled from a former condominium and undergoing extensive reconstruction. The condominium had 
been huge, totaling about 170 square meters. Ample sunlight shone through from a large and beautiful 
French window. An interior design team was busy working on the ceilings under the guidance of Liu’s 
office staff (later, I learned that two of them were Liu’s former business partners, also former bangbang). 
Liu came out from one of the rooms to meet me. He was in his early forties and about 5’3” tall. He 
wore a pair of reading glasses. He showed me around the condominium and told me that he had just 
bought this property and was going to move his office here from a much older building. He was obviously 
proud of himself for able to buy such a huge condominium when the housing price was skyrocketing in 
Chongqing. He was also eager to show off his connection with the global market. He indicated that he 
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was famous not only in China but also abroad, as he had been interviewed by media from Japan, Germany, 
and the U.S. It was clear that he was proud of his international charm. It seems to me that showing off his 
wealth was a way for him to show that his business is growing and that he is successful. Indeed, he was a 
very busy businessman. Our first interview was interrupted twice by business telephone calls.  
Legends of successful migrant workers have been widely circulated in China as well as in other parts 
of the world (Yan 2006; Ventura 1992). These testimonies of success have traveled freely across national 
borders in the global market economy, accompanied by flows of labor and capital migration. The 
protagonists of these stories are often poor migrants whose talents, efforts and labor pay off in the market 
economy. Fabricating and promoting success stories to mobilize the masses are by no means unique to 
Chinese society. Yet these success stories of migrant workers circulating in the contemporary Chinese 
media have special meaning to a China that is becoming the “world factory” and that is eager to 
demonstrate to the world its achievement in relieving poverty. 
Mao’s China features stories of revolutionary heroes/heroines. In their success stories, the protagonists 
work unreservedly and selflessly for the Party’s “socialist cause” and for their political convictions. Their 
stories, writings, public speeches, and even diaries were widely circulated through media reports and 
official publications. In the post-Mao era, as the Party’s emphasis shifted from class struggle to economic 
development, the heroes who were promoted and praised by the state were no longer revolutionaries who 
focused on social antagonism and struggled against class enemies but those who “added value” to 
themselves through continuous training, hard work, and a competitive desire to “win the game” in a 
highly unpredictable global economy. For the post-reform state, such a hero is valuable because his/her 
success points to the possibility of a similar fate, not only for the average Chinese who struggles for a 
competitive edge, but also for the state in its fear of being left behind in the project of development.  
This chapter analyzes the success story of Xiaoxiao Liu through a close reading of both Liu’s 
narratives and the narratives about him by scholars and the media. By comparing the dominant 
assumptions about rural migrant experiences with Liu’s own narratives, this chapter suggests that Liu’s 
narratives confirm, strategically use, and indirectly contest the official representations and dominant 
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images of rural migrants. Furthermore, I explore the cultural and social factors that enable Liu to extract 
representational value from his own derogated status and to convert it into monetary capital. Instead of 
dismissing the success stories of rural migrants as mere government propaganda, this chapter investigates 
the values and principles that these stories ascribe to rural migrants. These stories, then, are a part of the 
practices linked to the governing strategies of the state and the production of neoliberal workers’ 
subjectivities in contemporary China. 
4.1. A BANGBANG WITH A“WRITER DREAM” 
Liu was born in 1964 to a poor peasant family in Fushun County of Sichuan province, a village about 185 
kilometers away from Chongqing city. He received a regular education until high school when his 
family’s poverty forced him to drop out. But Liu was interested in reading and writing and was especially 
talented at writing. He attended an adult education program part-time and served as a part-time journalist 
for the town’s newspaper. He also volunteered in the local branch of the town’s culture ministry. 
According to Liu, in early 1992, after a severe fight with a village gang from whom he was protecting a 
young woman, he ran away to Chongqing, the city where his older brother worked as a migrant, to escape 
the gang’s revenge. But contrary to his expectation, his brother refused to help him stay in the city. 
Instead, he urged Liu to go home. He didn’t see any possibility for Liu, a short, skinny, badly nearsighted, 
physically weak man, to survive in the urban labor market. Because of his physical shortcomings, Liu did 
not meet the standard for “desirable worker” that urban employers would like to hire for the heavy 
manual work that most rural migrants end up doing. 
But Liu refused to accept his brother’s advice. He longed to become a writer and knew that the only 
possibility for realizing his “writer dream” (zuojia meng) was in the city. This might not be his only 
reason, but he chose to stay and support himself by selling vegetables as a street vendor. However, he 
soon went bankrupt and had to give up on his vendoring business. The primary reason, he said, was 
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because he did not know “how to do business.” Liu had many depressing and even dark memories of his 
vendoring experiences. In one article he later wrote about this experience, he complained that he “could 
not master the quickly changing market prices” and that he “could not allow himself to cheat the 
customers by manipulating the weigh scale that he used to sell vegetables” (Liu 1994). He also 
complained in the same article about the disdainful attitude people around him had toward his desire to 
read and write. He was mercilessly teased by his vendor colleagues when he used part of his meager 
earnings to buy newspaper every day. In other words, he felt that he was out of step with the business 
world and that his conflict with his colleagues reflected their contrasting value systems. One value system 
was market-based, and the other morality-based. But after Liu was forced to resign from the vegetable 
business, with no money and no educational certificate, he had little choice but to become a bangbang. 
For the next five years, Liu earned his living by working as a bangbang most of the time and doing 
several part-time jobs on the side. He tried working in a factory, as a waiter, and as a newspaper seller, 
but none of these part-time, short-term jobs could pay him enough to survive. He did not get along with 
the bangbang business world.  According to Liu, he could not earn much money working as a bangbang 
because he “did not know how to ‘talk business’ or to bargain with the customers;” he also “did not know 
how to steal a bangbang colleague’s’ customer by reacting more quickly [than that colleague] when 
hailed by the customer.” He just “stood at the corner of the street, waiting for customers to come” or 
“waited by the stump of a tree for the appearance of hares,” in his words (Liu 1994). Despite his “failure” 
in the business world, he kept “learning.” He bought a copy of Chongqing Evening newspaper every day, 
hoping to find life-changing opportunities from the job listings; his desperation to change his life can be 
seen in one vignette he wrote:  
“The newspaper finally disclosed a ‘golden path’ – an center office was hiring clerks! I went to that 
center, bringing my shoulder-pole with me. The gatekeeper thought I was carrying goods for someone 
working in that building and did not stop me at the gate. I went upstairs with others and put my shoulder-
pole in the hallway [because I was afraid to be recognized as a bangbang]…… The application form 
asked me to fill in the category of ‘previous work unit.’ I felt awkward and didn’t know what to tell them. 
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At last, I gave them my temporary address [because as a bangbang, I do not have work unit as my mailing 
address.]……A notice reached me three days later, saying that I was being offered the job but that I 
needed to find a guarantor and I needed to submit a cash deposit of 800 yuan (around US$100). As a 
bangbang, I was penniless and had no relatives from whom to borrow that amount of money. My ‘golden 
path’ was cut off. I cried like a baby” (Liu 1994). 
This account by Liu shows how desperate he was for an opportunity to change his life when he failed 
to find compassion from his bangbang colleagues. The big chasm in manual and mental work also 
affected Liu’s pursuit of an ideal job. Even though a clerk job ranks low on the job hierarchy and, in many 
cases, is considered a “woman’s job” in Chongqing, Liu still considered it “a golden path” because mental 
work is always preferred over manual work. And Liu is just one of many bangbang who disdain and loath 
manual work, even though they do it everyday. Many bangbang with whom I talked had expressed their 
preference for doing mental work but did not have the education and opportunity to do so. Most of them 
hope their children work “in offices” instead of “on the street.”  
Liu had a passion and desire for a literati lifestyle. While working as a bangbang in the daytime, Liu 
wrote about his migratory life at night. He explained his motivation for writing in an interview in 2005.  
“In early 1990s, I went to Chongqing as a rural migrant worker. Due to my poor eyesight and lack of 
education certificate, I was unemployed for a long time. In order to survive, I did what most rural 
migrants choose to do – work as a bangbang. Since then, I have scrambled from place to place in this city, 
carrying a bamboo pole and a rope, rain or shine, all year long. But I still did not earn enough to send any 
money back home. I was always poor. Moreover, I knew that many bangbang were enduring hunger and 
hardship in this city, just like me. I once saw a bangbang who fainted and fell to the ground due to hunger 
and exhaustion. When he regained consciousness, he wept. He cried [not because of pain and physical 
discomfort, but] because he lost his customer and the earnings! And another bangbang got no money, 
only physical violence after he worked for his zhuren (literally, this mean “master,” but here, it actually 
means “customer”)....  Sympathy for this population piled up in my heart and gradually filled my chest. I 
felt that I would die if I didn’t speak out [abiyt the feelings inside me]. So I took my pen and began 
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depicting the experiences and feelings of us bangbang by writing poems, shot stories, and vignettes” (Li 
and Zhu 2005). 
Here, during this stage in Liu’s life, we see his ambivalent attitude toward the migrant community. On 
the one hand, he was not in tune with his bangbang colleagues and obviously did not like the coping 
strategies they used. On the other hand, he had deep sympathy for the suffering and hardship that 
bangbang (including himself) experienced. He was trapped in his conflicting roles: an observer who, from 
a distance, watched and recorded things that happened in the bangbang community and a member of and 
participant in the bangbang community. In other words, he was an insider and outsider to the bangbang 
community at the same time.  
Liu submitted his writings to various newspapers but his work was rejected many times. Finally, one 
essay was published by a major local newspaper — the Chongqing Evening. He was encouraged by this 
success and also excited to find that the newspaper had remunerated him with 50 yuan. Liu used 20 yuan 
to pay his rent and the remaining 30 yuan to treat his bangbang colleagues to drinks. When recalling this 
experience later, he explained the significance of this publication. He felt that his talents and efforts, after 
many years of being unacknowledged, were finally recognized. The 50 yuan, moreover, ignited his 
imagination about the financially secure life a writer could lead. Therefore, following that experience, he 
had practiced writing all the more intensively and submitted his work to newspapers, hoping to be 
published again.  
At this stage, Liu’s writing focused on the social inequalities and injustices that bangbang and other 
poor people suffered. For example, in one of his early articles, entitled “Bangbang Master (bangbang 
laoda),” he wrote about the tragedy of a bangbang man. The bangbang, nicknamed “Master,” was an 
honest, friendly, and hard-working young man with a sturdy body. He was a popular, well-liked figure 
among bangbang. But one day, because of a street conflict, he was badly beaten by the gang members 
while he was working alone. He was found injured and lying unconscious on the street. He was sent to the 
hospital; his bangbang friends went to the police, asking them to deal with this case. However, the police 
ignored the bangbang’s request and drove them away. The bangbang then decided to pursue justice by 
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using their own strength. They called on a big group of bangbang colleagues and collectively protested 
the gangsters’ bullying of their colleague, Master. The gang members, frightened by the power of angry 
bangbang in groups, compensated for Master by paying his medical bill. However, Master suffered brain 
damage, and he could no longer function normally after the incident.  
In this story, Liu shares with readers his acute observations of the vulnerability of migrant workers 
such as Master. He also points out the structural reasons that contribute to the migrants’ vulnerable 
position in society. While migrants are often said to be the cause of social instability, they are actually 
often victims of urban violence. When the legal system refuses to uphold justice on their behalf, migrants 
have to resort to their own strength. That is what happened in Master’s case. However, the damage had 
already been done, and Master paid a very high price. 
The chief editor of a sub-district TV Guide Newspaper25, Chenglin Li, happened to read one of Liu’s 
articles and was very impressed by him. He was surprised that a bangbang, the type of worker who was 
often regarded by the urban residents as illiterate and backward, could write. He wrote a letter inviting 
Liu to meet in person at the newspaper office. Liu was very excited upon receiving Li’s letter. He 
explained to me during the interview, “You have to keep in mind that it happened more than ten years ago 
when the urban society was more conservative toward us outsiders than today. What I mean is that I came 
from the underclass (dicing) [and there had not been any urban residents paying attention to me, let alone 
an intellectual and editor]. He sympathized and promoted (tiba) me. It felt so gratified that he looked up 
to (qiao de qi) me… He is an intellectual with wisdom and great love, I would say…You know in any 
circumstance, a person with strong sense of inferiority, like me, would greatly appreciate any recognition 
from a [dominating] group [such as the urban intellectuals].” 26 At the time Liu considered this meeting a 
life-changing event. During our interview, he mentioned how nervous he had felt when going into the 
office of the TV Guide Newspaper editor. He was so anxious that when he entered Li’s office, his face 
                                                 
25
 These TV Guides  were newspapers that informed the audience about the weekly television  schedules. Such 
newspapers were mostly published by the local television stations and were only popular during the 1980s and 
1990s. 
26
 Author’s fieldnotes Nov. 7, 2006. 
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turned red, and he forgot to sit down. He just stood awkwardly in the middle of the room, without 
knowing how to behave. Li was friendly and warm to him and decided to help him with his writing after 
their first meeting. He gave Liu advice on what to write and how to write. Basically, he thought that Liu 
had gone in the wrong direction by focusing so intensively on imitating the literati’s writing styles. Li told 
Liu that he should write about bangbang since his experience as a bangbang was rich enough for him to 
write creatively. He also advised Liu to write in a severe and plain style and to use “colloquial language” 
(richang shenghuo yongyu) instead of words that sound too literary. He was willing to protect Liu from 
losing his “authenticity”, or “true color” in Li’s own words. For a certain period, Li and Liu frequently 
wrote each other letters, exchanging opinions about how to write “properly.” Li also helped Liu revise his 
manuscripts.  
Then Li invited Liu to write a column entitled “The Panorama of the World and Hundreds of 
Livelihoods” (shi qing bai tai)27 in his newspaper. Although the TV Guide newspaper was not a major 
newspaper, to become a column writer in an officially published newspaper of Chongqing city was 
already a major coup for Liu. Most of the stories that Liu wrote in this column were short, around five- to 
six-hundred Chinese characters. According to Liu, his inspiration for writing from drew from the life 
stories of people he got to know through migrant work.  
It is true that the leading characters in his short stories are mostly underclass people, including 
bangbang, rural peasants, and the urban poor. However, the stories were laden with mainstream values 
and moralities. In many of them, migrants are depicted as greedy, morally bankrupt, and having a “get-
rich-by-all-means” mentality. The stories themselves are hardly a form of fine arts, but more like a 
documentation of the grotesque underclass. Among the six stories that were accessible during my 
fieldwork28, four of them concerned the moral problems of bangbang. The story of “The Playboy Named 
Youngest Brother” is about a young male bangbang who had sexual relationships with urban women for 
                                                 
27
  In Chinese, the column’s name indicates an intention to exhibit the various living conditions of the underclass 
and their life stories.  
28
 The six stories are “Dark Heart Hei Zi” (hei xin Hei Zi), “Playboy Youngest Brother” (hua hua yaoge), 
“Loafing Mao Mao” (hunshi Mao Mao), “Fei Fei,” “Mountain Wind” (shan feng), and Gousheng Bridge (Gousheng 
Qiao).  
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money but was then abandoned by them once he became weak and sick. The story begins with a first-
person narrator who meets a beggar on the street. The beggar, it turns out, is the narrator’s former 
colleague, a man nicknamed Youngest Brother (yaoge). Though the narrator does not initially recognize 
yaoge, his memory of yaoge rushes back. Yaoge was “a tall and handsome young man” who was not 
satisfied with his bangbang life, the only job he could possibly find. He always dreamed about becoming 
rich overnight and complained about the fact that the reality turned out to be the opposite of this dreams. 
His unrealistic attitude often got him into trouble with other bangbang, who tried to persuade him to use 
more practical ways of making money, such as working for longer periods every day. Instead of looking 
into the sociopolitical factors that contribute to Yaoge’s awkward situation, the story focuses on his moral 
deeds, particularly how his immoral behavior ruined his own life. According to the story, Yaoge chose to 
take advantage of urban women to lead a better life. He fooled around with “sisters” (jie mei) who were 
actually his short-term girlfriends or sex partners and asked them for money. His ideal, the story told us, 
is to “lean on a moneybag (bang dakuan).”  He got the nickname “Playboy” because of his debauched life 
style. Tensions emerged between Yaoge and his bangbang colleagues when he brought his “sisters” back 
to the room he shared with other bangbang. Rather than delving into an analysis of the psychological 
complexities and sociocultural factors that caused the tensions, the story simplistically attributes these 
tensions to Yaoge’s wrong deeds. In the end, Yaoge pays a terrible price for his “corrupt life.” “Too much 
night life and too many women ruin Playboy’s health. Without his health and physical strength, he could 
not work as a bangbang any more. He became a beggar wandering around street corners, with two sunken 
eyes as hollow as holes” (Liu 1996). In my interview with Liu, he concluded that his motivation to write 
this story was that “the story is a moral tale persuading people to know the correct way to achieve success 
– to depend on no one but yourself.”29  
                                                 
29
 Author’s interview with Liu. Dec. 14th, 2006 
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These stories vividly remind the reader of the widely circulated moral stories of underclass people’s 
lives in story magazines like Gushi Hui (Story Sessions).30  The plotlines of Liu’s bangbang stories 
resemble these sensational and lucid stories in many ways. In many cases, the stories reinforce rather than 
challenge the mainstream values of the time. A lot of them also function as intensive moral sermons that 
persuade people to eliminate evil and eulogize good (cheng e yang shan). In theses stories, the 
protagonists’ fates were mostly determined by their behavior. Kindness repays kindness, while evil 
intentions result in bad endings.  Furthermore, Liu’s column stories contrast sharply with his previous 
writings, which pay close attention to the discrimination and marginalization that bangbang experience in 
the city.  
But these stories garnered a wider range of readers for Liu. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, he 
became famous, locally and nationally. His name appeared in the headlines of almost all the major local 
newspapers. TV stations, including CCTV (Chinese Central Television Station) and Phoenix Satellite 
Television, competed for his interviews. Finally, his fame reached international media. French National 
TV station came to Chongqing to interview him. From 1998 to 2004, more than nine documentaries were 
made based on Liu’s story.  
4.2. CONFIGURING SUCCESS, CONFIGURING A SELF-MADE HERO 
Most of the media reports focus on the fact that Liu, as a rural migrant worker, pursued a life that was 
very different from the one that his social status designated. He did not just make his name known to the 
urban society, but also to the local government. On the Fushun31 government’s website, he was praised 
for “not being satisfied to be a regular bangbang” and for “always thinking of ways to achieve something 
more” (gao chu mingtang). Even though Liu himself stated that his original motivation for writing was to 
                                                 
30
 Gushi Hui (Story Sessions) is a short story magazine published by Shanghai Literature and Arts Publishing 
House. It is one of the most popular periodicals in contemporary China. Most of the stories published in Gushi Hui 
are similar to tabloid stories, concentrating on sensational and lurid news or social events.  
31
 Fushun is the township which is in charge of the village that Liu came from.  
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express his feelings and to vent his anger over the social inequality and labor exploitation that he 
witnessed, the media has largely ignored his words.  Instead, it has focused almost exclusively on his so-
called “fighting spirit” (pinbo jingshen). They have made Liu the role model for the bangbang masses, 
claiming that the latter does not possess Liu’s fighting spirit.  Even academic writings have taken a 
similar perspective. For example, in Shiming Jian’s sociological research on the bangbang in Chongqing, 
Shi portrays Liu as an ambitious young man who has valuable characteristics that are missing from other 
peasants,“…But unlike his peasant ancestors, Liu is a young man with ambition. He would not like to 
farm in the country for his whole life. So he decided to be a writer.”(Jian 2000:179). Jian also dismisses 
the fact that Liu went to the city to escape the revenge of the village gangs. He explained Liu’s migration 
as a necessary step toward success. It goes,“Since he wanted to relieve his poverty and to achieve his 
ambition, he decided to leave his home town and go to the city in 1992.”  
Furthermore, despite Liu’s own statement that he was not willing to become a bangbang and that 
bangbang work was just a survival strategy to cope with his financial hardship at that time,32 the media 
romanticized Liu’s suffering and naturalized it as a necessary training/education (duanlian) that a person 
must receive in order to be successful. “Although he was forced to become a bangbang,” a local writer, 
Dequan Cao, wrote in his reportage about Liu, “this working experience is necessary for his success in 
that it ‘brings out his best qualities’ (molian). Without this experience, Xiaoxiao Liu would not be the 
person who he is” (Cao 2005).  
Liu was also praised for his perseverance in pursuing his “writer dream,” despite his poor working and 
living conditions. His success, in other words, was said to be completely due to his individual effort and 
his “fighting spirit,” the features that other bangbang supposedly did not possess. For example, in the 
CCTV documentary which was shown as a part of the “How to Become Rich” program on the 
agricultural channel, one scene shows Liu’s poor living condition. The camera pans the several-square-
meter room that Liu shared with more than ten other bangbang. An off-scene voice (Liu’s voice) says: “(I) 
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 In one documentary called “Bangbang Is Great,” Liu said during the interview, “I didn’t mean to be a 
bangbang when I first come out. I wanted to be a writer, with social responsibility. When I just get to the city, I had 
no other way to survive but to become a bangbang.”  
 84 
lived in this place for about four years. The light (in the room) is very dim. When nobody is around at 
midnight, I read and write under the street lamp outside the room.” He also says in this documentary that 
“[Even though the living conditions are difficult, I have never given up writing], for example, if I earn ten 
yuan, which can keep me going for two to three days, I would go back to where I lived and stay there the 
next day, continuing my writing.” Media reports and documentaries like this attempt to show that Liu’s 
success was a product of his willingness to “eat bitterness” (chi ku). Following their logic, it seems that he 
was fated to be successful because he could endure the suffering that others could not.  
Liu was not a passive recipient of the sophisticated media compliments. Rather, he was an active 
participant in this hero-making process. He confirmed the media’s narratives by distinguishing himself 
from his bangbang colleagues. In my interview with him, he said: “My success has much to do with my 
own effort to learn new things. I never believed that I could not change myself. The crucial problem for 
other bangbang who fail [to be successful] is that they don’t like to study. They don’t know the 
importance of learning.” In another interview, he reconfirmed this distinction when asked about the most 
important factor that contributed to his success: “It is continuous learning…By reading and writing, I kept 
gaining new knowledge and thinking through various things. It enabled me to know more about this 
changing world, the changing Chongqing, and my future” (Zhang 2007). 
Another strand of narrative around Liu’s success emerged against the backdrop of the state’s desire for 
social harmony and emphasized the care and help that Liu had received from the urban residents during 
his struggle to success. The local writer Dequan Cao, in his reportage entitled “The Legendary of 
Chongqing Bangbang,” depicts Liu’s editor Chenglin Li as a great mentor to Liu. Cao mentioned that Li 
not only improved Liu’s writing skills, but also changed Liu’s writing style from “sentimental twaddle” to 
“facing life with true feelings.” Furthermore, based on his interview with Liu, Cao listed in his book 
several other urban people who had helped Liu with his writing and his livelihood. Cao considered these 
interactions as “the city’s generous accommodation (reception) of the huge army of peasants (rural 
migrant workers).” Cao also argues that these helpers’ kindheartedness toward Liu should be regarded as 
“the generosity and love that the city gives to a bangbang.” “China is a country full of benevolence.” Cao 
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writes, “True love exists in the world” (Cao 2005). In this romanticized picture, Liu was the desperate 
poor migrant who wanted to become a writer, and the urban residents were his saviors. Liu was recorded 
to say that “My life today was given by them [the urban residents who helped me]. I will not forget them. 
If I forgot them, I would not call myself a human being” (Cao 2005).   
It is worth noting that Liu expressed his gratitude toward his urban helpers in a way that highly 
resembles the compassionate discourse which was and continues to be popular in China’s official 
statements and mainstream media coverage. A typical example of this compassionate discourse, which 
can easily be heard or seen even in the post-reform period, would be the poor peasants thanking the Party 
for helping alleviate their difficulties. This narrative was especially popular during the Maoist era when 
people thanked Mao and the Party for saving them from feudal and imperialist oppression. Take, for 
example, popular political slogans such as “People Who has Been Saved Do Not Forget the Benevolence 
of the Communist Party” (fanshen buwang gongchandang) and “the Communist Party is the Savior of 
Chinese people” (gongchandang shi renmin de da jiuxing) and in various art works.  In the post-reform 
China, the savior is no longer Chairman Mao, but mostly the “government” and the Party. The saviors to 
the migrant workers are the urban middle-upper class, who reach out to their poor counterparts with 
“love.” Notably, the people who need salvation have always been the poor peasants.  
In commenting on the politics of news production in post-Mao China, Wanning Sun argues that news 
by nature relies upon a mechanism of myth-making, or in Barthes’s words, is a mythology (Barthes 1972). 
She holds that news “depoliticizes beliefs and ideas that are products of specific social and historical 
relations, and turns them into ‘natural attitudes.’” In other words, the narrative forms and strategies in 
news-writing function as a major form of knowledge production and are “fundamentally ideological” 
(2009:69). However, Sun reminds us that news as myth is contingent on two conditions: the compassion 
discourse must never depart from the predictable discursive formula of a “compassionate story,” and 
“(t)he recipients of compassion must agree to enter the discourse consistently as ‘poor,’ ‘weak,’ and 
‘helpless.’” This analysis aptly explains the way Cao interprets Liu’s relations to his urban counterparts.  
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4.3. FROM BANGBANG WRITER TO ENTREPRENEUR  
The media called Liu “bangbang writer” and tried to take advantage of his status as a poor bangbang to 
create sensational stories. Liu was no longer a regular bangbang, but nor was he a professional writer. 
While his writing brought him fame, it did not bring him enough money to live. However, Liu chose to 
keep the halo that media forced on his head. For a period, he had to both work as a bangbang in the day 
time and keep writing articles when off work. At the same time, he was also made to actively interact 
with the media in exchange for fame and publication opportunities. However, the media interviews and 
writings took a lot of his working time, and the economic reward was meager.  
Although Liu was under great economic stress, he refused to take a contract job, even when there were 
chances to do so. 33  When asked why, Liu tended to emphasize his connection to the poor porters and his 
unwillingness to leave his bangbang colleagues behind: “I am a person who cares about feelings (zhong 
ganqing). I have had deep connections with bangbang throughout these years. Let me put it this way, 
when I went back to my home village these years, I could not stay for more than two days. I even could 
not sleep well. I knew I missed something; I wanted to go back to Chongqing. I felt better once I came 
back to the city.”  The local reportage writer Cao then concluded: “(Liu) feels uneasy to leave Chongqing 
and the bangbang. He even thinks it is cruel to leave them. He loves this city so much; he loves his 
bangbang work so much!” The media representation pigeonholed Liu into the social category of 
bangbang in order to extract more news value out of it. As long as Liu has connection to the underclass, 
he has value for the media and for the urban readers’ consumption. Liu took full advantage of the media’s 
desire to exoticize and romanticize him as an urban spectacle and collaborated with the media to create 
this image of “bangbang writer.”  
                                                 
33
 For example, Liu said that an owner of a flower cuisine restaurant in Chongqing read about his story, 
contacted him and offered him a management position and promised to pay Liu a monthly income of 1500 yuan for 
him to work in the restaurant. This is a good salary for a regular worker in mid-1990s’ Chongqing. Liu tried this job 
for a month and decided to quit. He complained that the long working hours made it impossible to keep writing. 
Later, he received another job offer from an entrepreneur in Chongqing. The entrepreneur expressed his admiration 
of Liu’s “integrity and talent” (guqi he caiqi), and invited Liu to work in his company. He promised to support Liu 
for his writing. However, Liu declined the offer. 
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4.4. AN BANGBANG-TURNED-ENTREPRENEUR WHO HAS NO TIME TO WRITE 
Unfortunately, Liu’s “love” of writing and bangbang work did not last long. Just when everyone expected 
Liu to pursuit the art of writing and become a professional writer, he declared in 1998 that he would give 
up writing, at least temporarily, and became an entrepreneur. He borrowed nearly ten thousand yuan 
(around US$1438) from his “media friends” and founded a moving company, Army of the Shancheng 
(Mountainous City) Bangbang, with two other bangbang business partners.  
His abrupt transformation attracted tremendous media attention. There was both positive and negative 
feedback. The positive side hailed Liu’s successful transformation from a penniless bangbang to an 
entrepreneur and praised his “fighting spirit.” The negative focused on Liu’s “disloyalty” to his writer 
dream and his degradation in the business world. But either way, Liu once again became a local focal 
point. Almost all the major local newspapers reported on the opening of his company. This time, the 
focus of the media was on the question of “why he gave up his writer dream to become a boss.” Liu 
offered two reasons on different occasions. The first reason was that he was under great economic 
pressure and wished to support his literary pursuits with the money from his business.34 The second 
reason was that he wanted to provide an organized, ordered, and reliable source of bangbang labor to the 
labor market. The idea was that his company, like the labor recruitment company that Yan documented in 
her research in Anhui Province (2003), offers not only commercial activity and services, but also the 
“reformation and education” that would bring efficiency and order to the labor market. This idea is 
especially attractive to the local government as the officials have associated the bangbang labor market 
with social disorder and criminality. The urban residents have also complained with the unruliness of 
bangbang. The local government thus applauded Liu’s company for promising to replace the unruly 
bangbang labor market with labor security and social stability.  
                                                 
34  In the documentary “Bangbang Is Great,” there is a scene showing the economic pressure Liu faces. The 
script goes: “Seeing that he could not help with his family’s poverty after many years of migration, Liu made a 
painful decision between his ideal and the reality—giving up writing. The priority for him is to find a way to earn 
money.”  
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The goal of providing organized and secure bangbang labor is achieved through what Liu describes as 
“reconstructing the collective image of a new generation of migrant workers” (Jian 2000:181). Liu also 
believes that rural migrants were not accepted by the city because “their mind, lifestyle, and behavior did 
not meet modern urban culture’s requirement. Migrants as a group were largely backward” (Jian 
2000:181). A good way to solve this problem, Liu thought, was to “organize them,” to conduct “self-
education and self-reform among the bangbang through education, and to raise their quality in order to 
meet the urban modern culture’s requirement and to construct a new image of the migrants.” Liu also said: 
“I am also a rural migrant worker. I must first commit to learning and reform (gaizao) myself; then I must 
unite other migrants. Together, we can finish the reform task (gaizao renwu).”   
In Shiming Jian’s interview with Liu (2000), Liu stressed the significance of discipline. The first step 
of reconstructing the new image of bangbang was to set up a strict recruiting policy to make sure that his 
bangbang employees were trustworthy and obedient. Any bangbang candidate seeking a job in Liu’s 
company needed to go through the company’s evaluation process. Those who received positive 
evaluations were asked to sign a two-year contract with the company but only on condition that an urban 
resident served as his guarantor. This, Liu believed, minimized the risk of recruiting an unruly migrant. 
Moreover, the bangbang would not be formally employed until they undergo a one-month probation 
period. This recruiting policy, Liu told me, was to guarantee the “quality” of the company employees.  
Liu also formulated a monetary penalty and reward policy for his bangbang employees. He evaluated 
their performances every month and punished or rewarded the workers based on their performance. For 
example, in Liu’s company, workers were divided into groups in the workplace; each group had a leader 
who supervised other workers. If no customers issued complaints about the workers, then the leader 
received a monetary reward of 20 yuan each month. But those workers who did garner complaints were 
financially punished. Liu considered this an efficient policy for disciplining the unruly workers (Jian 
2000:187).  
Furthermore, Liu emphasized the good service bangbang could provide if they were well-disciplined. 
When his company just opened, he distributed 30,000 copies of a Service Promise to the city residents. 
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This document, as an advertisement of sorts, ensured residents that his company provided high-quality 
service at a low cost. “Don’t worry if you have a problem; come to the “army of bangbang” for a 
solution,” the Service Promise said. It also said that the company had a corporate philosophy that 
cherished “honesty and righteousness, the spirit of eating bitterness and enduring hardship, warm-
heartedness and good service.” The company ensured the customers that its bangbang employees “do not 
smoke the customer’s cigarettes, eat with the customers, or accept tips from the customers” (Jian 
2000:186). These advertisements tried to ensure the potential customers that the company provided safe 
and reliable laborers who did not cause trouble or inconvenience. In other words, the bangbang 
employees were represented as the goods whose “quality” the company needed to guarantee in order to 
attract buyers.  
Lastly, Liu highly valued the “flexibility” of his company’s workforce. He promised the potential 
customers that the service could be delivered “day and night, on the spot, regardless of the weather” (Jian 
2000:186). In my interview with Liu, he also stressed that the importance for his company’s workers to 
work on a flexible basis: “They need to be ready whenever they are needed (sui jiao sui dao).” Yet this 
“flexibility,” as analyzed in my Chapter Three, is an alternative form of labor control. It made the workers 
work for prolonged hours and in difficult conditions at nearly no cost to the company owner since the 
company did not pay extra money or provide any subsidies as compensation.  
Liu justified his labor regime by appropriating both socialist moralities and market rationality.  On the 
one hand, he mentioned that one of his major goals was to sincerely serve the urban citizens. This 
narrative resembles the political slogan “Serve the People,” which was popular during the Maoist period. 
However, the privileged class at that time, “the people,” was replaced by the privileged class in the post-
socialist period, “the urban citizens.” On the other hand, Liu also drew on market economy logics to 
justify his labor regime. Liu thought that bangbang, as a workforce, was disordered and fragmented, 
which made the workers blind to business opportunities that require not only discipline in each individual 
worker but also collaboration among different sectors of the market. In other words, he was critical of the 
bangbang’s lack of market economy consciousness. But his company, Liu insisted, could dispatch the 
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bangbang to places of need and make them work collaboratively and efficiently by using proper 
disciplining techniques.  
Even more interesting, Liu vowed in our interview to protect bangbang’s legal rights and benefits. He 
represented himself as the spokesman of “the army of bangbang” and claimed that he knew what the 
latter wanted. But when I asked him about his insurance policy for his workers, he answered: “My 
company pays the full medical expenses for even the slightest worker injury. If the injury is the fault of 
the worker – for example, if it is caused by not wearing a helmet at the construction site – the company 
covers 50% of the medical expense. But if the injury is quite serious, then the company negotiates with 
the worker about the coverage of the medical expenses. My company buys accident injury insurance for 
the workers, which stops this July” [he didn’t explain why]. “Then, what about the medical insurance? Do 
your bangbang workers have it?” I asked. “My (office) staffs (bangongshi yuangong) all have medical 
insurance,” he answered after a pause, “but I can’t cover the bangbang workers’ medical insurance.” I 
asked if that was because his company was not profitable enough to provide the medical insurance. He 
denied this and came to his own defense: “None of the enterprises in Chongqing can cover all their 
employees’ medical insurance. They are not required to; I shouldn’t be required to either. It is what this 
society is like; I cannot change the way it is.” His words indicated that though he sympathized with 
bangbang, he obviously would not buy his workers insurance because it would be too costly for him and 
his company. As he put it, “I am an owner of a company, not a charity.”  
How successful is Liu’s enterprise? One interesting finding is that there is a discrepancy between what 
the scholars in China have found and what I have found. Shimin Jian, in his research on Liu’s company, 
states that Liu is exceptionally successful in saving himself from poverty and in rescuing other bangbang 
from a disordered labor market, from a low-income lifestyle, and from unprotected working conditions. 
He reports that Liu’s company is unusually successful, as evidenced by the fact that it had made a profit 
every month in 1999 when the consumption rate had dropped in Chongqing for 22 months in a row. At 
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that time, the monthly income of bangbang employees in Liu’s company was 450 yuan.35  When I 
interviewed Liu in 2007, he refrained from directly telling me his company’s profits. Instead, he chose to 
roughly tell me his individual wealth. He owned two offices in Chongqing city, ten trucks, and hoisting 
apparatuses such as lifting equipment and fork lifts. He hinted that running this business provided a 
steady profit, and he seemed eager to convince me that his company was well-managed and developing 
steadily.   
Liu’s company is also widely considered to be successful in providing work opportunities and in 
disciplining bangbang. Jian’s research documents one of these “achievements.” A local wholesale market 
invited Liu’s company to take over all the street haulage business. Jian writes: “(Since the takeover of 
Liu’s company,) the market got its order back. Both customers and business owners were satisfied.” 
However, this “achievement” shows that Liu’s company, as a corporation supported by money and fame, 
excluded the casual freelance bangbang workers from their workplace. These casual workers would have 
no bargaining power at all to compete with a corporation.  Yet this labor exclusion was hailed as a success 
of market reorganizing in China.    
But what about Liu’s literary dream? What about his promise to keep pursuing literary advancement 
with his business profits? When asked these questions in my interview, Liu answered: “I feel sorry that I 
haven’t written anything after my company was established. You see, I’ve been too busy. Ever since I’ve 
earned more money, I’ve been busy buying a house and a car, or busy with business. I have little 
connection with the [poor people’s] lives now,36 and I just can’t write anything.” He said that he would 
like to write a book about his success story after he retires. “Right now, it is just not possible,” he said.  
It is interesting that Liu listed “having little connection with [poor people’s] lives” as one of the 
reasons why he stopped writing. When he says “life,” I think he actually means a specific type of life – 
the rural migrant’s life from which he drew writing materials. He knows that this type of life had the 
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 Liu was reported to provide both three meals a day and the lodging to his bangbang employees.  Jian reports 
that the food and lodging cost about 250 yuan per month per person. He thus estimates that the average monthly 
income of Liu’s bangbang worker is around 600 yuan per month per person.  
36
 Liu’s original words are “wo xianzai meiyou shazi shenghuo jingyan le.” Literarily it means, “I have little 
living experience [of a poor migrant] now.”  
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representational value that makes it sellable in the market. Once he moves to a more privileged social 
status and loses this connection to the lower strata, his literary voice is no longer marketable. After all, 
who in the hubbub of the great city cares to read stories about a regular entrepreneur’s business life? 
4.5. CONCLUSION 
“If one sheep leaps over the ditch, the rest will follow” (bangyang de liliang shi wuqiong de), Mao 
Zedong told his people about fifty years ago. In post-Mao China, it seems that the society still operates 
under the shadow of Mao’s words in terms of making myths about the heroic features of the “leading 
sheep.” But revolutionary heroes are no longer needed; instead, everyone is encouraged to be 
economically successful in the market and to leave poverty behind. Success is no longer defined as 
revolutionary spirit and loyalty to the socialist cause, but as fame and money. The narrative of success 
and the changing meaning of success in post-socialist China point to a differentiation between “deserving 
citizens” and the less deserving citizens (Song 2007), between the people who “embrace risk” and the 
people “at risk” (Mark Driscoll 2007). The chasm between the “bangbang scholar” and the bangbang 
mass reconfirms a moral narrative that pushes poor migrant men to pursue success in the market economy 
in order to encounter the challenges and risks of a global market economy.  
In post-Mao China, Liu’s success is viewed as the success of a self-disciplined and self-reliant subject. 
The most frequently cited factor for Liu’s success is his “spirit” in fighting the odds. In such narratives, 
structural factors and social inequalities that contribute to migrant suffering are largely ignored. Liu’s 
success story can be understood as the perfect example of the “entrepreneurialization of self” (Gordon 
1991:44), not just in a literary way. “Self-making,” “self-development,” and “self-management” – these 
are mere fables that suggest the normalization of neoliberal developmentalism in the production of human 
capital.  
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The Agriculture Channel of CCTV nationally broadcasted Liu’s story to teach people “how to become 
rich” (zhifu jing).  The media referred to him as an “extraordinary example of success” (chenggong 
dianfan). In a widely-circulated article entitled “Seeking for the Starting Point in Commonplace,” the 
author cites Liu an a model for illustrating how peasants can get rich. The article concludes with the 
“precious lesson” extracted from Liu’s story that “at the beginning of your career, hardship is unavoidable, 
especially for those who are economically poor and eager to start their own careers. So you should not be 
picky in choosing your job. If you start with one job and work hard enough, you will be rewarded. Small 
business can be highly profitable.”  
However, despite the mainstream media and local government’s efforts to promote success stories 
such as Liu’s, bangbang were cynical about the easy connection between success and “neohumanism” 
being advocated.  During my fieldwork, most of the bangbang I met said that they had heard Liu’s story. 
Their opinions about it, however, varied. Some of them thought that Liu was admirable, but they did not 
think that Liu’s success was due to his much-praised personal characteristics, such as his self-
development mentality. Instead, they attributed Liu’s success to fate, luck, and good networking skills. 
One bangbang called Liu “that lucky guy.” Given good network and plenty of money, he said, he could 
be just as successful as Liu. Some bangbang viewed the media reports of Liu’s success as government 
propaganda. They told me that Liu was not as wealthy and successful as the media made him out to be. 
One bangbang who used to work for one of Liu’s business partners told me: “I was told that he had a hard 
time with business. He brags about his success, but he actually does not make much money. I wouldn’t be 
surprised if he does not earn as much as I do.” Most bangbang expressed their unwillingness to work for 
a moving company and to be bossed around. They told me that only old and uncompetitive bangbang 
sought jobs in Liu’s company because they were unlikely to do well as freelance bangbang. Some 
bangbang, however, yearned for a more secure job that would provide a stable monthly income. For them, 
Liu’s company was not a bad option. What is worth noting is that bangbang generally desire and value 
success, despite their varied opinions about Liu’s success. Even my relative who accompanied me during 
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my interviews with Liu urged me to learn from the latter. “It was not easy for a person like him to be so 
successful,” this relative said. “A person has to work on himself in order to change his fate.”  
Yan writes that the notion of self-reliance and self-development point to the fact that human 
subjectivity has been treated as the most important agent for market growth and economic development 
(Yan 2003). The value of the human being is directly linked to the productivity of capitalism. Poor 
migrants such as the bangbang in Chongqing become the fuel for economic take-off and the “standing 
reserve” (Anagnost 2006) that silently absorbs the hidden cost of producing a flexible and cheap 
workforce that capitalist accumulation needs.  Zhao describes the effect of neoliberalism as such, 
“Though the benign state, various social institutions, and exceptional individuals are doing their best to 
help, the only road to salvation for the economically and socially displaced is the personal will to survive. 
Those who overcome their own psychological barriers have fame and fortune to gain” (Zhao 2002: 129).  
In summary, the success of Xiaoxiao Liu reflects the changing development rationality and social 
landscape of China and illustrates the circulation of value from the representation economy to the 
economic realm. The value of Liu’s writing lies in its capacity to reinforce the social divisions between 
the orderly and well-disciplined urban setting and the chaotic and unruly rural migrant masses. The fact 
that Liu was a rural migrant worker himself adds the flavor of “authenticity” to his writing and makes his 
work more marketable. Once the representational value has been extracted from his own degraded social 
status, Liu quickly turns it into social and monetary capital by establishing his enterprises. The use value 
of Liu’s writing goes beyond satisfying the urban reader’s voyeuristic desire into the underclass society. It 
also justifies the overexploitation and labor regime in the economic realm and makes possible the 
capitalist accumulation of the surplus value in the workplace.  
Liu, who gave up literary success for economic success, represents the type of citizen that the state 
desires. A rural migrant who can write and demand sympathetic recognition of migrants’ suffering is too 
dangerous. Even a migrant who documents the lives of the lower social strata for some monetary reward 
is unwelcome. But an entrepreneur with no time to write is acceptable, even highly valued, in the post-
socialist society. Those bangbang who have neither the writing skills nor opportunities to be 
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economically successful are largely ignored as a homogenous mass. But how do individual bangbang 
survive the discriminating effects of social classification and social marginalization? What are their 
strategies in the face of exclusion and humiliation? Do they take collective action to protest social 
inequalities? These are the questions explored in Chapter Five.  
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5.0 BANGBANG’S GENDER STRATEGIES IN THE WORKPLACE 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
On a hot and humid summer afternoon in 2007, I visited some bangbang at their workplace – a hardware 
and electric appliance wholesale market, one of the biggest in Southwest China. I got to the southern gate, 
which was formed by two big cement pillars, an iron arch on the pillars, and a cement wall. This was the 
place where the bangbang stayed for a rest when between jobs. The long shadow of the big pillars and 
wall provided some shade and coolness during the hot summer afternoon. In front of me was an enormous 
building of 35,000 square meters, comprising two floors – the ground floor and the upper floor. Over 500 
privately-owned wholesale stores packed both floors like sardines. Iron wires, plastic boards, and metal 
goods separated one store from another. Hundreds of business owners, employees, customers, market 
managers, truck drivers, and bangbang worked in the market. Their movement and voices created a 
hubbub akin to a pot of boiling water. Outside the market, three highways connecting Chongqing and 
Chengdu (the capital city of Sichuan Province) converged near the southern gate. Cars and trucks were 
coming and going while people were walking in and out. Dust flew upwards when large vans whizzed 
past. A bit further out, numerous highrise buildings and large mansions made up the skyline, serving as a 
reminder of the rapidly ongoing urbanization process in Chongqing.  
Old Zhang, a bangbang man in his sixties, was asked by a store owner, a woman in her forties, to 
carry over goods from another market. Because of his age, Old Zhang could not compete with the young 
and middle-aged bangbang colleagues. His strategy was to not bargain with his customers over the 
workload and payment as other bangbang would. I have heard bosses praising Old Zhang for his obedient, 
easy-going attitude. But some bosses have abused his friendliness and asked him to do extra work for free, 
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to work for longer periods of time, or to carry goods at a price that younger bangbang would not accept. 
This time, Old Zhang and the female boss agreed that she would pay him after the work was finished. 
I went with Old Zhang for the delivery and went back with him to the female boss’s store for payment. 
However, the female boss did not pay him as they agreed but asked him to put the goods in order. Old 
Zhang tried to ask her for extra payment for the extra work, but her response was: “You greedy bangbang, 
do what I ask you to do.” Old Zhang tried to argue with her, saying that if she did not want him, he could 
work for other bosses, but that she should pay for his service. The female boss took out her calculator, 
punched in a few numbers, and then told Old Zhang that she would pay one a half yuan (about25 cents) 
for him to do the extra work. That price was way too low for the workload – almost an insult. But the 
boss justified her payment, “This [the work] is pure manual labor (chun xia li). No skill involved at all 
(meiyou jishu hanliang) and no brain work needed (bu dong naozi). How much do you expect me to 
pay?” Old Zhang was irritated and went back to the southern gate as a gesture of protest. I accompanied 
him to the gate. He told his bangbang colleagues that he was annoyed but he still considered accepting 
the “offer” in order to get his payment. However, the bangbang colleagues stopped him. They said that 
the female boss had treated them badly and that they should “teach her a lesson.” Old Zhang was hesitant 
about seeking revenge, but the other bangbang assured him that he would get his payment back in the end. 
One of the bangbang, Yan Fat Boy said, “It is right and proper (tian jing di yi) to pay for what you buy. 
You can call it reasonable wherever you go” (zou dao near dou shuodei zou).” Little Peng agreed and said: 
“Without us, she has to move them (the goods) herself. How much (physical) strength has she (to handle 
the heavy labor)? She needs us (to work for her); we don’t beg her (for it).” 
After a while, the female boss came out of her store, located near the southern gate, to call Old 
Zhang’s name. Old Zhang tried to make a compromise, asking her to add one yuan (about 50 cents) to the 
original payment. She became impatient and said: “A bangbang bargain with me [the boss]! Do you think 
I have to hire you? I will ask others.” Then the female boss yelled at other bangbang: “Anyone of you, 
come over! The money [for the extra work] is yours!” However, none of the about ten bangbang moved.  
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A bangbang named Little Li had just finished a job and come to the scene. He thought the female boss 
was calling him; he ran to her but quickly found out what was going on. He went back to the southern 
gate and joined his colleagues. The female boss kept yelling. Tan White Hair began to yell back: “You are 
a boss [who has money], not a bangbang like us [who has no money]. Why are you so stingy? Just pay us 
more, and we will work for you.” Other bangbang joined Tan, asking the female boss to pay Old Zhang 
and to raise the payment. Old Zhang was a little nervous, worrying that if female boss would be too upset 
to pay him for the work he had already done. He tried to find excuses to justify the boss’s rudeness, 
saying, “Women have long hair but little brains” and “A good man doesn’t fight with women” (haonan 
bu gen nǚ dou). Some bangbang nodded their heads, but others said: “A good woman doesn’t fight with 
men either” And “That evil woman (e poniang) didn’t learn how to be a woman at home.”  
The battle between the bangbang and the boss did not seem to be a serious fight. On the bangbang’s 
side, they were careful that their resistance did not irritate and humiliate the female boss. They spoke in a 
half-joking tone; the “battle” was more teasing than a serious conflict. At one point, Little Peng said: 
“Hey boss! You are too ‘smart.’ Thinking too much damages your health. Calculate less and you will 
become young and beautiful. Your husband will love you more.” “Bravo!” other bangbang exclaimed in 
support of Little Peng’s words. The female boss yelled back: “Better watch your own wives closely. Be 
sure that she doesn’t run away with wealthy men!” Tan White Hair responded: “I am not afraid of that. If 
she runs away, I will find a better one, young and pretty!” “Right! Dream on!” the female boss said. All 
the bangbang laughed. Later, Tan White Hair continued: “Nowadays, a man with money has whatever he 
wants. Wait and see, one day I might become a millionaire.” The female boss replied: “Yeah right, a 
bangbang millionaire. Let’s wait and see.” In the end, the female boss took a step back and agreed to raise 
the payment to two and half yuan.  
After the female boss left, Tan White Hair commented: “How come she [the female boss] is so 
arrogant? Not like a woman…She is from rural Zhejiang Province … [I]n the Maoist era, these ‘bosses’ 
were just like us – digging the earth. They were peasants too!” A male store owner who stood by Tan said: 
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“That’s true. We are all dagong de (working men). The real boss is the official who does not need to 
expend labor to earn huge amounts of money.”  
As this anecdote demonstrates, male bangbang face great challenges to their sense of masculine pride 
when working in the urban setting. Their capacity to hold their families together is brought into question 
because of their meager economic opportunities and marginalized social position. When the female boss 
challenged Little Peng, she said: “Better watch your own wives closely. Be sure that she doesn’t run away 
with wealthy men!” Such words illustrate the inferior positions that bangbang have in a post-Mao 
Chinese society which is becoming increasingly commercialized and stratified along class lines. In such a 
society, money buys not only goods, but also human relations. A rural migrant man who does not earn 
enough to raise his family risks losing his wife and children. The structural violence resulting from the 
intersecting lines of gender and class can be poignantly felt for these working men. However, instead of 
being passive victims, bangbang also actively make use of varied strategies to protect their decency and 
dignity. 
This chapter aims to delineate the gender strategies that bangbang adopt in the workplace to empower 
themselves against humiliation and violence. My goal is to reveal the gender inequalities in contemporary 
Chinese society, particularly in relation to the dynamics of labor and class. The concept of "gender 
strategies" comes from Hochschild (1989), who traces how husbands and wives negotiate and rationalize 
the apportionment of domestic labor. Hochschild defines a gender strategy as “a plan of action through 
which a person tries to solve problems at hand, given the cultural notions of gender at play” (1989:15). 
She argues, “To pursue a gender strategy, a man draw on beliefs about manhood and woman hood, beliefs 
that are forced in early childhood and thus anchored to deep emotions. He makes a connection between 
how he thinks about his manhood, what he feels about it, and what he does” (1989:15). In this chapter, I 
use the concept of “gender strategy” to refer to how men draw on their beliefs about manhood and 
womanhood and the dominant gender discourses for the purposes of cushioning themselves from the 
challenges to their sense of masculinity in the urban workplaces. In some cases, the “gender strategies” 
were more akin to displays of manhood rather than acts of protest. Such displays, however, could 
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empower the male workers to some extent but, in doing so, they put women in a more vulnerable position. 
For example, Tan White Hair said that if his wife (a rural migrant just like him) left him, he could find a 
young and beautiful girl as a replacement. By putting down his wife, Tan tried to exaggerate the value of 
migrant man over rural migrant women.  
5.2. GENDER AND WORK  
Men and women participate in work that is gendered. The occupational imperatives that shape 
interactions in the workplace naturalize and essentialize cultural constructions of masculinity and 
femininity for men and women (West and Zimmerman 1987; West and Fenstermaker 1995; Kimmel and 
Messner 2007). Contemporary ethnographic research on gender and work has focused on inequalities in 
the global economy and on the diverse practices that produce a gendered global labor force. Such 
scholarship offers insights into how the lived experiences of work are shaped by gender and labor 
inequalities (e.g., Constable 1997; Mills 2003; Parrenas 2000).  
Women become highly visible within this literature because of their underprivileged positions in a 
gendered economy. Against the backdrop of the new forms of flexible accumulation of transnational 
capital, anthropologists have provided rich and sensitive ethnographies on the feminization of global labor 
and gendered patterns of labor recruitment and discipline as well as on cultural struggles and various 
forms of resistance. Since the 1970s, scholars have found that the changing character of labor markets 
around the world has led to a rise in female labor force participation and a relative if not absolute fall in 
men's employment. Many jobs traditionally held by men are also feminized (e.g., Ong 1991; Cheng 1999; 
Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002). In country after country, women laborers have come to dominate off-
shore factory production lines, family firms, subcontracting arrangements, and informal work sections. 
Global factories reproduce similar models of organization wherein women dominate the lowest levels of 
both pay and authority, whereas men occupy most supervisory and managerial positions (Write 2001). 
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Hierarchical gender ideologies that define women’s labor as secondary and at most complementary to 
men’s cheapen the direct costs of labor to capital (Ong 1991). Cheng (1999) suggests that capitalist 
systems define work as a process of production that can contribute to the capital accumulation and 
exchange. Such a definition contributes to the devaluation of women’s work as that which is not 
productive and has low exchange value. Corporate production, on the one hand, identifies the desirable 
sexualized bodies for their labor force—often young, deferential and “nimble-fingered” female laborers. 
In other words, by defining women’s labor as cheap and as less valuable than men’s, hegemonic gender 
ideologies, along with the capitalist system, serve to lower the direct costs of global capital and to 
facilitate its accumulation strategies (Mills 2003).  
Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2002) offer pointed insights from a feminist perspective about the 
feminization of global labor and the influences of globalization on women. Their work shows that global 
persistence of patriarchy is never solely responsible for the subjugation of these third world women. 
Weathly first-world women can exploit poor ones just as effectively as men can. Although the authors 
neglect the differences among career women in the first-world, their work convincingly warns us that the 
category of “world women workers” is not sustainable because of the severe disparity between women’s 
socioeconomic positions on a global scale. Anthropologists have observed the emergence and circulation 
of a recruitment discourse that justifies the great need for cheap female laborers for assembly-line factory 
work. In this discourse, female laborers are viewed as having nimble fingers, a higher endurance for 
longer hours and a greater workload than men, and traditional virtues of sacrifice for supporting families 
by working in factories (e.g., Mills 1999; Pun 2005; Salaff 1981; Cheng 1999; Morokvasic 1984). There 
have also been significant academic analyses of how gendered patterns of labor recruitment impact local 
gender relations (e.g., Orton et al., 2001; Dolan 2001). Similar to recruitment, the patterns of labor 
discipline are also highly gendered (e.g., Mills 2003; Lee 1998; Salzinger 1997) and change over time, 
especially relative to political transformation (e.g., Rofel 1999; Rosenthal 2002). 
In addition to factory workers, transnational migrant labor also includes a large number of workers in 
the service economy, such as restaurant workers, domestic servants, and day laborers. These workers are 
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also subject to many kinds of gendered labor regulations and discipline. Constable (1997) examines how 
employment agencies both in Hong Kong and in the Philippines “domesticate” Filipina women to suit the 
ideal image of domestic workers for Hong Kong employers. The employers also set informal rules and 
regulations to amend domestic workers’ behaviors and attitudes to suit their tastes and expectations. 
These informal rules are not only imposed within the private domain of the household, but may also 
extend to the more private domain of a domestic worker’s body, personality, voice and emotions. The 
local laws and legal policies generally support employers, and thus reinforce, if not enhance, control and 
domination of domestic workers. Hondagneu-Sotelo (2001) offers a study of Latina domestic workers in 
Los Angeles. This sociological study devotes much attention to how employers establish networks that 
facilitate the recruitment and hiring of domestic workers and how such a process creates standards of 
employment that often fail to recognize domestic workers as full human beings who have feelings and 
intelligence.  
Ethnographers are just beginning to pay attention to the fluid and complex relations between the 
material conditions of labor and the configuration of masculine identity. Some ethnographers are 
concerned with how economic restructuring and localized globalization have incurred a crisis of 
masculinity (e.g., George 2000; Goldring 2001; Levitt 2001; Gamburd 2000; McDowell 2000; Newman 
1999; Roy 2003). They provide insights about the significance of work and economic power in 
determining masculine pride. A significant portion of the existing literature explores the emotional labor 
that men perform in highly gendered and prestigious occupations (Pierce 1995; Cheng 1996) and the 
struggles that male workers undergo in maintaining their manhood in women-dominated occupations 
(Henson and Rogers 2007; William 1989, 1992, 1993, 1995). Scholars such as Christian Williams argue 
that some men doing “women’s jobs” actually “benefit” from their token status and are able to ride the 
“glass escalator” to more prestigious, better-paid positions within women’s professions (Williams 1995; 
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Maume 1999).37 However, other scholars find that men in a female-dominated clerical occupation with 
little opportunity for promotion lack the advantages of upward mobility; they adopt various gender 
strategies to reassert the feminine identification of the job while rejecting its application to them, such as 
renaming and reframing the work, distancing themselves from the work with a cover story, and resisting 
the demands to perform deference (Henson and Rogers 2007). They argue that these strategies help to 
reproduce and naturalize the gendered organization of work and to reinvigorate hegemonic masculinity 
and its domination over women and men.  
Comparatively less discussed in this line of scholarship is how low-income working-class men such as 
bangbang assert their masculine pride in the absence of resources that signify other types of masculinity. 
This chapter argues that although rural migrant men who work as bangbang do a “man’s job,” they fall 
short of the ideals of urban masculinity on at least three fronts. First, due to their low income and 
marginalized position in society, bangbang lack avenues and opportunities for becoming the ideal type of 
men. Second, they face gendered assessment because they do not have a full-time, well-paid permanent 
job. Third, bangbang work, as a service job, often requires bangbang to perform deference to customers. 
However, the performance of deference and obedience challenge bangbang’s sense of dignity and pride. 
The resulting gender strategies reveal how male bangbang reject the application of femininity by put on a 
show of manhood.  
In particular, I argue that bangbang defend their masculine pride and integrity through the following 
tactics. First, they emphasize the culturally constructed masculine aspects of the bangbang work, such as 
the high demand for physical strength; second, bangbang tell bitter stories of their lives; third, they make 
use of socialist ethics that favor peasants and manual labor; fourthly, they resist performing deference to 
customers, especially female customers. These do not constitute the entirety of strategies that bangbang 
use, but are representative of what I saw in my fieldwork. However, although bangbang’s gender 
strategies do provide the potential to challenge the dominant gender order, they nevertheless naturalize 
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 By using the term “women’s job,” the author does not mean that she thinks that these jobs ARE “women’s 
jobs” or that certain jobs are supposed to be done by women. She is aware of the significance of historical 
construction of the gendered division of labor. 
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and reconfirm the urban hegemonic ideal type of masculinity that contributes to the exclusion and 
marginalization of bangbang. Furthermore, while socialist ethics empower bangbang in some way, they 
also reinforce negative stereotypes of peasants as outdated and uncouth.  
5.3. RECONFIGURATION OF CHINESE MASCULINITY IDEALS  
The negative stereotypes of bangbang as unvalued men were formed in post-Mao China in relation to the 
reconfiguration of masculine ideals in the course of China’s modern history. Since the 1930s, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) consistently promoted the value of manual workers and peasants. Mao Zedong 
extolled the virtues of rural life in contrast to the corruption of the city. With the establishment of the PRC 
in 1949, the CCP promoted workers, peasants, and soldiers (especially men) as heroes. State-promoted art 
and literature featured male revolutionary heroes who exhibited exaggerated physical strength and 
courage, rejected bourgeois lifestyles, and expressed devotion to communist ideals. The CCP also 
launched the Great Leap Forward, concomitant with communism of 1958-1960, in order to tackle the 
difference between city and countryside, between worker and peasant, and between mental and manual 
labor (William Hinton 1984:207). However, the official celebration of manual male work did not 
completely eradicate the popular stereotype of manual laborers as poor, uneducated, dirty, and less 
desirable. Urban Shanghai girls would rarely marry rural men, no matter whether these men were wealthy 
or not (Croll 1984). Despite the CCP’s effort to move workers, peasants and soldiers from the margin to 
the center in literary representations and on the stage, the traditional sense of wen (literati, scholarly) 
masculinity still had an upper hand in daily life. As Yiyan Wang suggests, CCP cadres (the majority of 
them men) were the modern literati in a sense. With their literacy and a communist education, they were 
seen as superior to the illiterate and uneducated masses of workers, peasants and soldiers (Wang 
2003:46).38 Also, peasants remained materially disadvantaged.  China’s hukou (household registration) 
                                                 
38
 For discussions of how meanings of Chinese femininity have changed from pre-1949 to Maoist China, see 
Tani Barlow’s study of the genealogy of womanhood in China (Barlow 1994), Mayfair Yang’s research on Chinese 
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system prevented peasants from working in relatively wealthy urban areas, thus reinforcing rural men’s 
socioeconomic inferiority in relation to urban men. 
With its quick transformation from a planned economy to a market economy since 1978, China has 
witnessed increasing economic and social stratification. In an era of commodification and consumption, 
individual social positioning no longer depends on one’s chushen (class of origin), but in many ways 
depends on the level of personal income and educational capital. With the widening rural-urban gap since 
the 1980s, the countryside and rural people have been stigmatized materially and symbolically as 
backward, ignorant, and despicable (Yan 2003). Previously glorified images of masculine and powerful 
peasants have largely disappeared.  
As poor rural migrants, bangbang fall into the category of unwanted men in the post-Mao era’s urban 
settings. Because they do manual work in urban regions and because they are economically poor, they 
immediately incite prejudice from more established urban residents. They are depicted by many urban 
locals as not manly enough. When young urban women look for a marriage partner, bangbang are not an 
object of desire but rather the topic of jokes and condescension. In many ways, bangbang’s experience of 
gender echoes what Margold found among Filipino migrant male workers in Saudi Arabia (Margold 
1995). Migration, to some bangbang, is a search for decency and dignity, but in reality, many experience 
a disintegrating sense of their masculinity and, therefore, of their selfhood. 
The social derogation of bangbang’s work also contributes to the demasculinization of male bangbang. 
Their work is highly male-dominated (about 99% of bangbang are males), but is not viewed by the urban 
residents as a good job for decent men. As Lisa Rofel observes in Other Modernities, female factory 
workers’ ideal boyfriends were “men who had proven their masculinity in these market achievements” 
(Rofel 1999:233). Indeed, well-educated and/or economically successful men such as CEOs, 
entrepreneurs, doctors, lawyers, government officials are more highly desired by women. Peasants, 
soldiers, or factory workers, on the other hand, are not as desirable. The rural-urban gap is an important 
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factor that rules out rural men as desired marriage partners for urban women. But with the gradual 
collapse of the hukou system in post-reform China, urban residency has come to matter less as a good 
occupation with a stable income and a high social status has come to matter more. A bangbang worker 
who is the father of a nineteen-year-old daughter told me that it would not concern him whether his future 
son-in-law was urban resident or not. “What matters,” he said, “is whether he earns enough money to 
financially support his family, including my daughter. In my opinion, many urban young men are useless, 
taking drugs, prostituting, and having extramarital affairs … If the young man (who pursues my daughter) 
is hard-working, who cares if he is a rural or an urban citizen?”  
Service work in contemporary China is dominated by women workers. But while bangbang work in 
Chongqing is considered part of the service economy, it is mostly done by men. Thus, bangbang actually 
work in a highly female-dominated economic sector, yet the occupation itself is male-dominated. As a 
service work, bangbang’s business requires deference and care-giving. Depending on the context, 
bangbang utilize different strategies to display deference and obedience to their customers.  
5.4. THE CHALLENGES TO MANHOOD 
Bangbang’s sense of dignity and manhood were challenged mainly on three fronts. First, in a society 
where a person’s value is largely decided by his/her job, bangbang who work on a casual and temporary 
basis are often derogated as “having no job” and thus as possessing no value. Such a scenario presents a 
major challenge to bangbang’s sense of dignity and pride, particularly given the fact that in the 
countryside, men who have opportunity to migrate and to find a job in the cities are generally viewed as 
especially capable. Second, since bangbang work is considered a form of physical labor that requires no 
skills, bangbang are normally devalued as “merely” manual laborers. Therefore, they do not possess 
much bargaining power in the labor market. Third, bangbang need to show deference to their customers 
most of the time; some bangbang felt humiliated working for the urban residents. To make the situation 
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even more threatening for male bangbang, their work does not provide opportunities for promotion. 
Unlike male nurses and elementary school teachers who also work in the service sector and are often 
subject to social discrimination, bangbang do not have institutionalized means for upward mobility in 
their jobs, no matter how hard they work (Williams 1995, 1989). Also, unlike the situation of male 
clerical workers (Henson and Rogers 2007), bangbang’s work does not provide an institution from which 
the workers can draw resources.  
In the following pages, I detail these challenges and highlight the connections between labor and 
masculinity. The social classification and hierarchical ranking of jobs are not just power-laden, but also 
very much gendered. For example, in post-socialist China, a permanent job is considered crucial for men, 
but not necessarily important for women. Women who stay at home or only work part-time are sometimes 
thought of “having a good fate” (hao ming).  
5.4.1. “He doesn’t have a real job”  
As many scholars have pointed out, the ability to secure a permanent job that provides sufficient financial 
rewards for the person to assume the breadwinner role at home is a core component of masculine identity 
(Connell 1987, 1995; Kimmel 1994; Cheng 1996; Kimmel and Messner 2007). The idea that men, instead 
of women, should hold permanent employment and should assume the breadwinner role is widely shared 
among bangbang and their wives. For example, a female shoe shiner mentioned that since her husband, a 
bangbang, has not been earning much money recently, she was the major source of her family’s income. 
However, she obviously did not think that she was the breadwinner. She said, “My earning can only pay 
for the food and some daily expenses. Women’s money is just the complement (to the family’s income). 
A man must be depended upon to raise a family (yang jia kao nanren). I’d like him to keep looking for a 
job, to work for a company or to have our own business (zuo shengyi) … Sometimes I push him to look 
for better jobs. … Bangbang’s work is not for him. I often reminded him that we have two kids who go to 
school. We need money.”  
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What her words demonstrate is that the uncertainty, irregularity, and poor remuneration of bangbang’s 
work often challenge male bangbang’s abilities to live up to the ideal of a man’s role as the self-sufficient 
breadwinner and head of his family. Both bangbang work and shoe shining are low-pay and temporary 
jobs, but the bangbang’s wife seems to think that such work is natural and unproblematic in her own case, 
but not in her husband’s. She believes that “a man must be depended upon to raise a family” while she 
earns money as “a supplement.”  
When male bangbang fail to fulfill such family responsibilities, they often feel guilt and shame. A 
bangbang nicknamed White Kid felt frustrated for not being able to earn enough money to keep his 
family together in the city. He lived alone in Chongqing while his wife and two kids remained in the 
countryside. He said: “I want to go back home to be with them, but I am afraid to.… It is not the money 
(spent on the travel)…It is that I am afraid to hear my younger daughter’s words -- she is lovely, really 
adorable -- she asked me, ‘Dad, when can I go to Chongqing and live with you?’” White Kid stopped 
talking and sighed before continuing. He told me that he felt proud to be able to afford the expense of 
inviting his wife and two kids to come to Chongqing and live with him for three months last summer. 
“We had a good time, all of us.” He said, “The younger one got sick because of the (hot) weather and I 
paid all the medical expenses – (it was) really expensive! But she was very happy to see me and the place 
where I work. I am saving every cent so that I can invite them to visit me this summer too.”   
One of the major challenges that bangbang face in doing their work is the inability of the job to 
provide enough income to raise their families. Some bangbang I met told me that they had planned to 
change their career path at certain points of their lives, even though such work is not ideal and does not 
allow for a flexible schedule. Some bangbang, however, did not like what they were doing and even 
refused to think of their job as a job. When I asked one male bangbang about his job, his response was: 
“What is the ‘job’ (gongzuo) we are talking about here? I don’t have a job … This (bangbang work)? I 
wouldn’t call it a real job. This is what I do for food (hun fan chi).” I asked him to explain the difference 
between “hun fan chi” and a “real” job. He said: “A real job is a job that makes a large amount of money. 
(It lets) you not worry about tomorrow’s dinner. We bangbang have to earn money every day no matter 
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what. Otherwise, my wife and kids would starve.” He also told me that “I am preparing for a change (of 
job). … I want my wife and kids to never worry about survival any more.” I have heard similar words 
from a few others and their wives. Some bangbang’s wives also did not see street carrying work as a real 
job. One such wife, when asked about her husband’s occupation, looked at me as if I were teasing her. 
She said: “My husband raised our family (yang jia). He is over there…yeah, a bangbang.” She told me 
after making sure that I was asking her seriously: “Well, you know, he’s got no job. He is a…bangbang.” 
She lowered her voice when she said the last word. “It is not well-reputed (bu guangcai) (to be a 
bangbang).” She said carefully, “No one takes bangbang seriously” (bushi zhengjing gongzuo). 
There is much truth to her words. A few male bangbang told me that they felt inferior and inadequate. 
A bangbang named Big Wang told me, “You get nothing from this job besides the money for food 
(chifan qian). You do what the boss tells you to do, like what, animals! Sometimes there are just too 
many bangbang (who compete for one job), and the boss doesn’t want you (to do the job). You feel that 
you are so cheap (xia liu). No value.” These words correspond interestingly with what Yan observes 
about master-servant relationships. “The presupposition of the master-servant relationship 
[Herrschaftsverhaltnis] is the appropriation of an alien will. Whatever has no will, e.g. the animal, may 
well provide a service, but does not thereby make its owner into a new master” (1973:500-501). 
Obviously, this bangbang did not just feel inferior, but altogether dehumanized, at work because his will 
had been subdued by the boss. He also felt humiliated when his value was decided by someone alien to 
him – the boss. Not only does he not have the power in the relationship, but he also does not feel he is a 
full human being. Rather, he feels more like an “animal,” an alienated being.  
Based on what bangbang told me about their experiences of discrimination in the city, the occupation 
of bangbang, for privileged classes, means a dreadful future with no hope. Men who do this job are also 
considered less manly or not manly enough. For example, one urban woman commented, “I often pity 
bangbang’s wives and kids. How do they put up with the fact that the household head is a bangbang? If I 
were them, I would worry very much about the family’s survival. I think only stupid men (naoke bu 
lingguang de nanren) with no capacity become bangbang. Otherwise, why doesn’t he look for a real 
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job?” Similarly, another urban man told me: “I asked a bangbang to carry a piece of furniture for me 
yesterday. … I told him to watch the corner of the hallway that led to my apartment (to prevent the 
furniture from being hit by the wall). He said ‘yes, boss.’ But he still hit the furniture on the hallway wall! 
I was mad… No wonder he is a bangbang! (He is) Too stupid to find a real job!”  
While some bangbang resist urban discrimination by emphasizing their financial independence and 
capacity to raise a family, others feel shame about their job. When I took pictures of bangbang, some 
purposely dropped the bamboo poles they were holding. “Better to not be seen working in Chongqing as a 
bangbang holding a bamboo pole in my hand,” one of them said. Some had not even told their family 
what they actually did for a living. They only say that they have found “work” (huo lu) in the city.  
5.4.2.  Bangbang Work is Pure Physical Labor (chun xia li) 
The social and cultural favoring intellectual over physical work in China contributes to the feelings of 
devaluation that bangbang experience at work. In post-Mao China, this value system is deliberately 
upheld to reduce the cost of physical labor. In the anecdote that opens this chapter, the female boss said: 
“This [the work] is pure manual labor (chun xia li). No skill involved at all (meiyou jishu hanliang) and 
no brain work needed (bu dong naozi).” She used the popular view of bangbang work as pure manual 
labor to reduce the value of Lao Zhang’s labor. In my fieldwork, I have repeatedly heard people tell me 
that bangbang’s work requires no skills. Naturally, then, such people would not be surprised that 
bangbang don’t earn much money. For example, a construction team leader and rural migrant told me: 
“Bangbang can’t do my work. Bangbang’s work only needs physical strength (xia si li), pure physical 
labor (chun tili). Bangbang don’t know how to demolish walls, build up walls, and work high above the 
ground. I bet that they don’t even know how to use electricity tester (shi dian bi)! ” In other words, he 
thought that construction work is superior to bangbang’s work because the former requires skill whereas 
the latter does not. I also met bangbang who agreed with this view and worried that the “pure manual 
labor” they were doing had ruined their ability to think. The bangbang, Big Wang, told me: “As 
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bangbang, we have to do what the boss tells us to do as if we’re robots. After a long period of working as 
bangbang – one’s brain rusts if it is not being used – I am afraid that my brain doesn’t work any more.” 
As some scholars have argued, to be technically competent is to be masculine (Cockburn 1985; 
Messerchimidt 1996; Wright 1996). Wright’s examination of computer system and relevant calculating 
culture shows that high technology occupations are highly masculinized. Engineering and computing 
professionals are considered a “man’s job” while women are viewed to be “particularly hurt by the 
obsession with technology and hands-on activities because the gender socialization experienced by most 
women yields a distinct lack of experience in ‘tinkering’ with electronics” (Wright 1996:87). Skills are so 
gendered that technological proficiency, characterized as masculine, often makes women feel 
uncomfortable (Wright 1996).  
China’s modernization, as a project of the state, also greatly advocates science and technology. In 
1988, Deng Xiaoping said: “Science and Technology are the primary power for productivity.” When 
China began to focus exclusively on economic development, science and technology were viewed as the 
foremost productive forces and the engine of economic growth (Song 1997). The Chinese government 
mobilizes a huge amount of the nation’s human and material resources to facilitate scientific and 
technological research every year. Human labor, supplemented with technological competence, has 
become the “new favorite” (xin chong) of the market economy. As countries enter the high-tech era, 
professionals such as those working in information technology, bio-technology, electronic engineering 
and finance have reaped high profits and generated much attention. These professions are closely linked 
to economic capital and to social status while the manual labor has been largely devalued. While the 
global workforce in low-end occupations has been feminized, the bangbang industry, although dominated 
by men, is not considered as a prosperous and valuable career option. Rather, bangbang are devalued as 
intellectually incapable, technologically incompetent, and economically lacking.  
One bangbang’s wife told me that she had pushed her husband to learn brick masonry skills from her 
relatives. “Having skills, one can earn money everywhere,” she said. “Bangbang work doesn’t involve 
any skills, but requires a lot of physical strength. What if he gets sick and loses his physical strength?” 
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She also mentioned that her relatives who worked as masons earn more money than her husband. “She 
(the mason’s wife) doesn’t need to work. She stays at home, doing whatever she likes. I like to work, but 
I’d also like to have the flexibility that she has.” But her husband refuses to learn the skills of a mason, 
saying that such work was not for him. The wife was very disappointed about this. 
Some bangbang deny the notion that their work does not require any skill. One day, Tan White Hair 
was planning to carry a whole box of bottled beers for a customer. But since the only tools that he had 
were plastic ropes and a bamboo pole, he was worried that the bottles would drop out of the box. An 
experienced bangbang man named Old Huang passed by and stopped Tan. Old Huang pointed out that 
Tan had incorrectly tied the bottles to the box. He showed Tan how to tie the knots in a special way to 
prevent the bottles from slipping. An onlooker bangbang turned to me and said: “Who says bangbang 
have no skill? See that (Old Huang’s knot)?” Old Huang responded: “That’s what the people say to 
devalue (wa zhua) us. I say that bangbang’s work requires sophisticated technological skills.” He put on a 
self-mockery tone. He then demonstrated to me a variety of ways to tie knots, with each knot 
corresponding to different types of goods. This demonstration was to illustrate bangbang’s skills that their 
work includes.  
Bangbang also protested against the stereotypical belief that their work does not require any 
intelligence. One bangbang said, “To do a good job, bangbang doesn’t need just physical strength…but 
also shuren39 (to ensure the business opportunities).” Another bangbang continued: “He also uses his 
brain. For example, you need to know the type of goods (you are dealing with) in order to rearrange them 
(while unloading them).” Fei Xiaotong argues that what is valued as “knowledge” and “skill” varies by 
context. The production of knowledge is itself a power struggle. Fei laments that urban residents are so 
inclined to dismiss peasants as illiterate and backward, particularly when they actually lack certain forms 
of knowledge that peasants possess, such as farming and gardening. The peasants’ children know how to 
seize grasshoppers in the field while urban children can only do so clumsily (Fei 1992). When certain 
types of knowledge – for example, science – are advocated as more advanced, especially when that 
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knowledge is connected to economic productivity and growth, other knowledge systems are subject to 
devaluation. Bangbang have expertise in delivering goods and know how to use tools property. However, 
they are unfairly treated as devalued workers. Moreover, as a social group, they are seen as the obverse of 
productivity and advancement. This, I argue, is a form of systematic violence sanctioned by the state to 
push the physical laborers to the bottom of the occupational hierarchy and to deny them the respect and 
reward that they deserve. The division of and inequality between manual and intellectual labors reflects 
the reorganization of value, knowledge, capital, production, and social relations in the post-Mao era.   
5.4.3. “A bangbang does his job without asking” 
In Chongqing, urban citizens often divide bangbang into “ones who do their work without 
asking/talking/bargaining” and “those who have slick tongues.” The former are considered dependable 
and trustworthy while the latter disrespectful and despicable. But this bifurcated evaluation, I argue, is yet 
another form of systematic violence toward bangbang that silences their voices. Such a point of view fails 
to address, much less raise understanding about, the vulnerability of bangbang at work. With no labor 
union to protect them, bangbang can only depend on themselves to bargain for their own ends. With no 
contract and work protection available in the workplace, bangbang have to reach an oral agreement with 
their customers about payment and compensation if any accident occurs. However, the recruiting policy 
adopted by most employers excludes the workers who know how to defend their own interests and desire 
only obedient and submissive ones. No wonder those “do their work without asking” are more likely to 
find customers, even if at the cost of their own benefits. 
In the opening anecdote, when old Zhang tried to bargain with the female boss, she said, “You greedy 
bangbang. Do what I ask you to do.” Later, she said, “A bangbang bargains with me [the boss]!” Her 
words demonstrate her belief that a bangbang worker should do whatever the boss asks him to do without 
giving any lip. In other words, bangbang need to present a performance of deference to the “boss.” Many 
bangbang experience such deference as humiliation and shame. One man named Brother Xia told me 
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about this feeling of shame: “This job is not decent (xia jian). Why? I felt shamed to do it at first. (I found 
that) I had to be at someone’s command (ting bieren de zhihui) and had to walk behind others’ asses 
(genzhe bieren de pigu houmian zou). And…(I) did not dare to bargain with customers or to refuse their 
unreasonable requests…  I felt like I was clumsy and stupid….”  
One day, I walked with Brother Xia on the street. He was suddenly called by a female customer to 
carry a bag of white rice for her. The female customer walked ahead while Brother Xia followed her 
carrying the rice. I walked beside Brother Xia. He turned his head and looked at me with a self-mocking 
smile: “Remember what I’ve told you? … See what I am doing? Walking behind others’ asses!” His 
voice was low since he wanted to keep it between us, but his feeling of shame and discomfort was strong 
enough for me to feel it. 
Bangbang’s work often includes care-giving. Their labor is not just a physical one, but also an 
affective one. For example, some store owner, once having established mutual trust with a bangbang man, 
will ask him to run errands for the businesses and his family free of charge. Such errands include taking 
care of the store when everyone is absent, buying lunch boxes for the shop workers, and even picking up 
the store owner’s child from school. Fearing losing their affiliation with the store owners and hoping to 
secure more work in the future, bangbang often find it difficult to refuse the bosses’ requests for this extra 
works. Some bangbang told me that they did these little favors for the bosses with expectations of 
receiving big favors from them, such as an increase in payment in the future. For some bangbang, care-
giving for the owners is a strategy for fulfilling their own purposes. But the care-giving role makes other 
bangbang feel inferior. For example, one bangbang told me that he and his colleague were asked to clean 
a customer’s storehouse before securing payment. He sighed: “We are like the laomazi (eldly 
maid)…..having to do everything to make the boss happy. Wipe his ass, clean his house…” It is worth 
noting that he compared his own job to that of maid. He seems to consider the caregiving role of a 
domestic worker similar to his own. Clearly, he rejects the caregiving role and refuses to be feminized. In 
other words, he tries to distance himself from a role that he considers more appropriate for women.  
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5.5. BANGBANG’S GENDER STRATEGIES 
In my fieldwork, I observed five gender strategies that bangbang adopt to buttress themselves from 
discrimination and challenges. These strategies include emphasizing the masculine aspects of bangbang 
work, distancing themselves from roles that are stereotypically associated with women, telling bitter 
stories about themselves, making use of collective memories of Maoist socialism that favors peasants and 
manual labor, and resisting performing deference to customers, especially those who are female. However, 
although some strategies shore up a type of masculinity that contests the upper-middle-class ideals of 
masculinity, other strategies enable bangbang to claim superiority over women. Rather than disrupting 
the conventional gender order, these strategies reproduce the existing gender system that privileges men 
over women.  
5.5.1. Emphasizing physical strength and the advantages of bangbang’s work 
In the city of Chongqing, bangbang were famed for their bodies and their extraordinary strength. People 
said that bangbang’s bodies were solid and that their strength was extraordinary because they performed 
manual labor every day. This narrative is a source of masculine pride for bangbang. Although physical 
labor is not as valued in the post-Mao era as it had been in the Maoist period, strong and healthy bodies 
are still desired and valued in post-reform China. From a historical perspective, China’s failure in the First 
Opium War (1840-1842) inaugurated a modern discourse of Chinese masculinity that associates an 
effeminate and weak body with China’s painful history of being penetrated and dominated by Western 
imperialism. A strong body, by contrast, denotes masculinity and modernity. Bangbang neatly 
appropriate this discourse to divert urban humiliation and marginalization.  
Lao Liu, a forty-seven year old bangbang with a solid body, has worked in Chongqing for about ten 
years. He recently helped his oldest son get a job at a Chongqing factory. His wife farms the family’s 
fields in their home village. “I am the one who provides nearly everything for my wife and children,” he 
said proudly. When I reminded him of his wife’s contribution to the family income, he laughed, “But 
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during the busy season of harvesting, I go back to help her. Without me, she can not even harvest the 
paddy,” he said confidently. When I asked him about how urban people treat him, he said, “… I know 
some urban people look down upon us bangbang. Some bangbang are afraid to offend them. I am not. 
Why should I be? Urban men’s bodies have been ruined by an indulgent (urban) life style, such as 
prostitution, mahjong playing, and banqueting … They are easily beaten down, like women. I beat a punk 
urban kid until he begged me to let him go.”   
Lao Liu’s narrative suggests that his extraordinary physical strength not only enables him to shoulder 
the heavy workload of a busy farming season and thus secure his dominant role at home, but also serves 
to bolster his claim to masculine domination over the urban male body, which he effeminized, even when 
he recognizes that “urban people look down upon us bangbang.” Although there are bangbang who 
lament their poor education and express their desire for intellectual work, bangbang also widely regard 
physical weakness as a symptom of intellectual work and a shameful state for men. Bangbang also adopt 
the tough guy ideal to justify the value of their manual labor. One day in my fieldwork, I took a photo for 
a group of bangbang. One bangbang onlooker yelled to those in front of my camera, “Are you scholars? 
You look so weak! You should all hold the poles in your hands and show off the masculine vigor of us 
Chongqing men, like tough guys!” All the bangbang in the picture agreed with what he said and posed in 
the way he suggested. This episode suggests that some bangbang regard intellectual workers as physically 
weak. They are thus also not masculine and not able to represent Chongqing men. For a man to be man, 
he should be tough. In other words, the appropriate way to be masculine is to do manual work and to have 
a solid body.  
Almost all the bangbang I interviewed prefer bangbang jobs to other forms of manual work, even if 
they choose to do other types of manual work on a part-time basis. As analyzed in Chapter Three, the 
bangbang work, as informal day labor, allows workers a certain degree of flexibility. Bangbang interpret 
this flexibility of their work as ziyou (freedom). Though this conceptualization of ziyou is more of a 
discursive construction than a fact, having ziyou at work is important to these working men. Bangbang I 
met told me one after another that the bodily control required for factory work or on a construction team 
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was not only unbearable and but also vehemently threatened the decency of “being a man.” In contrast, 
the casual work of street haulage provided working men an opportunity to reclaim dignity, although at a 
cost (Zhang 2008).  
While many bangbang I talked to mentioned that they would prefer an “office job” than their current 
job, some bangbang told me that they would not trade what they were doing for an office job because the 
latter did not provide ziyou. Several bangbang criticized urban office workers for their dependence on 
cadres or bosses. One bangbang pointedly mocked, “They (the urban office workers) have to lick their 
leaders’ boot to get promoted! I wouldn’t do such a girlish thing (poniang jia zuo de)!” Instead of treating 
such a comment as real criticism against office work, I argue that this is a tactical action the bangbang 
man takes to highlight the advantage of doing a casual job and to empower himself..   
Furthermore, bangbang I met often claimed that their job, compared to their wives’, was more 
valuable and proper for men. Bangbang’s wives who came to the city with them often worked as hourly 
workers, small factory workers, maids, shoe shiners, restaurant waitresses, janitors, and garbage collectors. 
Most were employed around the places where their husbands worked. A few bangbang I talked to, while 
appreciative of their wives’ hard work to bring money to the household, thought of the latter’s 
contribution as secondary to or less important than their own. For example, a couple of bangbang told me 
that the income from bangbang’s work was their family’s major income; their wives’ income was only 
supplementary. They also thought that as men, they would never take their wives’ jobs, which they saw as 
“women’s jobs.” For example, one bangbang named Brother Xia told me that he would not become a 
shoe shiner like his wife, even if it earned him more money than bangbang work. He said, “Women have 
nimble fingers. Their hands are soft and deft. They also have patience. We men are used to doing heavy 
work, and our hands are careless.” He laughed. “Also,” he added, “to shine other’s shoes is not decent 
(dijian). You have to sit lower than others (customers) and to take care of their stinky feet! That’s not for 
me.”  
Bangbang often considered their wives’ income as meager and not worth mentioning. When I told 
Brother Xia that one bangbang’s wife earned more than one thousand yuan (about US $300) per month in 
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peak season (late fall and winter when many young urban women wear long boots and leather shoes), 
which was close to the average income of a bangbang man, he said: “Well, that’s rare. Thinking of long-
term earning and stability, bangbang work definitely earns more.” Brother Xia’s wife is a garbage 
collector, but when we first met, he said that his wife had no job and “stayed at home doing nothing.” 
Later when I visited them at home, I saw him scolding his wife for being “useless” and “lazy.” He 
secured his male dominance at home by ignoring his wife’s contribution to the family and by putting 
down the value of her job.  
5.5.2. Telling Bitter Stories 
Not all bangbang that I met would tell others his bitter life stories. A man who expresses bitter emotions 
and feelings risks being seen as a coward (ruanruo) and less manly. But a few bangbang, during my 
interviews with them, told long and sad stories of their suffering in migration and work. Their purpose, 
however, was not to reap sympathy or to criticize social inequality, but to show off their courage and 
wisdom in overcoming the adversities and to explain why they have not been able to attain a better job. 
For example, a bangbang named Brother Jiang called himself “a man with bitter fate” (kuming ren). He 
told me that he was the youngest child in his family. His father divorced his mother when he was six 
years old and remarried when he was fourteen. He had two siblings and three stepsisters and a stepbrother. 
When he was thirteen, his older sister and brother divided the family property (fen jia). He was too young 
to protect his entitlement to the property, the majority of which was divvied up by his other siblings. He 
married when he was just twenty years old and had to pay monetary penalties to the local government 
three times for his early marriage.40 He worked as a stonemason in his village for three or four years 
before he went to Yunnan Province in Southwest China to work as a brick maker. The work was 
demanding, and he was not used to the humid Yunnan weather. He suffered a lot during that trip. He had 
also been to Guizhou, Sichuan, and Fujian (Xiamen city) for different jobs. “I have tried everything to 
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survive. … People like me married too early and lost family support too early. We had to work as manual 
laborer (shi xiali de) because we don’t have an educational certificate or an influential family. No money 
(from my family) for my education and my marriage. My life is surely more difficult than others.” He 
said, “But people like us are able to ‘eat bitterness.’ We depend on ourselves for everything. Once I left 
home, I’ve always depended on myself. One has to be capable. [For example,] generally, the goods [that I 
choose to carry] are as heavy as four or five hundred jin (two or two and half hundred kilogram). I had to 
be able to lift it (bu xia tili buxing) … I’ve experienced much bitterness (wo shi yizhi ku chulai de), I tell 
you.” 
Then he continued to tell me the things that he had achieved against the odds. He focused mostly on 
his monetary contributions to his family. He said: “My older sister got married, and my father passed 
away last year. The funeral costs 4,500 yuan (around US $700). I paid it all by myself.” He also felt proud 
of his newly built house in the countryside: “My house has three floors and more than ten rooms. I 
borrowed more than 20,000 yuan (around US $3000) to build my house. I paid all the debts in two years!” 
He also told me that that his wife did not need to work because of his income. He was the one who raised 
the whole family, including a newborn baby. He said: “I married too early and I don’t have good 
education to get a better job. But you see, I’ve paid off the fine [for my early marriage], built my house, 
and have my own kid.” 
Brother Jiang repeatedly stressed the hardships and suffering that he experienced, but also his 
successful survival. The great difficulties that he went through make his achievements even more 
impressive. The hardships and suffering have become proof of his endurance and his capability to “win 
the game.”  
5.5.3. Making use of socialist morality 
When Mao Zedong was in charge, he favored a large population and valued physical over intellectual 
labor. In China’s socialist period, peasants were the more respectful class and helped educate intellectual 
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workers. Such admiration of physical labor is difficult to find in the post-Mao era. Yet I met quite a few 
bangbang in their forties and fifties who quoted the political slogans popular during China’s highly 
socialist period (1949-1978) as a method for defending the value of manual labor. One day, during my 
preliminary fieldwork in the summer of 2004, I found a group of bangbang sitting together and talking 
about their businesses. One bangbang named Red Hair, after having a hard time with a customer, joined 
the group and complained: “That boss is so fucking (tamade) tough (to deal with). It is meaningless to do 
this job (ne ge gongzuo mei yisi).” A bangbang sat beside Red Hair said: “You are angry for what? 
Bangbang work is not supposed to be a decent job (bangbang shi xiajian). You can’t blame others.” 
Another bangbang named Specialized Household41 disagreed: “Who says bangbang work is not decent? 
We don’t steal, rob, or cheat. We work to get our food (pin laodong chifan). The boss’s labor is labor; our 
labor is labor too. (laoban de laodong shi laodong, women de laodong ye shi laodong).” A bangbang 
mocked Specialized Household: “Yeah, yeah. Labor! How much is labor worth?” Specialized Household 
said in response, “Labor is honorable (laodong guangrong)! Chairman Mao said so.”  Red Hair 
questioned back sarcastically, “How honorable is labor? Honor can’t be eaten and worn and can’t bring 
money (guangrong you buneng chi, chuan, ye meide qian)!” “Well,” Specialized Household responded, 
“even though that’s true, labor is still honorable. The great man (Chairman Mao)’s words…” 
During my year-long dissertation fieldwork, I encountered similar scenes in which socialist political 
slogans and morality were used by these working men to support their arguments or beliefs. One day 
when I worked with a group of bangbang in their workplace, a few of them were called by a customer to 
deliver a whole truck of goods. Since that businessman had a reputation of delaying payment, few 
bangbang responded. Finally, four bangbang went because the businessman promised to give them 50 -
60 yuan each. I went with them. It was a cold winter afternoon. The unloading took about three hours. 
When the work was done, it was almost dinner time. During the work, the four bangbang were excitedly 
talking about the 50 yuan that the businessman promised to give them. However, at the end, each of them 
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 He was a peasant who specialized in raising ducks and his family was used to being in a “specialized 
household” (zhuanyehu). But he went bankrupt in late 1990s and had to work as a bangbang since then.  
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only got 20 yuan. All four were raged. They got together and talked about a collective protest. When two 
of them were hesitant in arguing against the businessman, Lao Gao, who had been treated unfairly before 
by that businessman, said: “Don’t be scared. He (the businessman) owns us money; we have every reason 
to talk to him and get back our money. He has done such things to us a long time ago. I’ve had 
enough….Where there is repression, there is resistance (nali you yapo, nali jiu you fankang).” Another 
bangbang Xiao Peng responded: “Right! To rebel is right (zaofan you li).” “Where there is repression, 
there is resistance” and “it is reasonable to rebel” are both revolutionary slogans that were popular during 
the Maoist period. Here, they were used as justification of the workers’ resistance to unfair treatment in 
the workplace.   
In moments like this, the past socialist period, which had advocated egalitarianism and equalitarianism 
and which had favored manual labor and the masses’ resistance to violence and oppression, becomes a 
resource for bangbang trying to claim their power and pride. These scenes are what Anagnost calls 
“moments when vestiges of the socialist past rise up like ghosts to confront the present, evoking in quick 
succession the conflicting emotions of both intense nostalgic desire and scornful contempt” (Anagnost 
Sences:2). Although the socialist past and its ethics have largely evaporated with the collapse of socialist 
state, they still haunt Chinese people’s everyday lives like a ghost. It is when people like bangbang draw 
on the past to protest discrimination and inequality that the past rises up to remind us of its lingering 
existence. Such moments also show the transformation of value over the last five decades. What was 
valued in the recent past has lost its worth. The value of the socialist period has been spectralized and 
evacuated. In the era of commercialization and consumption, market rationalities have penetrate every 
aspect of social life, and “our conception of the good life is increasingly narrowed around incitements to 
consume” (Anagnost forthcoming: 24). In the above anecdote, I documented Red Hair asking, “How 
honorable is labor? Honor can’t be eaten and worn and can’t bring money (guangrong you buneng chi, 
chuan, ye meide qian).” His words point to the dominance of market calculation in forming people’s view 
of value. They also point out a shift in value from the socialist past. Honor becomes useless when it loses 
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its capacity to bring material benefits such as food, clothes and money. The labor that brings few material 
rewards is not valuable to manual laborers anymore.  
When bangbang draw on political slogans and socialist ethics to defend their pride and honor, they 
face the risk of associating themselves with the dismantled past and thus of subjecting themselves to 
further discrimination. When I told a relative of mine, an urban man in his fifties, that some bangbang 
thought “labor is honorable,” he said, “How backward! Those bangbang are out of tune with the time 
(gen bus hang shidai)...How can they still believe in that political crap?...No wonder our nation cannot 
advance, and no wonder our country is not powerful. (China has) so many foolish peasants (sha nong 
hua).” In his opinion, bangbang’s strategic use of the socialist morality proves their “backwardness.” He 
also seems to believe that the great quantities of “backward” peasants or rural migrants like bangbang 
contribute to China’s inferior position in the global community. He blames the peasants and rural 
migrants for being obstacles to the state’s modernization and economic development.   
At the same time, bangbang’s nostalgia for the socialist past cannot be dismissed as mere exaggeration 
and romanticization. In fact, many bangbang are aware of the socialist state’s violent and rigid control 
over rural labor and of the devastating consequences of the state’s intrusion into private lives. Moreover, 
fresh on their minds is the disaster of starvation and horror caused by radical political movements such as 
the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Some bangbang I met thanked Deng Xiaoping for 
the economic reform that had raised the living standard for peasants and allowed them to pursue better 
working opportunities in the cities.   
5.5.4. Resisting performing deference to customers 
Normally, male bangbang avoid confronting their customers in order to keep them and to get better 
payment; they show friendliness and obedience and try to satisfy the customers. However, if a customer 
challenges a bangbang’s pride to the extent of intolerance, the bangbang may refuse to keep performing 
deference. One big challenge is serving female customers, especially young urban women. Female 
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customers play bifurcated roles in bangbang’s stories. On the one hand, some female customers gain the 
respect and sympathy of male bangbang. Brother Chen once told me that he knew a female customer (a 
store owner) who ran her business alone. The woman worked hard and supported her family while her 
husband had extramarital affairs. She decided to close down her business and move back to her 
hometown. After telling me the story, Brother Chen sighed: “She is a good person, having been 
responsible (for her family) and living a hard life here. It is not easy for a woman to do businesses all by 
herself with these men around. (Life has) not (been) easy for her. I had sympathy for her, and helped her 
by moving goods. She gave me money (for the service), but I didn’t take it. In the end, she gave me some 
furniture (to express her gratitude).” In this case, female boss becomes the subject of sympathy and 
compassion.  
On the other hand, the female customers who were arrogant and dominating could be challenging to 
some bangbang. It is not just due to the interaction of gender and power, but also has to do with other 
forms of regionally- and socially-generated hostilities. One bangbang told me: “I don’t like to work for 
those female bosses, especially those from other provinces (wai di de). They asked you to do this and 
that … paying less (than male bosses).” “It is true. Woman is stingier than man (nǚ de bi nan de xiaoqi).” 
Another bangbang agreed and said: “It takes a long time to bargain with them (female bosses). Male 
bosses are not so troublesome.” However, in reality, the female bosses that the bangbang dislike might 
not be stingier than male ones. Bangbang’s opinion about female bosses are likely informed by the 
gender-specific stereotypes that cast women as stingier than men. Actually bangbang also complained 
about male bosses for their stinginess. For example, one bangbang Xiao Bao said: “Boss Hu is not 
generous at all. (He) bargains with us for just five jiao (about 0.071 US dollars).” Another bangbang 
responded: “Like the female bosses (gen nǚ laoban you yibing le).” This conversation shows clearly that 
the stingy female boss is more stereotype than fact.  
Bangbang resolved their conflicts with male and female customers in different ways. In the anecdote 
above, when the female boss kept bargaining with Old Zhang, the other bangbang turned the bargaining 
into an opportunity for teasing. Little Peng even said: ““Hey boss! You are too ‘smart.’ Thinking too 
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much damages your health. Calculate less and you will become young and beautiful. Your husband will 
love you more.” Here, the female boss loses her value as a full human being. Instead, under her husband’s 
figurative gaze, she is turned into the object of male desire. The teasing itself is also very much gendered, 
showing the male dominance of bangbang as a collective over the female boss as an individual. When a 
single bangbang meets a female boss, he is powerless because of the huge disparity in their respective 
economic and social statuses. However, when the bangbang unite together and collectively bargain with 
the female boss, they regain back the masculine dominance and power.  
In some cases, bangbang refused to perform deference to customers who they could not tolerate, even 
though they risked losing a business opportunity. Brother Xia told me that he once confronted a young 
urban girl. “She hailed me when I was looking for business near the food market. She asked me to carry 
some vegetable for her. I didn’t want to do it because I know some customers stroll very slowly in the 
food market and spend a long time being picky about the goods (while bangbang have to accompany 
them and wait for them). It is not worth it. But the girl told me that she would buy the goods quickly and 
leave soon. I believed her and followed her. But she kept strolling and shopping. I knew I was being 
cheated, so I told her that I needed to go. She wasn’t nice to me and… She said, ‘You are funny! I have 
your word (that you will wait for me until I am done with shopping). You can’t just leave.’ ‘Yes I can.’ I 
said. But she still didn’t leave. Finally, I became angry. I said, ‘You buy my service (ni maide shi wo de 
fuwu), not me! I quit (wo bugan le)’!” Then I threw all her goods on to the ground. I intentionally threw 
them into dirty water on the ground…” Brother Xia laughed. “What did she do?” “What do you think she 
could do?” Brother Xia said. He obviously felt proud and satisfied with the “revenge.” “She cursed me 
and had to bring back the vegetables herself.” He said. I asked, “Did you ask her for payment?” “Yes. But 
she didn’t give it to me. I thought, OK, at least I’ve gotten my revenge. Such a yellow-hair-girl 
(huangmao yatou),42 how can she be so arrogant! I was teaching her a lesson.” Brother Xia answered.  
In general, bangbang try to be friendly and obedient to the male bosses, too. When the male bosses 
become tough though, bangbang often poke fun at themselves to reduce the rising tension between them. 
                                                 
42
 In Chinese, yellow-hair-kid means “young child” or “little child.” 
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They also use foot-dragging, ignorance, and mild confrontation as forms of protest. But in rare cases, the 
conflicts between the bangbang and the boss elevate into verbal and even physical violence. In such cases, 
that bangbang can no longer work for that boss for an extended period of time. His reputation is damaged, 
and his business opportunities can shrink as other bosses become informed of his “lack of friendliness.” 
In extreme cases, he also has to leave the workplace and find a new place to work. However, bangbang 
do not tease male bosses the way that they do the female bosses. I have also never seen any bangbang 
make jokes about the male bosses’ wives or family members in front of them.  
5.6. CONCLUSION  
Working in the city as rural migrant men, male bangbang frequently encountered marginalization and 
discrimination that challenged their sense of masculine pride. The strategies they used to negotiate and 
resist the urban form of domination suggest an alternative type of masculinity that challenges the 
dominant gender order and the hegemonic ideal of masculinity that it promotes. However, their emphasis 
on man’s physical strength and solid body, the flexibility of bangbang work in giving them more control, 
and the priority of bangbang work over other female-dominated work have validated their masculine 
pride but at the expense of putting women in an inferior and less valuable position. When Lao Liu 
proudly bragged, “Without me, she cannot even harvest the paddy” and when Brother Xia criticized his 
wife for “dong nothing at home,” they to showed their privilege over women but also reproduced a 
gendered social order that views women as inferior to men. When bangbang tell the sad stories of their 
suffering and hardship, they often emphasize their capacity for endurance and their ability to raise their 
families against adversity. Bangbang like Brother Jiang also pointed out that he was the breadwinner of 
the family, not his wife. And when bangbang refuse to pay deference to female customers, they often 
make use of the negative stereotype of woman, especially young urban woman, to justify their actions. 
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When they deal with the female boss, their teasing way of negotiation and contestation reinforces the 
conventional gender order that enables them to initiate the teasing as men. 
Bangbang depart from the urban version of the male ideal yet simultaneously reproduce the 
conventional gendered norms. The socialist past becomes a resource for their self-empowerment; 
however, bangbang’s use of socialist morals to defend themselves and justify their resistance 
unfortunately incurs further discrimination and marginalization in urban settings. In other words, 
bangbang respond in a gender-specific manner to class oppression and to urban-rural disparities and 
inequalities, which in turn locks them into the same structured constraints they attempt to overcome. 
Their practice becomes a form of social action that ultimately results in the reproduction of the gender 
division of labor and reconfirmation of the present dominant gender order. 
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6.0 RELATIONSHIPS 
In this chapter, I examine what rural migrant men in Chongqing say about their relationships with the 
people closest to them. Migrant men’s relationships deeply inform their motivations for migrating and 
heavily influence how migration is experienced by individual migrants. Life in the city, in turn, can have 
a profound effect on migrants’ social relations. These relationships are shaped by powerful gender 
discourses and the social resources available to individuals. An examination of the relations between 
migrant men and their close kin, friends, and employers, shows how gender and power are intertwined in 
shaping migratory experiences. The fact that these relationships have a major impact on migratory 
decisions and experiences helps us to understand migration as a continuing process. Such a process is 
motivated not merely by economic calculations and desires but also by the migrants’ changing social 
relations.  
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first focuses on how rural migrant men’s relationships 
with close family members determine their decisions to migrate. The second discusses their relationships 
with wives who either stay in the countryside or work in the city. The third explores their relationship 
with laoxiang,43 friends, and urbanities. Throughout this chapter, I attempt to demonstrate how migrant 
men’s relationships with others shape their desires to migrate and their experiences of migration. I also 
further explore the impact of migration on these rural men’s relationships, especially those with close 
family members and friends.  
                                                 
43
 Laoxiang is a Chinese word which refers to people who come from the same place. The place can refer to the 
same village, but also include the same county, city, province, and even region.  
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6.1. THE DECISION TO MIGRATE  
In the 1990s, many scholars of Chinese domestic labor migration tended to use a “household strategy” 
approach to understand the motivations, decision making, and migration process behind the movement of 
millions of rural laborers (e.g., Zhao 1999; Cook 1999). This approach mainly follows classic economic 
theory in that it views individual peasants as autonomous, calculating actors but replaces the rational 
individual with the household. According to the “household strategy” theoretical framework, labor 
migration is determined by rational calculation of the household’s gains and costs in the interest of 
maximizing economic returns. This approach, however, has incurred criticism from feminists for 
downplaying the significance of other social forces that shape the decision-making processes – for 
example, “conflicts between the desires, expectations, and understandings of different household 
members, gendered differentials in power and control over resources in the household, and intra-
household divisions of labor, all of which are shaped by society-level discourses relating to gender” 
(Chant and Radcliffe 1992: 23; Wolf 1992: 20-23; cited in Jacka 2006:165-166). At the same time, 
scholars such as Willis and Yeoh (2000) argue for a revision of the “household strategy” approach and 
suggest looking at more diverse, kin-based decision-making processes. Such approaches refrain from 
assuming that economic concerns and family needs naturally outweigh intra-household relationships, 
gender differentials, and the wider social and economic process. As Curran and Saguy argue, “there are 
complex negotiations (either implicit or explicit) between family members where the outcomes are 
dependent upon both cultural expectations of each gender as well as the relative resources (power) 
available to each family member” (Curran and Saguy 2001). I agree with Willis and Yeoh as well as with 
Curran and Sagy’s respective viewpoints. My research reveals that although decisions of out-migration 
may be made by each migrant individual, the decision-making process involves not just the migrants, but 
also their close kin. Their relations reflect highly gendered social expectations and power structures 
within their households. This section explores the complicated neogotiations between family members in 
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relation to how decisions to migrate are influenced by wider social and economic forces as well as by 
gendered expectations.  
As researchers such as Jacka (2006) and Sun (2009) point out, rural young women in China who want 
to migrate are likely to encounter objection from family members, especially their parents. Married 
women, too, are normally not encouraged to migrate alone or migrate ahead of their husbands. In my 
interviews, I was repeatedly told by male bangbang that almost all the adult men in their villages were in 
the cities, seeking job opportunities and hoping to improve the quality of their lives while women, 
children, and the aged stayed in the countryside. Within a family, men are often the first to go to the cities 
to work. As the conventional view would have it, men are the breadwinners, and they act according to the 
economic rationalities that calculate the costs and benefits of migration. However, my research finds that 
economic advancement, while being one important reason for men’s out-migration, cannot fully explain 
the varied experience of men, especially those for whom economic benefits are not primary. The non-
economic factors and social forces, such as familial relationships, that shape the decision-making process 
of rural men have been largely ignored. While economic concerns may also be at the center of the 
decision-making, I believe that a purely economic perspective can only provide an over-simplified 
explanation of why rural men choose to migrate.  
Xiao Geng’s story illustrates this point. Geng is a 31-year-old man who had been working as a 
bangbang for about five years. Tall, skinny, and with a pale face, he looked more like a store clerk than 
manual laborer. His father was a rural elementary school teacher and his mother a farmer. His family, due 
to his father’s stable salary, was relatively wealthy in the village. His family belonged to a big clan and 
was well respected by the fellow villagers. Geng was well-off compared to his peers. He told me that he 
did not want to leave home to work as a migrant five years ago because he liked the quiet and leisurely 
rural life. But when the majority of adult rural men migrated to cities to earn money, and especially after 
some families became better-off than his because of the remittances the men sent back home, his ex-wife 
began to push him to do the same. She became jealous of the families that could afford to buy fancy 
household appliances, such as big color TV sets and VCD players. In Geng’s case, economic stress was 
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not the major reason for his wife’s dissatisfaction; instead, their differing conceptualizations of what 
constitutes an ideal life caused familial conflicts. When Xiao Geng refused to leave home, she blamed 
him for being useless and hopeless. Their relationship quickly turned bitter. After a big fight, she ran 
away with another man from their village and disappeared. Her elopement not only humiliated Xiao Geng 
but also enraged his parents, siblings, and relatives. Geng’s parents felt that his wife had made their 
family lose face. His close kin pushed him to look for his wife and divorce her, especially after they heard 
that she was seen by a villager in Chongqing city. Xiao Geng wanted to take time to deal with this issue, 
but the pressure from his family was enormous. He had no choice but to go to Chongqing. Because of the 
shame, he decided not to contact any of his relatives in Chongqing but to rely on himself. His travel funds 
were used up before he could find his wife. He began to do part-time jobs to support himself.  He ended 
up working as a bangbang because this occupation allowed him the time and flexibility to search for his 
wife. He found his wife after about two years of migrant life and divorced her. He did not return to his 
village afterwards but continued to work as a bangbang, mostly because he was in a relationship with a 
young woman he met in Chongqing. They had a baby girl, about whom he had not told his parents. He 
told me that he was still hurt by how his parents and relatives treated him when his wife deserted him.  He 
was not confident telling them about his new relationship and the newborn baby.  
Xiao Geng’s story shows that rural migrant men do not simply want to migrate, but in some cases, are 
made to. Their migration is not always a free choice but sometimes a pressured one. When migration 
becomes an important strategy not only for rural families seeking to better their material conditions but 
also for individual rural men hoping to establish superiority at home and in their home villages, men like 
Xiao Geng who refuse migration put their masculine pride at risk. In Xiao Geng’s case, he was criticized 
by both his wife and his close kin for being unwilling to leave home, although for different reasons.  A 
man’s value and reputation are to certain level determined by his willingness to migrate. In my fieldwork, 
I met male bangbang who viewed rural men who did not want to leave their home village to work in the 
city as “old-fashioned. Meanwhile, migration has also become the strategy adopted by rural men, like 
Xiao Geng, to escape humiliation and parental control over his personal issues.  
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China has a long history as a patriarchal society. Traditionally, men enjoy higher social and familial 
status than women, but they also carry more familial responsibilities and expectations. They are the 
breadwinners for their wife and children, and they are also expected to support their elderly parents.  As 
the popular saying has it, “bring up sons for one’s old age” (yang er fang lao). In the urban region of post-
Mao China, men and women are, in most cases, equally expected to support their parents, but in the 
countryside, men instead of women are still considered to be the primary caretakers for elderly parents. 
Additionally, social security for the elderly in rural regions is absent in contemporary China. Elderly 
peasants can rely only on their children for survival, especially after they lose the ability to work. Young 
unmarried daughters are expected to send remittances to their parents; but after they marry, they are 
expected to focus on their husband’s family. However, this is not the case for sons, especially the oldest 
son of a family. Adult sons are expected to send money to their parents both before and after marriage. In 
a family that has more than one son, elderly parents often choose to live with the oldest son, but each 
adult son is expected to give monetary aid to his parents every month (Meijer 1971; Yang 1959).  
Many male bangbang have told me that supporting their parents is one major reason for their decision 
to migrate. One of them described his rationale to me as follows:  
“My two sisters are both married. My younger brother is still in high school. My father’s blood 
pressure is high, and he can’t work too hard in the fields. My mother’s health is poor. Even so, they still 
farm some land and work very hard. I am the oldest one of my family. It is apparent that my parents 
would rely on me. I thought to myself, what would I do if my parents were sick when they were not able 
to farm their lands? The medical treatment is so expensive and we can hardly afford it. Now I am out here, 
and they don’t need to worry about their old age any more. As long as I have this job, they can ‘catch 
their breath’ (song kou qi).”  
Fulfilling filial obligations is also important in evaluating what it means “to be a man.” I have met many 
bangbang who chose out-migration to pay their parents’ debts and medical bills and to provide regular 
remittances to parents. Brother Chen, a thirty-eight-year-old bangbang, decided to leave his hometown in 
Yunnan Province and worked in Chongqing in order to save money for his mother’s eye surgery. 
Although his wife and teenage son were not happy with his decision to leave, he insisted on doing so. He 
recalled during our interview that his mother had saved his life when he was a little child. He was 
seriously sick and in a coma. His father had given up on him, but his mother refused to do so. She carried 
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him on her back and traveled on foot for days to get him to a hospital. He was treated in the hospital and 
survived. He said, “If I don’t do anything for my mother, how can I call myself a man? My son doesn’t 
understand this right now, but I want him to learn it. If I am not filial to my own mother, how can I expect 
my child to be filial to me?”  Shiming Jian (2000) also reports that a newlywed male bangbang in his 
early twenties left his wife to work alone in Chongqing city in order to pay his father’s medical bill. When 
asked whether he was willing to be apart from his wife, the bangbang answered: “My old father’s days 
can be counted. I work in the city (to pay his medical bill and) to fulfill my obligation of filial piety. My 
wife is still young; she and I have a whole life to be together.”  
However, my research also finds that rural parents who I talked to had largely lowered their 
expectation for adult sons in terms of financial support. One old father said that his adult son who worked 
in the city as a migrant was “like a clay Buddha fording the river – hardly able to save himself.” He meant 
that his son had lived a hard life as a migrant and could not be expected to take care of his father any 
more. To reduce the younger generation’s burden, capable men from older generation also go to the city 
to work. Old Zhang is such an example. He was in his late fifties when he migrated for the first time from 
his home village in Lidu County to Chongqing city. Before that, he had been a regular farmer in the 
countryside for almost his whole life. In the village, he led a respectable life, raising two sons and a 
daughter to adulthood. His older son passed away in mid-1990s because of a chronic disease. Old Zhang 
had lived with Little Zhang, his younger son, after the death of his older son and had given the whole 
family property, including his house, to Little Zhang. In 1999, Little Zhang was jailed after his fight with 
a neighbor. Even with the aid of a lawyer who requested 3000 yuan for his service, Little Zhang was still 
sentenced to five years in prison. As soon as Old Zhang knew that paying a 10,000-yuan penalty could get 
his son out of prison in one and a half years, he began trying to raise the money. He managed to borrow 
the money from fellow villagers and relatives. Little Zhang was released on bail and went to Chongqing 
to work in order to pay the debt. But after about one year and before the debt was paid off, Little Zhang’s 
second child was born. With two children and an unemployed wife, Little Zhang could barely make ends 
meet, let alone pay off a debt. He turned to his father for help. He urged Old Zhang to work in Chongqing 
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with him in order to pay the debt. Old Zhang initially refused to leave the countryside because he liked 
farming and rural life. But he could not resist Little Zhang’s repeated requests. Most importantly, Old 
Zhang expected to rely on Little Zhang in his old age. “He said if I take care of him this time, he will take 
care of me when I am too old to work,” Old Zhang told me. He worked side by side with Little Zhang for 
about two years in Chongqing as bangbang until Little Zhang was driven out of the workplace for 
repeatedly fighting with his colleagues. Little Zhang went back to their home village and worked on-and-
off as a motorcycle driver, but he never had a stable income. He was addicted to gambling and lost most 
of his earning on cards and mahjong. Old Zhang stayed in Chongqing and continued to send remittances 
back to his son’s family.  
Unlike Old Zhang, some elderly rural men who work in the city do not expect any reward from their 
children. They work only to share their children’s economic burdens and to save some money in 
anticipation of old age.  I met a few male bangbang who were in their fifties and sixties. None of them 
expected to depend on their children for a living. Just like their parents, the children were often migrant 
workers who engaged in low-end work that involved low pay and long hours. Many had difficulty making 
ends meet, let alone supporting their parents. But even if their children are well established in the city, the 
old men would not stop working. Old Wan was one of them. He was in his sixties when I met him. His 
son and daughter had both found jobs in Chongqing city and were both willing to take care of him. 
However, he chose to live alone and continued to work as a bangbang. He said: “I would prefer to go 
back to the countryside if I am too old to work. It is better to live alone than to depend on my children. 
They have their own lives; I will only be their burden.” Citing his great-aunt as an example, he said that 
even someone in his or her eighties and nineties could still be independent.  
The male bangbang who have children have another motivation to choose migration: to save money 
for their children’s education. It is an economic issue, but it is also about fatherhood. For these rural men, 
to be a good father means providing as much income as possible so that their children can get a good 
education. One such male bangbang said: “I would eat poorly and wear cheap clothes if my children 
could have good lives. Nearly all my savings are spent on their education. If they want to go to college, I 
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will support them without any hesitation, as long as they can pass the entrance examination.”  Another 
male bangbang, when talking about his two children’s future jobs, said firmly, “They (my children) will 
not be bangbang! They will go to college and work in offices.” When his son decided to drop out of 
school and go to a vocational school to save the family money, he persuaded his son to go to senior high 
school. He did not agree with most of his family members who thought that it was a waste of money for a 
rural child. In his opinion, the knowledge that his son learned in high school, such as mathematics and 
English, would help him become a “skilled worker” instead of a “purely manual worker.”  
The irony is, to be a “good father,” these rural men had to leave their homes and were absent in their 
sons and daughters’ lives. Some male bangbang had not been able to develop a close relationship with 
their children. One male bangbang, Brother Wang, recalled his recent experience of visiting his family in 
Dazu County near Chongqing city. “My two sons did not talk to me; they behaved as if I was air. They 
are afraid of me. But what’s there for them to be afraid of?...I asked about their studies. They only gave 
me very short answers. It is either ‘Yes Dad,’ or ‘No Dad.’ …”  Another bangbang told me, “When I 
played with my boss’s son (in the city), I thought of my own (who lived in the country). He is eleven-
years-old, but we barely spent time together. He is closer to his mother…He wasn’t happy that I was not 
there for him; but he was not unhappy either. His mother told me that he barely asked about me. I guess 
he was used to my absence.”  In order to compensate for their absence, male bangbang send back gifts 
and money for their children. “They need to understand,” one bangbang said. “Their father was not there 
for them because he had to provide for them. They should not live their father’s life. They should study 
hard and go to college so that they could have a good job and live with their children.” However, a 
bangbang’s wife told me that the money and gifts sent back home only “spoil” the children. “They think 
money is easy,” this mother said, “They ask for it when they don’t have money.  They don’t want to study 
hard. They say, ‘why go to college? Look at Dad. He didn’t go to college, but he sends us these fabulous 
clothes and toys!’”  
Rhacel Salazar Parreñas’ research on Phillippina migrants’ families found that in transnational 
families where the fathers migrated for work and mothers stayed at home, the fathers were eager to 
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establish authorarian measures of discipline over their children (2005). However, the practice of 
authoritarian discipline often aggravated the tension between fathers and their children at home. I found 
similar cases in my fieldwork. In many rural families, fathers were often responsible for supervising their 
children’s school work, helping them with homework, and communicating with their children’s teachers. 
This was not because mothers could not handle such tasks, but because it was widely believed that fathers 
had the authority to carry out such roles. For example, I heard several bangbang’s wives complained that 
their children did not perform well at school because the childrens’ fathers were absent from home. One 
of them said, “My son is afraid of no one except his father. No matter how many times I yell at him and 
urge him to stop watching TV and start doing his homework, he just ignores me. He knew that I would 
never beat him. My heart is too gentle and soft. But his father is different. He doesn’t speak to him (their 
son). He beats him. So each time my husband comes home, my son behaves himself very well.” But the 
more eager the father was to establish his authority at home after a long absence, the more intense the 
relationship between him and his children. As Brother Wang said, when he asked his children about their 
studies, they just gave him very short answers. The tension between the father and children was hard to 
ease. In Brother Wang’s case, he realized that his children’s indifference toward him was related to his 
absence, but he could not afford to remain at home.  
Migrant men tried to compensate for their absence when they returned home. When I accompanied 
one bangbang to visit his rural home, I observed him spending a lot of time with his adult children, 
visiting their families, having long conversations with them, and making plans with them. He spent a lot 
of time playing with his grandchildren, taking care of them, bathing them, and carrying the youngest 
grandchild on his back when he went out to visit his friends. His return was like a holiday for his whole 
family.  
The above examples do not suggest that migration is the only way for male migrants to fulfill familial 
obligations or that meeting the family’s financial needs attenuates the rural men’s personal desire to fulfill 
parental or familial expectations. In many cases, rural men migrate to “learn new skills,” “take a look of 
the outside world,” “live my life in the way that I like,” or “change my fate.” These are some of the 
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answers I received when I asked male bangbang about their reasons for migrating. They came to the city 
of Chongqing with a variety of dreams and hopes. Self-development and self-advancement were topics 
that repeatedly came up in my conversations with them.  
6.2. MIGRANT MARITAL RELATIONS  
As argued above, migration is a process that should not be understood as merely a “household strategy” 
that aims to improve the economic conditions of the migrant families either. Male migrants, just like 
female ones, choose out-migration out of consideration of many non-economic factors. Once they leave 
home and work in the city, migration does not just impact the lives of the migrants. It is a continuing 
changing process that brings long-lasting changes to the migrants’ relationships with family members and 
their local communities. Marital relations, among other relationships, are deeply impacted by migration.  
Whereas Western scholars have examined how the migrant experiences of women impact their marital 
relations, scant attention has been paid to the impact of migration on the marriage life when men are the 
ones who migrate. Women attract more academic attention because the conventional gender norm 
considers migration not “natural” and proper for women. A migrant woman can be viewed as an 
irresponsible mother to her child and disloyal wife to her husband. Whereas migration is considered to be 
problematic for women, it is all “natural” for men, since men are expected to work and be the 
breadwinners for their families. However, such expectations obscure the changes that male migration 
brings to marital relations. How does the absence of a husband within the household change a wife’s daily 
activities? How do married couples cope with the emotional and psychological consequences of migration? 
Does migration bring more harmony or more conflicts to marital relationships? Scholars such as Margold 
(1995), Rhacel Salazar Parreñas (2005), Michele Ruth Gamburd (2002), and Lena Na¨re (2010) have paid 
attention to male migrants’ experiences and to how migration shapes migrant men’s perceptions of 
manhood and familial relations. Following these scholars, I explore the impact of migration on migrant 
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men’s families in the context of post-Mao China by examining the relationships between bangbang and 
their spouses. This examination includes cases in which the husband migrates alone and those in which 
the husband and the wife migrate together, in some cases with pre-school-aged children.  
6.2.1. Husbands Migrate and Wives Plow 
About two thirds of the bangbang that I met migrated with their wives and, in some cases, also with their 
children. However, about one third of them migrated alone. These men chose to migrate alone not 
because they preferred to do so, but because they could not afford to raise their families in the city. For 
those who had school-aged children, the husband’s absence also meant that the wife had to stay in the 
village to take care of their children because the children were not allowed in urban public schools. Jacka 
argues, there is nothing “rational” or “natural” in this “man migrate woman plow” pattern; if thinking 
“rationally,” male peasants should stay in the country while allowing their wives to migrate because 
farming is heavy manual labor and would therefore traditionally constitute a “man’s job.” But the 
changing nature of gendered divisions of labor helps make sense of the ongoing movement of a huge 
number of men away from the agrarian economy. The “man’s job” is then turned into the “woman’s job.”  
What Jacka does not mention is that although many migrant families have “naturally” accepted this 
new gendered division of labor, the old way of thinking that casts farming as a “man’s job” does not 
easily go away.  Some bangbang I met expressed discomfort in having their wives taking care of the land 
in their absence. One bangbang said: “I asked my wife to stop farming most of our land. One of my 
relatives is farming it right now. A woman can’t do the tough job (xinku huolu) as well as a man.” Many 
bangbang also returned to their home villages at the peak farming season to help spread seeds in the rice 
paddles and reap the ripe rice crops. Helping with the farm work is an important way that male rural 
migrants reasset their masculine pride. 
Male bangbang who I talked to carefully maintained regular communication with their wives and 
children in the countryside. Many had cell phones but, to save money, made phone calls only when 
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needed. When fellow villagers also working in Chongqing city went back home, bangbang often asked 
them to bring messages and gifts to their family members. Continuous communication with their families 
became a source of emotional support for these rural men in the city. Normally, bangbang would not 
admit to outsiders their emotional attachment to their wives, choosing instead to keep such emotions to 
themselves or to boast how little they care. One bangbang said, “Without my wife around, I am free all 
the time. No one yells at me when I smoke and drink.” However, when talking to me in private, some of 
them expressed deep feelings for their spouses. A thirty-two-year-old man nicknamed Three Three talked 
about his wife, “I owe her a lot. She is hard-working and treats me and our children very well. I feel 
secure as long as she is in charge of the house.” Another bangbang, on a different occasion, said, “I feel 
the happiest when I call my wife. We talk often. … She is a good helper to me and to the family. Because 
of her, I can work full-heartedly without worrying about my family in the countryside.”  
Many male bangbang who lived alone in the city experience enormous loneliness. Most of them rent 
apartments with coworkers, friends, or fellow villagers. Normally, more than three people share a room. 
There is barely any privacy in the rented apartments. Many of them have a rotating schedule with their 
roommates for cooking simple dinners. Rarely do they dine out. When they do, they only go to street food 
vendors or to inexpensive restaurants. They spend their leisure time playing cards, drinking, watching TV 
or DVDs, listening to free music in public parks, and visiting fellow villagers or friends. They rarely 
participate in the same activities as most urban adults – for example, surfing the internet, going to pubs, 
playing computer games, or attending evening classes. These activities are too costly for them. There is 
very limited emotional support for these migrants who leave their families in the countryside. According 
to a 2005 survey conducted by the journal Watching The East Weekly, loneliness is the top emotional 
problem for adult rural migrants. However, I never heard a bangbang confess his loneliness in public or 
in front of his coworkers.  Their conversations generally consisted of news concerning their home villages, 
children, and neighbors. Asked directly, some men admitted that “it is not interesting to be alone” (yige 
ren buhao shua) but would not elaborate more. But when they were with their close male friends and in a 
very relaxed environment, sometimes a few of them would indicate loneliness. When I had a hot pot with 
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Brother Liu’s bangbang friends during their leisure time, these men mentioned the joy with which they 
returned home for the Spring Festival the previous year. They complained that migrant life, compared to 
rural life, was lonely and isolated. One of them said: “My wife joked that I am living a ‘good’ life while 
she is eating bitterness in the country. I told her that I envy her ‘bitterness.’ For me, the life back home is 
sweet. Bitterness is life here.”  
Male migrants’ sex lives were also altered by the long-term separation from their spouses. A survey 
commissioned by the Guangdong Sexology Association in 2009 found that up to 36 percent of married 
migrant men in Dongguan of Guangdong Province are bothered by sexual repression. About 30 percent of 
rural married migrant men said that they had sex with sex workers. Another 30 percent of them said that 
they had had more than one sexual partner. In the case of bangbang, they sometimes expressed their 
desires and complaints by making jokes in front of their colleagues. Those who could not meet their 
wives on a regular basis sometimes became the subject of such jokes, especially right after visiting their 
families in the countryside.  
For example, White Kid, a thirty-four-year-old male bangbang was teased by his male colleagues after 
he came back from a short visit to his wife and children. White Kid’s bangbang colleague Fat Kid Yan 
said, “You look great, White Kid! What did your wife cook for you?” Another colleague followed, “It is 
probably not the food that counts; it is the quality of sleep (shuimian zhiliang)!” White Kid looked 
awkward and uncomfortable. But he just tolerated such jokes with an awkward smile on his face. In two 
other interviews, two married male bangbang each admitted that they had had sex with sex workers. They 
considered their behavior to be that of a normal man. One of them said that sex workers were also 
migrants in the service sector. “They need to make a living, just like me. I bought their service. That’s 
all,” One of them said. Some married bangbang criticized those who had sex with sex workers. Xiao 
Jiang, a bangbang who had been married for ten years said that enduring sexual repression was part of 
being a “real man.” He said: “Before my wife joined me here, I was all alone (in the city). It was very 
hard, but I swore to myself that I would be loyal to her no matter what. She was also lonely at home and 
life wasn’t easy for her either. … I told myself to be strong and to resist temptations for my family … I 
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am a man. If I can’t endure the suffering, how can my wife endure it?” But other married bangbang were 
less critical. Tan White Hair said: “it may not be an ideal situation, but it is understandable. It is not easy 
for everyone (who works) out here.” Brother Chen also mentioned that several of his bangbang 
colleagues had a history of sleeping with sex workers. “They were out of options.” Chen told me, “As 
men, they had the need. I understand, though I prefer to not do it myself.”  
The absence of a husband causes changes in the day-to-day operations of the household. Rural men, 
although normally not involved in many domestic errands, do play an important role in maintaining the 
household. They do chores such as repairing the house, carrying heavy materials, supervising children’s 
homework, chopping fire wood, and farming the land (especially plowing the land). When they are absent, 
the wives and other family members often have to rearrange their schedules or ask others to take on the 
husband’s workload. Yunfang, a bangbang’s wife, said that she had to give up farming her rice paddy 
after her husband went to Chongqing because she had such a hard time handling both the farming work 
and domestic chores. Some wives had to ask for help from their parents, parents-in-law, or other relatives. 
But in some cases, as a last resort, they had to seek help from their male neighbors or fellow villagers, 
which at times triggered familial discord. Xiao Hong, a bangbang’s wife, told me that rumors about her 
having an affair with her male neighbor cropped up after he had helped her with some home repairs. She 
decided to leave the village and join her husband in Chongqing city to avoid hurting her own and her 
family’s reputation and to avoid bringing further trouble to her male neighbor.  
The wives of bangbang also say that they feel insecure after their husbands leave. “If a burglar breaks 
in (my house), I am the only one who can fight with him. My child is too small, and my parents-in-law 
are too old,” said Xiao Hu, one bangbang’s wife. She told me that she put a kitchen knife under her 
pillow every night in case she ever has to fight off burglars. She only stopped doing this when her 
husband came home. Another concern among the wives of bangbang were the rumors and the talk among 
the wives themselves about their husband’s loyalty. One bangbang’s wife told me that she had heard 
about many cases in which a husband’s extra-marital affairs with women in the city led to broken 
marriages and divorces. She said, “I was worried after hearing so many sad stories from my friends. I 
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can’t imagine what it would be like if he did that to me. He is the backbone of my family and father of my 
child. … So I call him frequently and ask my father (who was also working in Chongqing) to visit him 
often. … No, not because I don’t trust him, but because he and I were not together…” Most of the wives I 
talked to, however, expressed confidence in their husbands’ integrity and loyalty to marriage. Sexual 
harassment is another reason for left-behind wives’ sense of insecurity. Huifang Wu and Jingzhong Ye’s 
research on left-behind wives in five provinces of China provides a vivid example in which the wife of an 
absent migrant worker was sexually harassed by her male neighbor (Wu and Ye 2009). The neighbor 
often peed in front of the woman’s house and intentionally exposed himself to her. When the woman 
confronted her neighbor, he verbally assulted her.  
The sex life of the wife also changes in the absence of her husband. According to People’s Daily, a 
study by Chinese Agriculture University reveals that China has 47,000,000 “left-behind women,” about 
54.2 percent of the total “left-behind” population. These women, due to the absence of their husbands, 
face many problems, including the lack of a regular sexual relations. The patriarchal social structure in 
rural China exerts more rigid control over women’s sex than men’s. Women who have extra-martial 
relationships are often subject to more severe punishment and more intense social criticism than their 
male counterparts. Newspapers often carry stories in which left-behind wives committ suicide – for 
example, by drinking pesticide – after her husband discovered that she had partaken in an extra-marital 
relationship. The bangbangs’ wives that I talked to had varied opinions on this issue. Some thought that 
extra-marital relationships were not a correct way to solve marital problems but that it was also wrong to 
only punish the wife. “If the man is really capable, he should not leave the wife behind and let her make 
mistakes,” said Sister Liu, a bangbang’s wife. Some thought that a woman’s quality (suzhi) determined 
whether or not she would be able to keep her chastity (shou jie) for her husband. Some blamed the strong 
temptation that left-behind women faced in the countryside and criticized the third party for being evil 
and selfish. One bangbang’s wife told me that years ago, when her husband was in Fujian Province, she 
was attracted to her ex-boyfriend in her parents’ village. They expressed their feelings to each other, but 
they stopped the relationship before it got serious. She said that she understood women who had extra-
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marital relationship because of loneliness, but she would not divorce her husband for another man 
because she loved her children very much and wanted to give them a complete family.  
6.2.2. Marital Relations in the City 
Previous research on the marital relationships of rural migrant couples who both work in the urban 
regions has produced two contradictory perspectives. One is that migration empowers rural women 
because they actively participate in paid employment and in other activities in the public sphere (Murphy 
2004; Willis and Yeoh 2000). The other is that migration causes great stress on husband-wife relations. 
From the second viewpoint, women are often vulnerable in family conflicts and subject to domestic 
violence at the hands of their husbands (Jacka 2006). I argue that to ask questions of whether migration 
empowers or weakens migrant men/women is too simplistic and less productive than examining who is 
empowered or weakened by migration and how such outcomes are determined in particular circumstances. 
Migration should be considered as multiple and as a continuing process, as Piper and Roces argue (2005).  
Opportunities and stress, family discord and harmony, empowerment and disempowerment co-exist in 
migrant experiences. The social locations, or “power geometry” (Mahler and Pessar 2001), of individuals 
help determine to what extent they are agents or victims and how they respond to what they encounter. 
Mahler and Pessar’s conceptual model—gendered geographies of power (GGP)–focuses on analyzing 
people’s social agency and social positions within multiple hierarchies of power. Pessar and Mahler 
suggest that gender should be conceptualized as a process, as one of several ways that humans create and 
perpetuate social differences (Mahler and Pessar 2001). In the following section, I discuss relationships 
between married bangbang and their wives in Chongqing in terms of how migration changes the marital 
relations and influences the choices that they make. My overarching argument is that male bangbang’s 
masculine pride is under assault when their wives actively engage in paid employment and gain more 
independence. However, the gender hierarchies in the work place and in the households that keep men in 
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the privileged positions remain powerful. Migrants’ connections with their home villages also prevent 
wives from dominating their husbands in marital relations. 
6.2.2.1. Bangbang and Unemployed Wives The wives of bangbang whom I met normally tried 
to bring income to their households. Among the 37 wives I met in the city of Chongqing, about 
20% (7 persons) did not have paid jobs, whether because of sickness, maternity leave, or 
difficulties in finding a job. Two of the seven women were full-time mothers taking care of 
newborn babies, and the remaining five did part-time work. Two of the unemployed wives 
earned a monthly income of 300-400 yuan by cooking for their relatives who had no time to 
cook. Another one had a gynecological disease and did not had any formal paid job, though she 
did make rice dumplings for local food supermarket and sewed clothing parts for small local 
factories. The husbands of these women were bangbang who had been doing their work for over 
five years; their incomes were relatively more stable than than of the newcomers and that of 
bangbang in their sixties and seventies. The wives did not plan to work permanently as 
housewives or as full-time mothers. Most of them were looking for work opportunities in the city 
or planned to do so when their children were old enough to go to the kindergarten. 
Women’s unemployment could be used as an excuse by men to commit domestic violence toward 
their wives. Two housewives I met in Chongqing, Third Sister and Fourth Sister (the two of them were 
sisters) told me that they felt extremely insecure without a stable monthly income. Their husbands were 
both bangbang. The sisters spent most of their time taking care of their households but also went out 
picking garbage, selling the discarded materials for cash almost every day. Third Sister also sold snacks 
along the street where her husband worked. However, their husbands did not consider such activities 
actual work and devalued their contribution to their households. Fourth Sister’s husband, Brother Xia, 
thought that she was “useless” and “has nothing to do but play around every day.” He expected her to find 
a “serious” job (zhengjing gongzuo) and earn a stable income. I heard similar comments from Sister 
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Third’s husband, Brother Zhai. Later, I found out that Brother Xia has an unhappy marital relationship 
with Fourth Sister while Brother Zhai has a bad relationship with his parents-in-law. Brother Xia beat 
Fourth Sister a couple of times. The wives’ unemployment was an excuse for the unhappily married men 
to express their dissatisfaction towards marriage. 
In some families, the husband is under pressure to mediate the relationship between his unemployed 
wife and his parents, who expect his wife to work. Brother Tian’s wife did not have a paid job for almost 
eight years. She worked in several factories before getting married and didn’t want to go back to factory 
work. She also had health problems. Brother Tian supported his wife’s decision to take a leave, but his 
parents were unhappy with her unemployment. They thought that their daughter-in-law was too selfish in 
making their son the breadwinner of the family. The relationship between the parents-in-law and 
daughter-in-law had been tense.  
6.2.2.2. Bangbang With Working Wives  Several male married bangbang complained about 
their wives’ growing bargaining power. Wood Zhao was one of them, “She used to be more 
docile (tinghua), but the job that she has changed her bit by bit. Once she began to work for the 
clothing factory, she became more opinionated (shuohua yingqi). She wants to make decisions 
about everything. Sometimes she would rather listen to those people (his wife’s coworkers) than 
to me.” Sister Hu, the wife of Wood Zhao, admitted that she was more outspoken after she found 
that job. “I guess women who earn money like men have right to speak at home. Every once in a 
while you can’t put up with any more and you must speak out.” But she also said that she always 
listened to her husband for “big decisions” because “he is more experienced and 
knowledgeable.” In-sook Lim (1997:38) finds that migrant couples often have different senses 
about the extent to which a wife has changed. My research confirms Lim’s conclusion. I found 
that husbands tended to think that their wives had changed radically after migration while wives 
did not think that they had changed that much. While Sister Hu said that she only talked back to 
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her husband when she “couldn’t put up with” him, her husband, Wood Zhao thought that she had 
developed a “stronger opinion” and a desire to “make decisions about everything.” Although 
Sister Hu thinks that she consults her husband for important decisions, he felt that his authority 
was challenged. Their statements show that even a little change in the wife can be perceived on a 
grander scale by the husband.  
Male bangbang often expressed gratitude toward their working wives for sharing their financial 
burden. However, some men that I talked to also feared that their wives would become too powerful and 
challenge their authority at home. Three factors contribute to the husbands’ fears. First, the wives’ earning 
power often gave them more bargaining power in their marital relationship. Second, urban life could 
“corrupt” the wives with the temptation of consumption and modern ideas. Third, when the wife found a 
job more easily than her husband, the husband often felt threatened and experienced a loss of masculine 
pride.  
Working wives often had opportunities to make decisions on how to spend money. One bangbang’s 
wife, Sister Huang, said: “My husband is stingy and wouldn’t buy anything except very basic stuff. I had 
to persuade him to buy me a bath soap. Now I earn my own money and don’t bother to ask his approval 
any more. I buy whatever I like … ” A few working wives I met told me that their status was raised at 
home after they had paid jobs. “I barely had a say on how to spend our money because I didn’t have a 
paid job,” one of the wives told me. “I felt that my husband was not happy each time I asked him to give 
money to my parents. Now I earn money too, and I can give my parents money without having to see my 
husband’s unhappy expression.” However, I heard their husbands complaining that the wives spent 
money on “useless” commodities. One bangbang man told me that his wife insisted on buying a 
particular brand of shampoo instead of the cheapest one. “I don’t understand why she has to buy the more 
expensive one,” he complained. “I would prefer that she save that money for big things … such as a DVD 
player.” He also told me that his wife liked to go shopping with her women colleagues, which had barely 
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happened before she found a job in a clothing factory. The worried look on his face clearly indicated his 
concern with the change in his wife’s consumption habits.  
Another threat that working wives posed to rural migrant men was that the highly gendered 
recruitment of rural laborers made some job opportunities more accessible to women than to men. For 
example, nine working wives I met worked in clothing factories as trimmers or seamstresses; thirteen 
wives worked as shoe shiners; five wives were waitresses in restaurants. Most of these wives also 
engaged in part-time domestic work for urban residents to earn extra money. These jobs, according to the 
wives, prefer women because of their “nimble fingers,” “flexibility,” and “carefulness.” By contrast, male 
rural migrants, even though they would like to do these jobs, are not normally recruited. One male 
bangbang said: “(Women) can easily get recruited and work in the factories (jin chang), as maids (bang 
ren), or as shoe shiners. None of these jobs are for men. Even if I would like to work in those factories, 
they (the employers) wouldn’t employ me because men are not preferred. They say that it is more 
expensive to hire a man, and it is harder for them to manage men than to manage women.” Another male 
bangbang said: “My wife found her first factory job in about one week. The factories are shorthanded in 
peak season…I couldn’t find any factory job and began to work as a bangbang. But the first half year, I 
was a newcomer and had few customers. Sometimes (I) waited for a whole day but earned little money. 
The two of us depended on her earnings to survive. It was a stressful time for me. I didn’t want others to 
laugh at me, so I went back home (to the village) for two months just to save face.” 
In my fieldwork, I found that rural migrant women who work alongside their bangbang husbands in 
the city have relatively less bargaining power at home and defer to their husbands’ authority more 
compared to women who have different occupations than their husbands. I met two bangbang groups, 
each consisting of at least five married couples. The group members lay claim to certain territory in a 
commercial zone and stayed together during work and off work. These migrants were mostly relatives or 
people from the same home village and knew each other quite well. In the workplace, they shared the 
workload and risks. They negotiated payment and working conditions with the “bosses” collectively. 
They also chose the same place to live in the city, sharing the rent and living expenses, cooking and 
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cleaning together. Once their earnings reached 100 yuan, they distributed it equally among the couples. In 
other words, the working wives in these groups worked as many hours as their husbands and earned as 
much as their husbands. Because of this specific labor organizational scheme, these migrant couple 
groups called themselves “Primary Communism” or “People’s Communes,” indicating a rule of 
egalitarianism. However, the division of labor and the status of the group members was not egalitarian at 
all. There was a strong gender hierarchy within the groups. For example, male members always took the 
lead in decision-making related to the business. Female group members often chose not to “talk business” 
in the work place, especially with strangers, but waited for their husbands to come or let their husbands 
make the decisions. 
 Furthermore, men, not women, were in charge of the important tasks within the groups. Take one 
group as an example– one man, Xiao Qin, the leader of the group, was in charge of business connections, 
payment negotiations, daily work assignments and arrangements; Lao Chen, Xiao Qin’s brother-in-law, 
kept the account book, which recorded each service and its payment; Xiao Hu, Xiao Qin’s other brother-
in-law, was responsible for keeping the second account book, which recorded collective expenses, such as 
food daily expense, monthly electronic bill, and so on; Fat Huang, Lao Chen’s cousin, made purchases of 
food for the whole group; Xiao Qin, Lao Chen, and Xiao Hu, all three male members, comprised the head 
of the group and distributed the daily earnings to each family. None of the female group members took 
these positions.  
Moreover, while women worked as many hours as men, they also did most of the domestic work after 
“work.” The typical off-work dynamics within Xiao Qin’s group are as follows. The women return to the 
rented room first, taking turns washing clothes, cleaning rooms, boiling water, and preparing the dinner. 
When the men got home with groceries, the women were busy cooking. The men gathered around the 
dining table, smoking, drinking, chatting, playing cards, and calculating the daily earnings. When the food 
was ready, the women served the men. The men ate together, just as the women did, but the men and 
women ate at different tables. The women sat around a lower and smaller table next to the men’s big and 
better table. When the men needed more rice, they never got up to refill their bowls. They simply asked 
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their wives to do it. After the dinner, it was the wives who, again, took turns cleaning the dishes and 
boiling bath water for the men.  
The husbands in this group tried to limit their wives’ mobility, especially in the workplace. Xiao Qin’s 
group serves as an example. In 2004, both men and women in this group worked on the street or in the 
open market place. The wives loaded and unloaded goods along with their husbands by the side of the 
road. Sometimes, they attracted the inquisitive look of pedestrians. In 2006, this group was hired by a 
market warehouse for loading goods. All the women were sent to the warehouse to work while the men 
worked in the open air or in public, moving between streets, stores, and markets. Xiao Chen’s wife, Sister 
Wei, told me that this arrangement was deliberate because the husbands decided it would be better for 
their wives to work inside where they could work without being in the public eye. “Showing the face in 
public (pao tou lu mian) is not good for a woman, especially when she is working with a group of (adult) 
men.” Sister Chen said, “A woman like that gets nothing but rumors. This arrangement benefits us.”  The 
other women nodded their heads in agreement.  
These observations show that while the working wives felt safer working inside the home than 
working alone in factories or on the street, they did not necessarily have a higher status at home. What’s 
more, frequent familial conflicts sometimes arose from husbands and wives working side by side.  For 
example, in the workplace, Xiao Hu sometimes yelled at his wife when he thought that she was being 
slow and inefficient. Xiao Qin’s wife, San Mei (Third Sister) told me that Xiao Qin had been quarrelling 
more often with her since they started working together. Their relationship had been more peaceful when 
she worked as a waitress in a relative’s noodle restaurant in another subdistrict of Chongqing. She quit 
that job only because Xiao Qin no longer wanted a long distance relationship. In our conversation, she 
said she missed her former colleagues and wanted to go back.  
In public, many married male bangbang rarely admit that they share household chores, such as 
cooking, cleaning, and washing clothes, after migrating to the city. They often boast in public how 
willingly their wives take on all the domestic work and shower them with warmth and love. However, in 
private, some of them admit to helping with chores.  Xiao Guan works in the construction material market, 
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which closes at six every day. After closing time, he would spend another half an hour wandering around 
to see if there were business owners who were closing business late and would hire extra hands. If not, he 
would go to the nearby food market, buy vegetables and meat,44 and go home to prepare dinner. When I 
asked him whether he felt upset because he cooked food for his wife who worked in a clothing factory, he 
laughed and said that cooking did not bother him because his wife had to work over ten hours a day and 
did not have time to cook. “Sometimes she comes back home at ten o’clock in the evening and has to get 
up at seven to go to work. I can’t wait for her to cook for me. I would starve” he said. Working wives, 
such as Sister Du, agree that their husbands do more housework in the city than they had in the 
countryside. Sister Du said, “Somehow we don’t have any other choice (but to have more equal division 
of housework). I have to go to work, and the factory (where I work) has strict work schedule. In the peak 
season, staying up all night is common. Compared with me, my husband has a more flexible schedule. So 
he has to cook, clean, and take care of the house whenever possible.” 
However, my interviews with both male bangbang and their wives show that rural migrant men’s 
increasing involvement in housework does not necessarily mean more equal gender relations within the 
households. Male bangbang helped their wives with cooking and cleaning not necessarily because of the 
latter’s earning power. Wives also did not think that their husbands should do the housework to 
compensate for their inability to be sole breadwinners. A husband would choose to increase his 
participation in housework mostly because he understood the importance of collaboration in his family’s 
survival. Therefore, as wives work outside the home to share the burden of providing financial resources 
for their family, husbands were expected to accommodate their wives’ rigorous schedules by doing some 
housework.  
Although working wives tried to resist their husbands’ dominance at home, they did not challenge the 
social system that produces gender inequality; if they do challenge their husbands’ authority, it is often 
strategic. Besides the reasons mentioned above, three important factors sustained male dominance and 
                                                 
44
 The places bangbang families rent in the city do not have a refrigerator, so normally bangbang choose to live 
close to big food market and to buy food to cook every day.  
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gender inequality between bangbang and their wives: the gendered discourses that value male bangbang’ 
work more than their spouses’ work, the wives’ belief in their husbands’ authority, and the migrants’ 
connection to their home villages. Chapter Five described how gender hierarchies create asymmetric 
values attached to work for male bangbang and their spouses. This chapter briefly examines the other two 
factors. 
A few working wives naturalized the unequal division of labor in their households. For them, the 
husband represents the backbone of the family and is worthy of respect from the wife. This can be clearly 
seen in the case of Sister Yang. She worked as a shoe shiner and a part-time domestic worker. Meanwhile, 
she did most of the household chores and took care of both her husband and her two children. When 
asked if this division of labor was because her husband earned more than she did, she said no. She told me 
that in peak season (winter), she often earned roughly 1000 yuan a month. Sometimes she earned more 
than her husband. She said, “As long as he works hard to support this family, I am happy to do the 
housework. After all, the man is the ‘pillar’ (ding liang zhu) of a family. Without the pillar, the house 
can’t stand by itself.” Similarly, another working wife, nicknamed “Captain,” said, “A man is to be 
depended upon in terms of raising a family (yang jia kao nanren). A woman’s role is to supplement the 
man. A woman can help her husband more if she earns money. But she is not helping him if she henpecks 
her husband. Not good for the family.” It is obvious that the working wives, while enjoying the freedom 
and autonomy that paid employment brings them, are willing to maintain the conventional gender 
hierarchy in the households to some extent. Actually, the working wives I met in the field greatly valued 
the survival of the family in addition to valuing individual freedom and pleasure of independence. They 
considered their participation in paid work more as a family responsibility than as a way to struggle for 
equal marital relations. Captain said: “How much pleasure can you have when your husband is laughed of 
by his friends? Your husband loses face; you lose yours too.”  
Some wives did not challenge husbands’ dominance at home due to their fear of public opinion within 
the bangbang community. A henpecked husband was not respected back in the countryside, so a couple’s 
domestic relations in the city also influenced the family’s reputation in the home villages. Shufen, a forty-
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two-year-old migrant woman, decided not to challenge her husband’s authority at home for exactly this 
reason. Shufen’s family and her sister-in-law’s family shared the same apartment in Chongqing. Shufen 
said that she was very careful not to “boss around” her husband in front of his sister’s family. “His sister 
might tell her mother, who will surely get angry with me.” Shufen said. “After all, we are going back (to 
the home village) in the future. I want to keep a good relationship with my husband’s family. This is 
important for a woman like me who is marrying from the outside (of my husband’s village),” she said. 
She also told me that her female friends who were in similar situation tried to use “soft” methods to talk 
their husbands into doing things, such as lowering their voices, appealing to their husbands, or using jokes. 
They were careful to avoid a “hard” and dominating attitude.  
Working wives who did not respect their husbands put their reputation at risk in the local community. 
Xiao Yan, a thirty-five-year-old working wife, was mentioned by several others as a “bad example,” 
although she was the breadwinner of her family. When her husband, a former bangbang, became 
seriously sick because of his diabetes, Xiao Yan became a shoe shiner in order to provide for him and for 
their teenager son. However, her colleagues gossiped that she did not respect his husband and bossed him 
around in public. Captain said that Xiao Yan’s husband did not have any pocket money and had to ask for 
it time after time. “It is a shame for a man to ask for money from his wife. I pity Xiao Yan’s husband.” 
Another bangbang’s wife told me that Xiao Yan’s parents-in-law refused to live with them because they 
thought Xiao Yan “henpecked” her husband. Xiao Yan was not willing to go back to the home village 
because her mother-in-law told relatives how “domineering” she was to her husband. Xiao Yan also 
rarely visited her husband’s relatives in Chongqing. When I interviewed Xiao Yan, she said that her fate 
was “bitter” (ming ku) because of her husband’s sickness. “I am doing the thing that men are responsible 
for. People talk all kinds of things because they are not in my shoes. If my husband took charge, he would 
spend every penny on food. He is hungry. He wants food. But his sickness would never be under control.” 
She was worried about her relation with her husband’s parents. But she insisted that she had every reason 
to “be in charge” because her husband was not capable of doing so. In contrast to Xiao Yan, most wives I 
met tried not to confront their husbands directly conflicts arose but used more indirect methods. 
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6.3. RELATIONSHIP WITH LAOXIANG, FRIENDS, AND URBANITIES 
6.3.1. Laoxiang and Friends 
Informal networks between relatives and people from the same community are one of the most important 
resources for migrants who look for jobs and adapt to the urban settings (Zhao 2003; Solinger 1999; 
Zhang 2001; Ma and Xiang 1998). However, Jacka argues that local ties prove to be less trustworthy and 
less relied upon by rural migrant women than previous scholarship implies (Jacka 2006: 193). My 
research confirms Jacka’s conclusion that while local networks still play an important role for male 
bangbang, close kin and friends provide more reliable assistance.   
Why are laoxiang ties among bangbang not as important as scholars like Ma and Xiang (1998), or Li 
Zhang (2001) suggest? In Li Zhang’s research on Zhejiangcun (Zhejiang Village) in Beijing suburb, local 
networks are crucial for organizing the community, mobilizing support and providing assistance to 
migrant workers and their families. Solinger’s studies on Zhejiangcun find that within the settlement, 
migrant leaders built large housing compounds, restaurants, medical clinics, schools, and recreational 
facilities (Solinger 1999). The mutual support and trust of laoxiang in Zhejiangcun are a major resource 
for most of the migrants. However, the bangbang community is quite different from Zhejiangcun. 
Bangbang workers in Chongqing do not form such residential communities based on place of origin. 
Many bangbang’s settlements in Chongqing have a highly mixed population, poorly organized 
community lives, and barely developed leadership. Although some bangbang residential compounds were 
formed by people from the same county or home village, the majority of migrant settlements consist of 
people from different counties, regions, areas of Chongqing municipality as well as from other provinces. 
Unlike Zhejiangcun which is located at the suburb of Beijing city, the migrant compounds in Chongqing 
are located within the city of Chongqing, sometimes right next to the urbanities’ communities. In a few 
cases, several bangbang families rent an apartment and share the rent. In such cases, there was a mix of 
Chongqing urbanites and rural migrants in one community. Furthermore, renovation of some urban 
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regions and demolition of old city buildings force rural migrants to be constantly on the move, which also 
makes it difficult for them to form their own communities.  
My research suggests that “laoxiang” is a very useful medium for bangbang to forge connections with 
others, especially when they first meet each other. For male bangbang, laoxiang can refer to people from 
the same village, but can also mean people from the same county, city, and even larger areas. The exact 
meaning of laoxiang depends on the context. Sometimes when a bangbang does not want to clarify his 
relationship with another person, he would say that that person was his “laoxiang.” However, given the 
broad meaning of laoxiang, this category includes a range of relationships, some of which are not close 
relationships for the migrants. Old Jiang, when recalling how regretful he was in introducing some 
laoxiang into his crew to work in an electronic equipment market, said: “I don’t trust laoxiang easily any 
more. Laoxiang, so what? The two laoxiang I brought into our crew smoked my cigarettes like they were 
free, stole my bamboo pole when I was not there, and did not treat me with respect…If he’s not honest 
and hard-working, there is no way that a laoxiang will be better than a stranger.” However, in a different 
occasion, when Old Jiang wanted to talk to a male bangbang who recently joined their crew, he openly 
inquired about the latter’s hometown. When he found out that the latter came from the same county, he 
immediately introduced himself to the new comer as “laoxiang” and they quickly started a conversation.  
Relatives, especially close relatives, and good friends are not only important in helping new migrants 
settle down in the city, but they are also a main resource of help and support to those who have “found 
their feet” in the city. Many male bangbang share rented rooms with close kin and friends, not just to save 
money, but also to protect their own safety. In the job market, kinship and friendship bring bangbang 
together more easily than other social connections. In one electronic equipment market, over sixty 
bangbang automatically grouped themselves into seven crews and competed with each other for 
customers. One such group had eleven bangbang, eight of whom were relatives. The other three were 
either former coworkers or good friends of the group leader. Although they can find laoxiang in this 
workplace, they never joined them for work or shared housing with them. The mutual trust and good 
collaboration cultivated among them was more dependable than local ties. However, sometimes close kin 
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were not that supportive and friendly to each other either. Brother Wang and his elder brother, both of 
whom work as bangbang, present such an example. The two brothers did not get along. Brother Wang 
complained to me that his elder brother was extremely selfish and inconsiderate. He recalled that his elder 
brother once recruited a few colleagues (including Brother Wang) to work for a “boss” but then pocketed 
part of the payment without even telling Brother Wang about it. Brother Wang now avoids working with 
his elder brother and chooses to socialize with his friends and coworkers.  
6.3.2. Bangbang and Urbanites 
Scholars have argued that very few rural migrants have made friends with urban people; it is especially 
difficult for rural migrant women to have friendly interactions with urbanites (e.g., Jacka 2006). The only 
exception, as previous literature implies, might be domestic workers. Being “outsiders within” (Gaetano 
2004), they sometimes develop intimate relations with their employers. Some scholars point out that 
members of the older generation of male urbanites often have negative attitudes toward rural migrants, 
but urbanities with higher-income and higher-education have much less negative attitudes, especially if 
they have migrant friends (Neilson et al. 2006). My research finds, however, rural migrants and urban 
residents may become friends if they have similar class backgrounds or migration experiences. Brother 
Xia and Xiao Fang are one such example. Brother Xia is a forty-five-year-old male bangbang who has 
worked in Chongqing for nine years. Xiao Fang is an urban resident and laid-off state-owned factory 
worker who has mild mental problems. Since being laid off from Chongqing’s biggest military factory in 
1992, Xiao Fang had been working as a full-time street cleaner for the local subdistrict office. His 
monthly income is 500 yuan RMB, consisting of a 300-yuan salary and a 200-yuan basic living allowance 
provided by the local government for his adolescent son. Xiao Fang’s wife divorced him and married a 
Hong Kong businessman a few years ago. She also took their son away. Since then, Xiao Fang has lived 
alone and has been in contact with very few relatives. For the purposes of earning more money and of 
making contact with other people, he began to work as a bangbang about four years ago, and became 
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friends with Brother Xia. Xiao Fang could only do bangbang work after dinner. Brother Xia often met 
him near the workplace, telling him where to find that day’s business opportunities. Brother Xia also 
invites Xiao Fang to his home to have dinner now and then. Xiao Fang, on the other hand, tells Brother 
Xia about things in the city and sends gifts to Brother Xia’s wife and children. Brother Xia has sympathy 
for Xiao Fang’s loneliness and isolation. He said, “Xiao Fang and I both have bitter fates. He is an urban 
resident, but the city doesn’t give him anything good. What’s the difference of urban and rural 
(resident)?” These two often help each other and provide emotional comfort to one another. When Xiao 
Fang’s mental problems got serious, Brother Xia sent his wife to wash clothes and to cook food for Xiao 
Fang. When Brother Xia quarreled with his wife or children, Xiao Fang would invite him for a drink and 
a long talk. The similar class background and social positions became the foundation for their friendship 
and mutual support.  
I also observed that bangbang had friendly relationships with vendors, food/newspaper stand owners, 
sellers in the food markets, as well as other members of the urban poor. One newspaper/food stand owner, 
a laid-off state-owned factory worker, is a friend of Brother Zhai. He would often ask Brother Zhai to 
watch his stand when he went to bathroom or errands. Brother Zhai is so familiar with him that he knows 
where he put what. If Brother Xia runs out of newspapers while he is watching the stand, he puts the 
money under a batch of newspaper, the place where the owner always keeps the money. Meanwhile, 
Brother Zhai also gets help from the stand owner. When he goes out carrying goods for customers, he 
often put his belongings, such as his water bottle, jacket, and extra ropes, under the newspaper/food stand 
so that he does not need to bring them with him. Sometimes the owner gives bottled water to Brother Zhai 
for free and tells him about the latest business information. Brother Zhai sometimes helps the owner to 
carry heavy loads for free in exchange for the latter’s help. They have been collaborating like this for 
years. 
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6.4. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have examined rural migrant men’s relationships with the people close to them and how 
these relations shape the decisions and experiences of their migration. These relations often powerfully 
impact the pattern and destination of migration, occupations migrants take up, and their everyday 
experiences in the city. Rural migrants’ experiences, in turn, shape or change their relations with close 
family members, friends, employers, and urbanities.  
The migration of both men and women can pose great challenges to rural migrant families.  Although 
men are normally not constrained by the moralities that often prevent women from migrating, they face 
other difficulties and problems in deciding to migrate. While people assume – and in some sense it is true 
– that men migrate primarily to provide economic resources for families and to fulfill the breadwinner 
role, this chapter argues that non-economic factors and social forces also play important roles in shaping 
the migratory decision-making process and results. Such factors include gender ideologies that value 
migrant men more than men having no migration experience, the conventional morality that enjoins sons 
to provide financial security to aged parents, and the patriarchal structure of rural society in which the 
father actively contributes to an adult son’s familial survival.  
Bangbang often migrate ahead of their wives and children; this migration pattern bespeaks the need 
for economic affordability in some cases, but it should not be seen as a natural pattern of migration. Jacka 
argues that “notions of what is rational are shaped by dominant discourses relating to gender and the 
power relations they embody” (Jacka 2006: 204). The “men migrate, women plow” pattern of migration 
becomes possible precisely because of changes in the gendered division of labor that favors men working 
“outside” and women working “inside” (in the rural home village). Farming the land becomes part of the 
“domestic” support that wives provide to their husbands. Furthermore, this pattern is one of a few that 
applies to the cases of the bangbang that I met. I heard about several other migration patterns. In one case, 
a married woman migrated alone and before her husband because the latter was sick and could not afford 
travel. In another case, husbands and wives migrated together and left their young child with the 
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grandparents. In fact, some couples took different patterns of migration in different life stages. Many 
factors such as the age of family members, health conditions, financial needs, and individual desires and 
willingness all play a role in shaping migratory experiences.   
Migration may improve the material conditions of the male bangbang’s families, but it also brings 
enormous stress to both male bangbang and their spouses. Loneliness and distress resulting from long-
distance relationships can bring devastating consequences to a family. Sometimes migration contributes 
to familial tragedies. According to the Journal of China Reform, migration is the reason behind more than 
50 percent of divorces of rural married couples. While divorce among bangbang was rarely discussed 
during my fieldwork, male bangbang who lived alone in the city experienced enormous loneliness and 
lacked emotional support. These men also became the subject of jokes that challenged their masculine 
pride.  
The respective social positions of men and women help determine how much willpower they have and 
to what extent they will be empowered or disempowered. My research finds that although working wives 
made significant financial contributions to their families, they had limited agency in resisting the 
authority of their husbands in the households. The jobs of working wives are often considered as 
complementary to their husbands’ while the value of their work are also viewed as secondary to that of 
their husbands’ work. Some wives’ deep-seated belief in their husbands’ authority in the households also 
helps maintain male dominance at home. Due to their intimate connection with their home villages and 
with fellow villagers in the city, most migrant women choose not to challenge their husbands for the sake 
of their own reputation. Even wives who work side by side with their husbands as bangbang may not 
enjoy greater gender equality. Compared with their husbands, these wives are in inferior positions. Their 
earnings are often counted as part of the husbands’ earnings. Although there are wives such as Xian Yan 
who struggle for a leading position in their households, most wives would not go this far. But it does not 
mean that these wives are passive or simply victims of patriarchal domination. They avoid direct 
confrontation, but try to solve problems in “soft” ways. 
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My research also finds that laoxiang (people from the same native place) is a flexible concept and does 
not necessarily refer to people from the same village. Male bangbang widely use the concept of laoxiang 
to make connections to each other and to obtain support. Yet, they sometimes trust friends and close 
relatives more than people that they merely identify as “laoxiang.” Furthermore, bangbang’s interaction 
with urbanites varies. Some of them are antagonistic and indifferent, yet others are friendly and mutually 
supportive. Rural migrants and the urban poor may become friends because of shared class statuses and 
similar backgrounds. In some cases, male bangbang also make friends with small business owners who 
have migration experiences and who understand the hardship of migrant life. Rural migrant men’s 
relationships with urbanities and with the “bosses” are more complicated than people normally would 
imagine.  
In brief, rural to urban migration is a process that is embedded in social relations and cultural 
expectations. The economic benefit to the family is one important dimension of how decisions of 
migration are made. But individual dreams, desires, and hopes; relations with close kin; available 
resources; and social positions also determine the “rationality” of migration. The experience of migration, 
in turn, influences and transforms the social relations of migrants. Under any circumstances, rural 
migrants make their decisions with full consideration and firmly control their own lives. They are not 
“blind flow” (mangliu) of labor who simply follow others. They are the masters of their own lives. 
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7.0 CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has examined the gender and labor inequalities that Chinese migrant men experience 
when they participate in post-socialist China’s economic development and modernization. I have traced 
the linkage between the political economy of development, the rationality of urbanization, and the logic 
of the post-socialist state and asked how this linkage informs the desire, agency, and subject formation of 
migrant workers. In particular, my research has examined the social and cultural forces behind rural 
men’s decisions to migrate, the cultural politics of exclusion that pushes migrant men to the bottom of the 
society, the discursive conditions and contradictions embedded in the migrant men’s struggles for 
survival, the strategies they adopt to defend their decency and dignity, and the social relations that change 
and are changed by rural men’s experiences of migration.  
My research on bangbang has argued that in Chongqing, rural men’s migrations are not just an 
important attempt to pursue economic advancement, but also part of their quest for decency and 
masculine pride. Out-migration and working in the informal economy have unique meanings for Chinese 
rural migrant men – they constitute valuable approaches for the men not only to pursue economic success 
and social upward mobility but also to elevate their reputation as responsible and capable men. Here, the 
money earned through working in the city is significant in elevating rural men’s reputation. But what is 
equally important is the experience of migration; the migrants’ experiences evidence their possession of 
wider social connections, updated knowledge and information about the market, and a better mastery of 
survival skills. However, my research has demonstrated that the majority of poor rural men experience 
systematic violence during migration which forces them to remain exploited and socially marginalized in 
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the urban region. In many cases, labor migration does not alleviate rural poverty and reduce social 
inequalities, but leads to a greater divide between the haves and have-nots.   
Furthermore, my research found that bangbang in Chongqing exemplify the large proportion of rural 
migrant workers who end up working in the informal service sector. These migrants work on a casual and 
temporary basis, being hired and fired based on the needs of their employers. They are less visible in 
academic writings and less represented in public than migrant workers in off-shore factories or workers 
laid off from state-owned enterprises. I have argued that the informality of their employment – that is, the 
capacity of this large reserve army of labor to be itinerant – is the result of China’s labor market 
deregulation and economic restructuring. Workers like bangbang have to keep looking for job 
opportunities between different economic sectors and various employment modalities in order to survive. 
The social differentiations between haves and have-nots, the politics of exclusion that accompany 
economic development, and the intersection of gender and class inequality all contribute to the 
exploitation and marginalization of rural migrants who work in the informal sector. The structure of social 
inequality is organized not only along the lines of class, gender, age, and place of origin (rural/urban), but 
also in terms of labor divisions (physical/intellectual labor, skilled/unskilled labor, informal/formal 
employment, and so on).   
I have also analyzed how the rhetoric of “freedom” (free choice, free movement of labor) functions as 
a pro-growth strategy that reorganizes the flow of knowledge, capital, labor, social relations, and the 
formation of worker subjectivities. China’s economic reform since 1978 and its deregulation of the 
transportation labor market have made bangbang work an “always available” occupational option for 
poor unskilled rural migrant men. This phenonmenon can be described as the “disguised informalization 
of work” (Breman 2001; 2010). In promoting a neoliberal ethos of “freedom” – which, in the case of 
bangbang, basically means flexible employment, unpredictable working time and workload, high 
mobility, little/no work protection, and no social benefits – the state actively shifts the economic risks and 
costs of labor reproduction to individual male porters. In other words, the rural villagers silently absorb 
the hidden costs of producing the cheap, flexible workforce that capitalist accumulation requires. The 
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porters, on the other hand, (re)interpret, negotiate, and challenge these risks; their actions reshape these 
discourses to their own ends.  
Moreover, I have argued that the experience of male porters is largely shaped by the changing 
discourse of masculinity in post-Mao China. The masculine heroes in the socialist period who exhibited 
exaggerated physical strength and martial vigor, rejected bourgeois lifestyles, and expressed a devotion to 
communist ideals have largely been deemed as outdated and irrelevant in the post-reform era. In the 
current era of commodification and consumption, individual social positioning no longer depends on 
one’s chushen (class of origin), but rather on one’s personal wealth. Rural men have thus needed to re-
evaluate what it means to “be a man” and to reposition themselves as they travel between the urban and 
rural regions, particularly since deep-rooted differences between rural and urban regions create vastly 
different – yet overlapping – standards for what makes a man a man. Rural men in Chongqing embrace 
bangbang work, as it provides flexible work schedules, a casual work atmosphere and immediate cash (all 
of which are quite important for their sense of dignity). At the same time, they must negotiate the global 
economic forces that bind them to irregular employment and low-end service work. When society still 
primarily defines a man’s value in terms of his job (or, more specifically, when permanent employment, 
full-time job, stable income, and success in market economy are the socially privileged features of a man), 
the informal, low-income, and servitude-alike nature of bangbang work challenge bangbang’s sense of 
manly pride. Although bangbang do use gender strategies to offset the negative effect of informal 
employment on them and protect their masculine pride, these strategies have the potential of reinforcing 
and perpetuating the existing dominant gender norms that devalue women’s labor and push women to 
vulnerable social positions.  
Lastly, this research has found that the participation of bangbang in collective resistance against the 
government is rare. Why? The state repression of strikes is one major reason; the Household 
responsibility System that guarantees the rural migrant a piece of land to which they can return is another 
reason (Lee 2008). I have argued that the fragmentation of employment also makes it difficult to organize 
large-scale collective protests. Since bangbang work can only provide an unstable income, many 
 162 
bangbang have to change jobs frequently or do multiple jobs at the same time in order to make ends meet. 
This changing of jobs and of workplaces results in a fragmented workforce, which is dispersed over 
numerous small businesses. It is not surprising that class consciousness is so elusive for these casual 
workers. Though they might share similar working experiences for a short period of time, their working 
relationships rarely last long. Resistance is mostly on an individual basis, such as foot-dragging, 
avoidance, obstruction, inertia, and so on. Bangbang, when appearing in groups, have more power than 
acting alone. But even their group resistance is usually limited in duration and in range.  
Since my fieldwork ended in 2007, there have been many changes in the world of rural migrant 
workers, especially after the global economic downturn in 2008. The most noticeable change, a change 
that occurred even before the global financial crisis, was the massive shortage of migrant labor in the 
economic engines of China, for example, the export-oriented industrial regions of southern China and the 
Pearl River Delta. The Wall Street Journal reported that in 2010, even with a salary increase of more than 
30 percent, few factories in the Yangtze and Pearl River deltas successfully attracted enough migrant 
workers to sign work contracts (Hong 2010). The following four factors have been said to contribute to 
the labor shortage. First, since the agricultural reform in 2006, rural incomes have increased to the extent 
that in some places, farming is becoming more rewarding than doing low-end physical work in the coastal 
area. Second, the rapid development of second-tier cities such as Chongqing, Nanchang and Wuhan has 
provided new working opportunities to rural laborers. Many migrant workers prefer these regions because 
they are closer to home. The salaries migrant workers receive in these second-tier cities are in some cases 
almost on par with those offered in the more developed coastal areas. Third, with the rapid pace of 
urbanization, China is creating a burgeoning group of idle farmers who can afford to live off of their 
rental income. For them, labor migration is not a favorable option. Lastly, it is said that the new 
generation of rural laborers, unlike their parents’ generation, has relatively better living conditions at 
home and refuse to put up with the hardships of migration. In particular, media reports stress that the new 
generation of Chinese migrant workers are better educated and do not want to work for jobs with low 
salaries or with poor working conditions (Callick 2004; Barboza 2006).  
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Contrary to such optimistic narratives, Chan’s research provides more pessimistic picture of the “labor 
shortage” problem after the 2008 economic crisis. Chan reports that the economic crisis struck the export-
oriented factories heavily and Western demand for China’s exports dropped dramatically. Twenty three 
million rural migrant workers lost their jobs and were forced to go home (Chan 2010a). He found that 
massive unemployment combined with non-payment of wage triggered some unusual labor protests. 
From Chan’s perspective, the future for returnee migrants in the countryside is not promising. The 
majority of migrant workers, especially “second generation” migrants, did not have experiences or skills 
in farming because most of them left the countryside right after they finished middle or elementary school. 
Even worse, a large proportion of returnees did not have access to farmland because they had left their 
land to others for many years (Chan 2010b). Chan documented the unemployed rural migrant workers’ 
words describing their feelings of displacement: “There is no future as a labourer; returning to the village 
has no meaning.”  
According to the Xinhua News reports, Chongqing provides around 7,000,000 rural laborers every 
year to other regions of China, and about 3,000,000 rural migrants go to the coastal areas for work. 
However, after the 2008 financial crisis, Chongqing saw a massive return of migrant workers who lost 
their jobs and went home to take up local employment opportunities. Kaixian, one of Chongqing’s 
counties, is an example. Kaixian exported 485,000 laborers to other regions of China every year since 
1997. However, at the end of 2008, about 50,000 had returned. The total of returnees in Kaixian County 
in 2008 doubled the number of returnees from the previous year (CCTV 2009). One major measure that 
the local government took to deal with the impact of the returnees on the local economy was to expand 
vocational training and retraining. However, Chan’s research found that the government programs which 
were set up to help jobless migrants get new jobs were often turned into “yet another ‘embezzlement 
project’ (liancai gongcheng) for local governments and officials in some locales” (Chan 2010b).   
Even worse, for a developing county such as Kaixian, there were not many working opportunities 
available for returnee migrants. Participation in farming and agricultural production was not an option for 
some returnees with limited access to land. One wonders where the returning rural migrants can go if they 
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cannot find work opportunities in the coastal areas or if working in the developed areas no longer pays off 
due to the wage cuts after the financial crisis. The quick development of inland urban economies may 
absorb a fraction of the returning workforce, but does it have the capacity to accommodate all the migrant 
workers and provide them with work opportunities? Furthermore, China’s economic rise was built on 
cheap labor, how will the labor shortage in southern China impact the country’s patterns of economic 
development and labor politics? How will the changes in China’s labor supply influence global economic 
dynamics and labor conditions in other parts of the world? These questions are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. However, I have no doubt that thorough ethnographic research on these questions will 
greatly benefit not only the understanding of China’s model of development, but also the labor conditions 
and the regime of capital on a global scale. 
The return home of millions of rural migrants has provided plenty of cheap labor supply to inland 
second-tier cities’ development. However, the flood of returning migrant workers into Chongqing means 
fiercer competition in the labor market and higher living costs, such as a rising monthly rent. The rapid 
urbanization and economic restructuring in Chongqing has also led to significant structural changes. In 
August 2010, the Chongqing government officially began the hukou reform45 to acquire farmland from 
peasants for urban development, with the goal of converting around ten million peasants into urbanites by 
2020. Peasants, including rural migrants such as bangbang, are being forced to give up their land in 
exchange for urban resident status. In official statements, seizing land and the proletarianization of the 
rural workforce have been framed as a “privilege” that liberates peasants from the constraints of the 
hukou system. However, this “privilege” does not grant rural residents real entitlement to any social 
benefits. Meanwhile, as part of this urbanization process, Chongqing’s roads and public transportation 
                                                 
45
 China’s hukou policy has been widely criticized for its unfair treatment of rural residents and the social 
injustice it has caused. Ironically, however, due to this unjust system, Chinese peasants are supposed to be 
guaranteed access to farmland in their village of residence, even if they leave to work in the city for many years. 
Since Chinese peasants have barely had access to social welfare and benefits after the reform, the access to land has 
become the only security available to them. Changing the hukou system would presumably remove the only security 
from the peasants and push them to become urban proletarians trapped permanently in poverty at the bottom of 
society.  
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systems have quickly developed. More people rely on cars and public transportation, leaving less work 
for bangbang. Media reports frequently circulate sad stories about how bangbang are disappearing with 
the improvement of transportation.  
Based on my dissertation research findings, I hypothesize that the hukou reform and Chongqing’s 
urban economic restructuring will produce a growing population of urban poor proletarians and a surge of 
urban slums while generating more informal economic patterns and greater flexibility of employment. 
The work competition among bangbang will become even fiercer, and a large proportion of them will 
engage in more complex and diverse income-generating activities and experience a drastic deterioration 
in their livelihood. How will bangbang counter such challenges that threaten their survival and masculine 
pride? What new knowledge about urbanization, poverty, rurality, work, and individual freedom will be 
produced and circulated in the hukou reform? What politics of representation are adopted in creating new 
images of migrants when bangbang’s residential status shifts from rural to urban? Do new forms of 
inequalities and social stratification emerge when rural migrants become city residents? These questions 
are worth exploring through future ethnographic research.  
Another big change in terms of the labor conditions in China is the recent growth in the intensity and 
frequency of labor unrest among rural migrant workers. In the summer of 2010, Guangdong Province in 
southern China witnessed at least thirty six strikes in forty eight days (The Economist 2010). The most 
well-known ones included those at Honda Motor Co., electronics giant Foxconn and a parts supplier for 
Toyota Motor Corp. The labor unrest at Honda Motor Co. attracted hundreds of young rural migrants. 
The workers protested against low wages, long working hours, and used cell phone text messages and the 
Internet to organize the strike. They also demanded the right to abandon the current trade union controlled 
by the government and to form their own (the latter is illegal in contemporary China). Factory workers at 
Honda and Foxconn appear to have won wage increases. According to some sources, the labor shortage 
and the declining population of working-age Chinese have provided the lever for rural migrant workers to 
bargain with the employers and to take collective actions (Pierson 2010). However, given the enormously 
diverse economic practices and patterns of economic development in China, one wonders if it is possible 
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for Chinese migrant workers to form trans-local collective actions against exploitation and repression. 
While factory workers are relatively easy to organize for collective action, casual workers in the informal 
sector who work on a temporary basis and are frequently hired and fired are much harder to mobilize.  
As my dissertation found, the accessibility to land and the possession of a piece of land have become 
the last resort for rural migrants. If they fail to keep a job or if they do not do well in the cities, they can 
return to the countryside and live off the land. Since the current hukou reform in China will take away the 
last social security (land) from the peasants, I hypothesize that this change will intensify the conflicts 
between capital and labor and may push landless laborers into collective resistance against the state if the 
rural laborers fail to do well in the cities. In the case of bangbang, although their job is contingent and 
casual, they do have their own forms of labor organizing, which might serve as the foundation for more 
intensive and more formal collective actions against repression and exploitation. But what still remains a 
question is what new forms of sociality and new common ground will emerge among bangbang with the 
growth of fragmentation of employment in Chongqing and in other places in China. 
The development and modernization of China are just one ongoing process of global economic 
development. In this dissertation concerning a group of Chinese rural migrant men, I have turned a highly 
critical eye to the assumptions that underlie the development project in China. My research has revealed 
that economic development cannot be understood merely as an economic process and cannot be fully 
explained using economic terms. Labor markets, production processes, and development logics are 
socially and culturally constructed and are deeply embedded in local institutions and practices. My 
dissertation has documented such processes in the transportation industry in Chongqing through 
bangbang’s participation in China’s economic development and modernization. It has explored the 
connections among rural to urban migration, casual and informal employment, and masculinity. 
This dissertation has significant implications for the anthropological studies of development, labor, 
migration, and masculinity. By focusing on casual workers in China, I have questioned the strongly-held 
notion that departure from rural regions is, for the rural poor, a significant step towards a better life and 
economic advancement. My research has shown that the economic restructuring of China since the reform 
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in late 1970s has not merely resulted in a mass exodus from the agricultural sector to the manufacturing 
industry, but has also produced a huge nomadic workforce whose members remain outside the formal 
economy. Recruited on a temporary and casual basis, they are at the lowest rung of the employment 
hierarchy and are experiencing severe exploitation and marginalization. Socially deprived contingents, 
such as bangbang, consist of a large itinerant workforce that, due to a lack of public and academic 
representation, has been invisible to most researchers. The fragmentation and invisibility of this 
workforce is a consequence of neo-liberal form of governance that governs with the rhetoric of 
“freedom.” 
While western scholarship on gender and development has focused on female migrant workers’ 
experiences, it has become increasingly clear that a “woman-only” approach is insufficient for 
understanding the complex gender hierarchies and patriarchal structures embedded in development 
projects. My research contributes to the growing literature on masculinity and labor migration by 
documenting the intimate connections between migration, labor politics, and migrant men’s 
understanding of what it means “to be a man.” It documents changes in gender roles and in how people 
understand gender in post-reform China. My research argues that labor exploitation and social 
marginalization are highly gendered. While rural men can be recruited to do dangerous and physically 
demanding work because of their “manly features” (endurance of hardship, capacity for demanding 
physical work, revolutionary spirit of “eating bitterness,” and so on), they can also be subject to the high 
standards set by urban citizens. As a result, they can be denied the privilege of “being a man” because of 
their poverty, the informality of their job, and their low social status. When rural men such as bangbang 
try to defend their masculine pride by using the gender norms around them, they often reinforce the 
gender norms that devalue men and women in vulnerable class positions. My research thus contributes to 
gender studies in general and to masculinity studies in particular by improving our understanding of 
Chinese working-class masculinity in post-Mao China. 
My research also contributes to global studies, especially with respect to how globalization is made 
possible through the exploitation of labor in developing countries. There have been wonderful scholarly 
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analyses of how globalization accelerates the growth of contingent labor in off-shore factories, domestic 
work, and high technological businesses, among others. Yet very little ethnographic research has been 
done on the changing nature of work in the transportation industry, despite this sector’s significant role in 
the circulation of goods and materials in local, national, and global economies. My dissertation has aimed 
to bridge this gap in the literature by providing an ethnographic account of the relations between the 
informalization of work in the transportation industry and the livelihood of individual day laborers 
(porters).  
A comparative perspective that compares the development process in China and other developing 
countries in Asia can shed new light on my research. In an anthology of recent scholarly essays, Jan 
Breman (2010) offers a valuable comparison between rural-urban labor migration in Xiamen city in 
southern China and the labor circulation in India. He finds that in China, casual work is the exception 
rather than the rule; China’s reform “has succeeded in industrializing at a rapid speed but without the 
emergence of large slums or informal settlements” (2010: 244). In Xiamen, he found a “striking absence 
of vagrants” (2010: 254) and came across only few people who depended on casual work for a living. 
Though Breman’s observations are valid, one must consider two things: first, due to enormous differences 
in regional development in China, the degree of informality in urban economies varies greatly; second, it 
remains to be seen how successful the Chinese government will be in their efforts to bloc the creation of 
urban slums after the recent hukou reform and the changes of land policy. My research reveals that the 
informalization of the workforce has been intimately tied to China’s economic reform and recent rural-
urban migration. Further research will disclose the magnitude and internal dynamics of China’s informal 
economy. A comparative perspective that compares China’s expansion of the informal economy with that 
of India and Latin America will be especially useful. This is one of the directions of my future research.  
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